Commonwealth of Virginia v. Curtis Eugene Johnson ( 1999 )


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  •                         COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Senior Judge Baker
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1375-98-2                   JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
    AUGUST 10, 1999
    CURTIS EUGENE JOHNSON
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    George F. Tidey, Judge
    Jeffrey A. Spencer, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellant.
    No brief or argument for appellee.
    In this appeal by the Commonwealth of Virginia
    (Commonwealth), the sole issue is whether the Circuit Court of
    Henrico County (trial court) erred when, on the petition of Curtis
    Eugene Johnson (Johnson), it restored Johnson's license to drive,
    which had been revoked after he was declared an habitual offender.
    The Commonwealth contends that because all of Johnson's
    convictions for driving on a suspended license were not due to
    suspensions listed in Code § 46.2-361(C), the trial court was not
    authorized to restore his license to drive.    We agree and reverse
    the trial court's judgment.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    The Department of Motor Vehicles (DMV) issued an order of
    revocation on May 15, 1996, declaring Johnson an habitual
    offender.    The order cited, as the basis for the adjudication,
    five convictions for driving under revocation or suspension,
    including:   (1) June 12, 1994 (convicted October 28, 1994); (2)
    December 19, 1993 (convicted October 28, 1994); (3) July 30, 1992
    (convicted September 21, 1993); and (4) July 3, 1993 (convicted
    September 21, 1993). 1   Johnson's DMV driver history record
    reflected six active license suspensions as of October 28, 1994:
    (1) October 20, 1989, "for opr permit opr unins mv"; (2) February
    14, 1990, "ct order fail to pay fine"; (3) February 13, 1992, "ct
    order fail to pay fine"; (4) April 1, 1993, "for not found on
    warrant"; and (5) and (6) September 21, 1993, "for court order."
    In order to be eligible for license restoration under Code
    § 46.2-361(B), the convictions leading to a person being declared
    an habitual offender must have been based "entirely" on
    convictions set out in Code § 46.2-351(1)(c).    Additionally, the
    convictions must have been based upon suspensions for failure to
    pay fines, failure to furnish proof of financial responsibility,
    or failure to satisfy a judgment.    See Code § 46.2-361(C).
    "[W]here a conviction for driving on a revoked or suspended
    license is based on an offense committed when the driver is under
    1
    The fifth conviction, a July 27, 1990 conviction in the
    Richmond General District Court, was re-opened and dismissed on
    March 21, 1997, because Johnson was "not the person charged."
    This conviction no longer appears on Johnson's DMV record.
    - 2 -
    more than one suspension or revocation, [the conviction] is
    rendered under all such suspensions and revocations."
    Commonwealth v. Brown, 
    28 Va. App. 781
    , 787-88, 
    508 S.E.2d 916
    ,
    920 (1999).   See Commonwealth v. Lynn, 
    29 Va. App. 151
    , 156, 
    510 S.E.2d 270
    , 273 (1999).
    One of the suspensions in effect when Johnson was convicted
    of driving on a suspended license was for operating or permitting
    the operation of an uninsured motor vehicle without paying the
    uninsured motorist fee.   This is not a type of suspension included
    under Code § 46.2-361(C).   See Brown, 
    28 Va. App. at 786-87
    , 506
    S.E.2d at 191.   Johnson was not, therefore, eligible for license
    restoration under Code § 46.2-361(B).
    Accordingly, for the reasons stated, the order of restoration
    is reversed and the petition for restoration is dismissed.
    Reversed and dismissed.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1375982

Filed Date: 8/10/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014