W & L Construct., etc. v. Herchel Sullivan ( 1997 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Moon, Judges Coleman and Willis
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    W & L CONSTRUCTION & PAVING, INC.
    and PENNSYLVANIA MANUFACTURERS'
    ASSOCIATION INSURANCE COMPANY           MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    v.       Record No. 2764-96-3                 MAY 27, 1997
    HERCHEL FRANK SULLIVAN, JR.
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    James G. Muncie, Jr. (Kathryn Spruill Lingle;
    Midkiff & Hiner, P.C., on brief), for
    appellants.
    Gerald F. Sharp (Browning, Lamie & Sharp,
    P.C., on brief), for appellee.
    W & L Construction & Paving, Inc. and its insurer appeal the
    decision of the Workers' Compensation Commission granting Herchel
    Frank Sullivan (claimant) temporary total disability benefits.
    The commission held that the claimant was a statutory employee of
    W & L Construction and that the claimant was temporarily totally
    disabled for psychiatric reasons.   Finding no error, we affirm
    the commission's decision.
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the claimant as the
    prevailing party, the evidence established that the claimant was
    employed by MMS Trucking at the time of his injury.    MMS Trucking
    is a trucking company owned and operated by Myra Sullivan, the
    claimant's sister-in-law.    MMS Trucking owned one dump truck,
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    which was driven by the claimant and had one employee, the
    claimant.    Myra Sullivan negotiated and entered into a contract
    with W & L Construction, a general contractor, to haul asphalt
    and gravel to various construction job sites.
    STATUTORY EMPLOYEE
    In order to recover, the claimant had the burden of proving
    that he was an employee of MMS Trucking, which was a
    subcontractor of W & L Construction.      See Craddock Moving &
    Storage Co. v. Settles, 
    16 Va. App. 1
    , 3, 
    427 S.E.2d 428
    , 430
    (1993), aff'd, 
    247 Va. 165
    , 
    440 S.E.2d 613
     (1994); Code
    § 65.2-302.   "'What constitutes an employee is a question of
    law'; however, whether a specific person falls within that
    definition 'is usually a question of fact.'"      Metropolitan
    Cleaning Corp. v. Crawley, 
    14 Va. App. 261
    , 264, 
    416 S.E.2d 35
    ,
    37 (1992) (en banc) (citation omitted).
    In determining whether an individual is an employee, we
    consider four elements:    1) selection and engagement of the
    servant; 2) payment of wages; 3) power of dismissal; and 4) power
    of control of the servant's action.      Hamilton Trucking/Hamilton
    Terminal Corp. v. Springer, 
    10 Va. App. 710
    , 715, 
    396 S.E.2d 379
    ,
    381 (1990) (citation omitted).    "[T]he first, second and third of
    these elements are not essential to the relationship. . . .       The
    'power of control' is the most significant element bearing on the
    question."    Id.; see also Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Gill, 
    224 Va. 92
    , 98, 
    294 S.E.2d 840
    , 843 (1982); Behrensen v. Whitaker, 10
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    Va. App. 364, 366-67, 
    392 S.E.2d 508
    , 509-10 (1990).
    The right of control inherent in an employer
    and employee relationship is the power to
    control the means and methods by which the
    result sought is to be accomplished. An
    employer retains power to direct "the means
    and methods" by which an employee performs
    his or her work. Furthermore, "it is not the
    actual exercise of control, but the right to
    control," that is determinative.
    James v. Wood Prods. of Virginia, 
    15 Va. App. 754
    , 757, 
    427 S.E.2d 224
    , 225 (1993) (citations omitted).
    In this case, the evidence proves that Myra Sullivan had the
    right to control the means and methods by which the claimant
    performed his work.   She delegated the authority and
    responsibility for conducting the claimant's day to day duties to
    W & L Construction under the contract.    The nature of the hauling
    contract with W & L Construction made it unnecessary for Ms.
    Sullivan to directly control the claimant on a daily basis.    Ms.
    Sullivan negotiated the contracts for hauling, with the exception
    of the occasional weekend hauling for individuals who contacted
    the claimant directly.   She received all payments for hauling,
    both from W & L Construction and from private individuals.     The
    claimant did not pay for use of the truck, rather, he was paid to
    operate it.   The fact that he was paid a percentage of the gross
    receipts is of no consequence.     See Hill City Trucking, Inc. v.
    Christian, 
    5 Va. App. 106
    , 111, 
    360 S.E.2d 867
    , 869 (1987), rev'd
    on other grounds, 
    238 Va. 735
    , 
    385 S.E.2d 377
     (1989).    Ms.
    Sullivan withheld all state and federal taxes from the claimant's
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    paycheck and paid his Social Security taxes.     She was solely
    responsible for all maintenance, insurance, and operating
    expenses relating to the dump truck.     She retained the power to
    control the claimant and how he performed his work and as such he
    was an employee of MMS Trucking.
    Because MMS Trucking did not have three or more regular
    employees at the time of claimant's injury, it is not subject to
    the Workers' Compensation Act.    Code § 65.2-101(2)(h).   However,
    since MMS was engaged in the same trade, business, or occupation
    as W & L Construction, the claimant was a statutory employee of
    that corporation.   Code § 65.2-302.     Thus, the commission did not
    err in finding that the claimant was a statutory employee of
    W & L Construction.
    TOTAL DISABILITY
    Upon appellate review, the commission's findings of fact
    will be upheld when supported by credible evidence in the record.
    Stancill v. Ford Motor Co., 
    15 Va. App. 154
    , 158, 
    421 S.E.2d 872
    , 874 (1992).    Here, the commission found that the claimant
    was totally disabled as of February 27, 1996 as a result of
    post-traumatic stress disorder and anxiety depressive syndrome.
    Dr. McKnight, a psychiatrist who was treating the claimant, and
    Dr. Kanwal, an internist, both opined that, while the claimant
    had recovered from his physical injury and was physically able to
    work, he was totally disabled by the post-traumatic stress
    disorder and anxiety depressive disorder caused by the accident.
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    This uncontradicted evidence constitutes sufficient credible
    evidence for the commission to have found that the claimant was
    temporarily totally disabled as a result of the accident.
    Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the commission.
    Affirmed.
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