Jennifer Lynn Wilks v. Fairfax County Department of Family Services ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Petty, AtLee and Senior Judge Clements
UNPUBLISHED
JENNIFER LYNN WILKS
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 1758-14-4 PER CURIAM
JUNE 16, 2015
FAIRFAX COUNTY
DEPARTMENT OF FAMILY SERVICES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
David S. Schell, Judge
(Leslie A. Shopf, on brief), for appellant.
(David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Peter D. Andreoli, Jr., Deputy
County Attorney; May Shallah Kheder, Assistant County Attorney;
Matthew J. Yao, Guardian ad Litem for the infant child; Yao Law
Firm, P.C., on brief), for appellee.
Jennifer Lynn Wilks (hereinafter “mother”) appeals the termination of her residual
parental rights to her child, J.W. Mother asserts the trial court erred by ruling that the Fairfax
County Department of Family Services (hereinafter “DFM”) made reasonable and appropriate
efforts to assist her in reuniting with her child. Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the
parties, we conclude this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision
of the trial court. See Rule 5A:27.
The trial court terminated mother’s parental rights pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C) and
16.1-283(E)(i). Subsection (E)(i) provides as follows:
The residual parental rights of a parent or parents of a child who is
in the custody of a local board or licensed child-placing agency
may be terminated by the court if the court finds, based upon clear
and convincing evidence, that it is in the best interests of the child
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
and that (i) the residual parental rights of the parent regarding a
sibling of the child have previously been involuntarily
terminated . . . .
Mother attacks the sufficiency of the evidence solely with regard to whether she was
provided adequate services.1 Subsection (E) does not impose a duty upon DFS to provide
services to a parent.
Because mother does not challenge the trial court’s decision to terminate her residual
parental rights under subsection (E), the issue of whether termination was warranted pursuant to
subsection (C) is rendered moot. Accordingly, we do not reach that issue as mother does not
contest there are adequate grounds for termination of her parental rights under Code
§ 16.1-283(C). See Fields v. Dinwiddie Cnty. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 46 Va. App. 1, 8, 614 S.E.2d
656, 659 (2005) (termination of parental rights upheld under one subsection of Code § 16.1-283
forecloses need to consider termination under alternative subsections).
The trial court’s decision is summarily affirmed. See Rule 5A:27.
Affirmed.
1
The only subsection of Code § 16.1-283 cited in mother’s opening brief is subsection
(B).
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