City of Poquoson Law Enforcement v. Lou H Hooks ( 2002 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Bumgardner and Humphreys
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
CITY OF POQUOSON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND
VIRGINIA MUNICIPAL GROUP
SELF-INSURANCE ASSOCIATION
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1517-02-2 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
DECEMBER 10, 2002
LOU H. HOOKS
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
Ralph L. Whitt, Jr. (Michael P. Del Bueno;
Whitt & Associates, on briefs), for
appellants.
Stephen F. Forbes (Mark C. Grohlher;
Forbes & Broadwell, on brief), for appellee.
City of Poquoson Law Enforcement and Virginia Municipal
Group Self-Insurance Association (employer) contend the Workers'
Compensation Commission (commission) erred in awarding medical
and temporary total benefits to Lou H. Hooks (claimant). The
issues on appeal are whether credible evidence supports the
commission's finding that claimant's May 18, 2000 injury arose
out of his employment and whether claimant's June 14, 2000
accident was a compensable consequence of the May 18, 2000
injury. For the following reasons, we affirm the commission.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
I. BACKGROUND
On May 18, 2000, claimant, a sergeant for the Poquoson
Police Department, tripped while walking from his interior
office to the squad room. He was discussing a radar assignment
with another officer, and was carrying approximately eight
legal-sized folders each containing a one and one-half inch
thick notebook. He tripped over a sliding glass door track
between his office and the squad room and injured his left
ankle. No evidence proved the sliding glass door or track to be
defective. The door track measured approximately one and
one-half inches high. The floor on either side of the track was
flat, smooth tile. When claimant was asked why he tripped on
the door track, he said:
I think it was because I had all that
material in my hands. It was normal, but a
little bit more than normal because it was -
I had to carry it like that in front of me,
and I was talking to Officer Kimbrell
explaining to him why the chief wanted radar
ran [sic] on Browns Neck Road.
In 1971, claimant sustained serious injuries to both of his
legs and had ongoing, continuing problems with his legs. After
the May 18, 2000 accident, he was initially diagnosed with a
sprained ankle. Eventually, when his condition did not improve,
further tests showed a hairline fracture in his ankle.
On June 14, 2000, claimant, who was still using crutches as
a result of the May 18 accident, was at home, standing at his
bathroom sink when he felt a sudden pain in his left foot. He
- 2 -
lifted his left leg up to ease the pain, fell and injured his
right leg. The emergency room physician diagnosed a hairline
fracture to his right leg. Claimant described that accident:
I had my crutches with me and after I
finished using the bathroom, I was standing
- I turned - I laid my crutches up against
the wall when I was stable, when I stopped
moving, and I washed my hands and I started
to stand up and all of a sudden I felt a
real sharp pain in my left leg and the next
thing I know, I was on the floor.
The deputy commissioner found that:
In the absence of more credible testimony,
it is found that Hooks's credible testimony
establishes that he was injured in the
manner he described in his hearing
testimony.
This incident is found [to be] an
identifiable incident or sudden,
precipitating event, that occurred as a
result of a condition of Hooks's work place.
Furthermore, although Hooks clearly suffered
from left leg problems before May 18, 2000,
Dr. Stiles's June 6, 2000 office note
indicating that he had suffered a new
fracture at the site of his old injury
establishes that his industrial accident
aggravated a pre-existing condition.
Hooks's right leg injury is found a
compensable consequence of his May 18, 2000
industrial accident. . . .
It is again found that Hooks credibly
testified about the mechanism of his June
14, 2000 injury . . . .
(Internal citations omitted.)
The commission, on review, held the instant case to be
analogous to the situation outlined in Turner v. Southern
- 3 -
Virginia Mental Health Institute, VWC File No. 175-08-63 (April
30, 1996), and awarded benefits.
We found that tripping over [a raised
doorsill or the adjacent door mat] was a
risk of employment, and awarded benefits.
We stated, "The risk of tripping over the
doorsill . . . is a risk of employment, and
any resulting injury is compensable."
Similarly, in this case, the claimant
credibly testified that he sustained an
injury when he tripped over the door track
between his office and the hallway. As in
Turner, the risk of tripping over the door
track was a risk of the employment, and the
claimant's injury therefore arose out of his
employment.
* * * * * * *
The claimant credibly testified that on
June 14, 2000, he experienced a sharp pain
in his left foot, which he had injured in
the May 18, 2000 incident, while standing at
a sink washing his hands at home. He lifted
the foot, resting his weight momentarily on
his right foot, and fell to the floor. The
claimant's physicians all opined that the
claimant's May 18, 2000 injury led to his
right leg injury on June 14, 2000.
Employer appealed that decision.
II. ANALYSIS
Employer contends that no credible evidence supports the
commission's finding that claimant's May 18, 2000 injury arose
out of his employment or that claimant's June 14, 2000 injury
was a compensable consequence of the May 18, 2000 injury. We
disagree.
"On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most
favorable to the claimant, who prevailed before the commission."
- 4 -
Allen & Rocks, Inc. v. Briggs, 28 Va. App. 662, 672, 508 S.E.2d
335, 340 (1998) (citations omitted). "'Decisions of the
commission as to questions of fact, if supported by credible
evidence, are conclusive and binding on this Court.'" WLR Foods
v. Cardosa, 26 Va. App. 220, 230, 494 S.E.2d 147, 152 (1997)
(quoting Manassas Ice & Fuel Co. v. Farrar, 13 Va. App. 227,
229, 409 S.E.2d 824, 826 (1991)). "Where reasonable inferences
may be drawn from the evidence in support of the commission's
factual findings, they will not be disturbed by this Court on
appeal." Hawks v. Henrico County School Board, 7 Va. App. 398,
404, 374 S.E.2d 695, 698 (1988). "The commission, like any
other fact finder, may consider both direct and circumstantial
evidence in its disposition of a claim. Thus, the commission
may properly consider all factual evidence, from whatever
source, whether or not a condition of the workplace caused the
injury." VFP, Inc. v. Shepherd, ___ Va. App. ____, ____ S.E.2d
____ (2002). However, "[t]he commission's decision that an
accident arises out of the employment involves a mixed question
of law and fact and is thus reviewable on appeal." Southside
Virginia Training Center/Commonwealth of Virginia v. Shell, 20
Va. App. 199, 202, 455 S.E.2d 761, 763 (1995) (citation
omitted).
Employer contends that the door track was not a hazard of
the workplace and, therefore, claimant's injury did not arise
out of his employment. We disagree.
- 5 -
An accident arises out of the
employment if there is a causal connection
between the claimant's injury and the
conditions under which the employer requires
the work to be performed. . . . Under this
test, if the injury can be seen to have
followed as a natural incident of the work
and to have been contemplated by a
reasonable person familiar with the whole
situation as a result of the exposure
occasioned by the nature of the employment,
then it arises "out of" the employment. But
it excludes an injury which cannot fairly be
traced to the employment as a contributing
proximate cause and which comes from a
hazard to which the workmen would have been
equally exposed apart from the employment.
The causative danger must be peculiar to the
work and not common to the neighborhood. It
must be incidental to the character of the
business and not independent of master and
servant. It need not have been foreseen or
expected, but after the event it must appear
to have had its origin in a risk connected
with the employment, and to have flowed from
that source as a rational consequence.
The mere fact that the hazard is one to
which the general public likewise is exposed
is not, however, conclusive against the
existence of such causal relationship.
R.T. Investments v. Johns, 228 Va. 249, 252-53, 321 S.E.2d 287,
289 (1984) (internal citations and quotes omitted).
Employer cites cases relating to falls on stairways in
support of its contention that the raised, sliding glass door
track was not a risk of employment. We have held that in order
for a fall on stairs to be compensable, there must either be a
defect in the stairs or claimant must have fallen as a result of
a condition of the employment. Shell, 20 Va. App. at 203, 455
S.E.2d at 763. Both parties agree that the sliding glass door
- 6 -
track was not defective, thus our analysis is limited to whether
the facts, properly viewed, show that the door sill was a hazard
of the employment. The commission viewed the photographs of the
sliding glass door track and found the one and one-half inch
high sliding glass door track located wholly within the interior
of a building on a flat, smooth floor was a risk of employment.
We agree. It was not a standard, domed, smooth, one-piece
doorsill commonly found in offices. The sliding glass door
track was two strips of metal with space in between for the
glass door itself, one and one-half inches straight up from the
floor. Prior to May 18, 2000, claimant had sustained multiple
serious injuries to his legs and, at times, walked with a
noticeable limp. He was talking to another officer and carrying
8 to 10 inches of envelopes and notebooks in front of his chest
when he tripped over the sliding glass door track. These facts
create the requisite nexus between claimant's injury and his
employment.
Claimant's June 14, 2000 injury is clearly a compensable
consequence of the May 18, 2000 injury. The deputy commissioner
found claimant's testimony credible when he stated pain in his
injured left leg caused him to fall and injure his right leg.
"'The issue in cases involving the range of compensable
consequences flowing from the primary injury is essentially one
of whether the medical evidence proves a causal connection
between the primary injury and the subsequent occurrence.'"
- 7 -
Allen & Rocks, 28 Va. App. at 672, 508 S.E.2d at 340 (quoting
Williams Indus., Inc. v. Wagoner, 24 Va. App. 181, 188, 480
S.E.2d 788, 791 (1997) (citing Leonard v. Arnold, 218 Va. 210,
214, 237 S.E.2d 97, 100 (1977); Bartholow Drywall Co. v. Hill,
12 Va. App. 790, 794, 407 S.E.2d 1, 3 (1991))). The record
shows that all claimant's physicians attributed claimant's June
14, 2000 fall to his injury of May 18, 2000, and claimant
testified credibly that the pain from his May 18 injury caused
him to shift his weight to his right leg causing him to fall.
Credible evidence supports the commission's finding that
claimant's May 18, 2000 injury was caused by a risk or hazard of
the workplace and his June 14, 2000 injury was a compensable
consequence of his May 18, 2000 injury.
For the foregoing reasons, the decision of the commission
is affirmed.
Affirmed.
- 8 -