Brian Scott Timmons v. Airborne Freight, etc ( 1995 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    BRIAN SCOTT TIMMONS
    v.          Record No. 1761-94-4          MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
    AIRBORNE FREIGHT CORPORATION                 MAY 16, 1995
    AND
    AMERICAN MANUFACTURERS MUTUAL
    INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Kathleen G. Walsh (Ashcraft & Gerel, on brief),
    for appellant.
    Michael L. Zimmerman (Brault, Palmer, Grove,
    Zimmerman, White & Mims, on brief), for appellees.
    In this appeal from a decision of the Workers' Compensation
    Commission (commission), Brian Scott Timmons (claimant) contends
    that the commission erred when it found that claimant did not
    prove his injury arose out of his employment with Airborne
    Freight Corporation (employer).    Finding no error, we affirm the
    commission's decision.
    On appellate review, we construe the evidence in the light
    most favorable to the party prevailing below.       R.G. Moore Bldg.
    Corp. v. Mullins, 
    10 Va. App. 211
    , 212, 
    390 S.E.2d 788
    , 788
    (1990).    Claimant had been a customer service agent for employer
    for six years immediately prior to July 21, 1993.      His work
    required him to receive telephone calls regarding employer's
    ____________________
    *Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    freight services.    In the performance of that work, claimant sat
    in a wheeled, swivel chair answering telephone calls through a
    headset and use of a computer.     He was evaluated on how quickly
    he answered the calls.   He worked at a desk and was required to
    swivel one to one and one-half feet to access the computer when
    responding to a call; however, he could reach the computer
    without turning.    At the time of his injury, claimant had locked
    his foot behind a roller on the base of his chair, preventing the
    chair from moving.    While responding to an incoming call on July
    21, 1993, claimant was required to access the computer.    When he
    moved to receive the call, his locked foot prevented the swivel
    chair from moving.    His lower body remained stationery while his
    upper body twisted.   Claimant testified that as he twisted, he
    felt something pop in his back.     His claim for compensation
    benefits was based upon the injury resulting from that incident.
    To recover under the Workers' Compensation Act, claimant
    must prove, by a preponderance of the evidence, that he suffered
    an "injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the
    employment."   Code § 65.2-101.    "The phrase arising 'in the
    course of' refers to the time, place, and circumstances under
    which the accident occurred.   The phrase arising 'out of' refers
    to the origin or cause of the injury."     County of Chesterfield v.
    Johnson, 
    237 Va. 180
    , 183, 
    376 S.E.2d 73
    , 74 (1989).
    The question of whether an injury "arose out of" the
    employment is a mixed question of law and fact.     Park Oil Co. v.
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    Parham, 
    1 Va. App. 166
    , 168, 
    336 S.E.2d 531
    , 532 (1985).     We
    must, therefore, determine whether the facts presented are
    sufficient as a matter of law to justify the commission's
    finding.   Hercules, Inc. v. Stump, 
    2 Va. App. 77
    , 78, 
    341 S.E.2d 394
    , 395 (1986).
    In its opinion, the commission said:
    The claimant has the burden of proving an
    injury by accident on July 21, 1993 arising
    out of and in the course of his employment.
    The dispositive question is whether the
    claimant's injury resulted from a risk of his
    employment. We find that it did not. The
    evidence shows that [claimant] did nothing
    more than turn in his chair to answer the
    telephone and access his computer. No
    significant exertion was required, and there
    was nothing awkward or strenuous in his
    movements. The mere act of turning in one's
    chair is insufficient to bring the injury
    within the coverage of the Act.
    We hold that the evidence supports that conclusion.
    Claimant relies upon First Fed. Sav. and Loan v. Gryder, 
    9 Va. App. 60
    , 
    383 S.E.2d 755
     (1989).    The cases are
    distinguishable by their facts.    In Gryder, the Court
    specifically noted that if Gryder had been only working at her
    desk and felt a sharp pain when she "twisted," she would not have
    been permitted to recover.   On those facts, Gryder supports the
    commission's decision.
    In the case before us, claimant's injury was caused solely
    by his twisting.   The conditions of the work place had nothing to
    do with the injury he sustained.    See Plumb Rite Plumbing Service
    v. Barbour, 
    8 Va. App. 482
    , 
    382 S.E.2d 305
     (1989).
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    Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the commission's
    decision is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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