Leonides Dorestal, Jr., s/k/a Leonidas Dorestal, Jr. v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2019 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges O’Brien, Malveaux and Senior Judge Clements
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
UNPUBLISHED
LEONIDES DORESTAL, JR., S/K/A
LEONIDAS DORESTAL, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1373-18-2 JUDGE JEAN HARRISON CLEMENTS
NOVEMBER 5, 2019
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG
Sarah L. Deneke, Judge
Julia B. Dillon (Law Office of Julia B. Dillon, PLLC, on brief), for
appellant.
Rosemary V. Bourne, Senior Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
In a jury trial, Leonides Dorestal (appellant) was convicted for child cruelty committed in
September, 2016.1 On appeal, appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his
conviction. Appellant claims that the Commonwealth did not prove that, during the period of the
indictment, he inflicted any of the injuries later found on the body of the four-year-old victim,
W.A. Finding that the evidence was sufficient to support appellant’s conviction, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
The jury also convicted appellant for child cruelty and felonious abuse or neglect of
W.A. in October, 2016. This Court denied appellant’s petition for appeal challenging those
convictions.
BACKGROUND
“In general, when reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence to support a
conviction, an appellate court considers the evidence in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, the prevailing party below, and reverses the judgment of the trial court only
when its decision is plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.” Marshall v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 648, 652-53 (2019). “If there is evidentiary support for the
conviction, ‘the reviewing court is not permitted to substitute its own judgment, even if its
opinion might differ from the conclusions reached by the finder of fact at the trial.’” Chavez v.
Commonwealth, 69 Va. App. 149, 161 (2018) (quoting Banks v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App.
273, 288 (2017)). “In accordance with familiar principles of appellate review, the facts will be
stated in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the prevailing party at trial.” Gerald v.
Commonwealth, 295 Va. 469, 472 (2018) (quoting Scott v. Commonwealth, 292 Va. 380, 381
(2016)).
In the early fall of 2016, appellant and his girlfriend, Sehar Asim, lived in a small
Fredericksburg apartment with Antwaun Carey, W.A., A.A., and appellant and Asim’s infant
son. W.A. and A.A. were Asim’s children. Appellant took an active role in the caretaking
responsibilities for all three children.
On October 6, 2016, W.A. was taken to the emergency room at Mary Washington
Hospital. Sarah Alley, a forensic nurse at the hospital, examined W.A. and photographed
numerous injuries on the child’s body. The photographs of W.A.’s injuries were introduced at
trial. Near his eyes and forehead, W.A. had petechiae, or hemorrhages under the skin caused by
burst blood vessels at the surface of the skin. As Alley testified, petechiae may be caused by
many things, including persistent coughing, blunt force trauma, and strangulation, and can take
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several days to heal. The appearance of W.A.’s facial petechiae was consistent with those
caused by blunt force trauma because they were grouped in clusters.
In addition to the petechiae on W.A.’s face, the child had redness and swelling across the
bridge of his nose, abrasions on one arm, a resolving bruise or mild redness on the outer left
elbow, red and light purple discoloration on the back of one ear, a small abrasion on the other
ear, reddened linear discoloration on his chin, multiple and distinct patterned bruising areas on
his outer and inner legs, linear and round discolored areas on his upper left thigh, petechiae on
his buttocks, resolving petechiae on his mid-back, linear patterned redness and bruising on his
left flank, bruising on his right flank, hemorrhaging in his left eye, crescent-shaped abrasions on
his arms, and faint petechiae below his neck. The patterned area of bruising on the left outer
thigh had a square or rectangular appearance, and there were “wide strips of bruising” on the legs
and other areas. Alley was unable to say when W.A. had sustained the bruises.
On the same day W.A. visited the emergency room, Detective Carlos Reyes of the
Fredericksburg police interviewed appellant for several hours. Appellant initially spoke about
his relationship with Asim and the children. However, over the course of nearly an hour, Reyes
said that the relationship appellant described was not the same as the account W.A. had provided
to authorities. When Reyes asked what had happened that day, appellant said that W.A. had
been urinating in inappropriate places; appellant held W.A. down by the legs while Asim
spanked him twice on the buttocks. At the time, W.A. was wearing pants. Appellant said he did
not know the cause of the petechiae on W.A.’s face.
Appellant claimed that the marks on W.A.’s legs were caused by a playground accident,
but then said he had seen only one red mark on the victim’s legs after the accident. However,
when Reyes questioned appellant further about the sources of the petechiae and the marks on
W.A.’s face and legs, appellant admitted that he had spanked the victim four times with a belt on
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the previous Sunday, or about ten days before. Appellant said he had “whooped” W.A. because
he had lied about urinating on the floor. Appellant said he did not see any marks on W.A.
immediately afterward.
Reyes asked appellant if he realized that he had caused marks found on W.A., and
appellant agreed that he did. Appellant told Reyes that the marks on W.A.’s legs were probably
caused by appellant spanking the child two weeks earlier. Reyes asked appellant whether he
now realized that his conduct had reached the point of child abuse, and appellant responded that
he did.
During further discussion, appellant admitted that he became upset and frustrated with
W.A. that day after the child had urinated on the floor again. Ultimately, appellant admitted that
he had lost his temper and that he had thrown the child on the couch a few times, thinking the
child would not be hurt. Appellant said W.A. fell to the floor from the couch the third time
appellant threw him. Reyes had appellant use a doll to demonstrate how he had thrown W.A. to
the couch.
When Reyes left appellant alone in the interview room, appellant said to himself, “I don’t
like lying. I get scared, panicked.” Later, appellant said, “Damn, I’m going to jail. I need a
lawyer.”
At trial, a portion of appellant’s testimony to a special grand jury in 2017 was read into
evidence. In that testimony, appellant stated that, about one to two weeks before October 6,
2016, he used “a kid’s belt” to spank W.A. four times. Appellant said he punished W.A. because
he had either urinated on the floor or poked A.A. with a stick. He said that the “beginning of
September was the last time we did the corporal punishment on him.” Appellant admitted that
he was spanking W.A. “very often.” Appellant was twenty-three years old and six feet and six
inches tall. He stated that Carey had never disciplined the children in the household.
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Dr. Robin Foster, the director of the child protective team at Virginia Commonwealth
University Health, testified as an expert in forensic pediatrics and child abuse. Dr. Foster
examined the photographs taken during Alley’s forensic examination of W.A. Foster stated that
it was not uncommon for children of W.A.’s age to have bruises, but that bruises usually are
“over bony areas instead of soft tissue areas.” She opined that it was “uncommon” to find
bruises where W.A.’s bruises were located – the thighs, calves, upper arms, trunk, and the soft
part of the back. Foster said that while an average three-year-old child may have as many as
twelve bruises, W.A. had “somewhere over three dozen” bruises. W.A.’s bruises “would not be
expected to have occurred in even several short falls in terms of total number of bruises.”
Dr. Foster stated that bruises can take days to weeks to heal. Foster opined that “because of the
number of injuries and because of the distinct morphology of a good number of those bruises it is
consistent . . . with physical abuse.”
Carey testified that on the morning of October 6, 2016, Asim got upset with W.A. after
he urinated on the floor. He and appellant helped hold W.A. down while Asim hit the child
seven times with a belt. Carey said that when W.A. refused to apologize, appellant lifted him up
and dropped him softly on the sofa five or six times.
ANALYSIS
“It is unlawful for any person . . . having the custody of any child willfully or negligently
to cause or permit the life of such child to be endangered or the health of such child to be
injured . . . .” Code § 40.1-103(A).2 “Code § 40.1-103(A) covers a wide swath of criminal
behavior (from mere endangerment to actual torture) and requires only a threshold mens rea
2
“This Court invalidated part of Code § 40.1-103(A) for vagueness, specifically, use of
the word ‘may’[in that portion of the statute]. However, that does not change the statute’s focus
on the protection of a child’s life, health, or moral well-being and does not affect our analysis or
ruling.” King v. Commonwealth, 56 Va. App. 133, 138 n.3 (2010) (citing Commonwealth v.
Carter, 21 Va. App. 150 (1995)).
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showing of ‘criminal negligence’ — a standard higher than mere ‘lack of ordinary care.’”
Barnes v. Commonwealth, 47 Va. App. 105, 111 (2005) (quoting Ellis v. Commonwealth, 29
Va. App. 548, 556-57 (1999)). Criminal negligence “involves a ‘reckless or indifferent disregard
of the rights of others, under circumstances reasonably calculated to produce injury, or which
make it not improbable that injury will be occasioned, and the offender knows, or is charged with
the knowledge of, the probable result of his acts.’” Id. (quoting Ellis, 29 Va. App. at 557). A
determination of criminal negligence is “specific to the circumstances of each case and, thus,
whether a defendant’s conduct is criminally negligent is usually a question for the trier of fact,
unless reasonable minds could not differ.” Carosi v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 545, 556 (2010).
Appellant maintains that the evidence did not exclude the reasonable hypothesis of
innocence that other adults in the home could have caused W.A.’s injuries. We must determine
“‘not whether there is some evidence to support’ the appellant’s hypothesis of innocence, but,
rather, ‘whether a reasonable [fact finder] upon consideration of all the evidence, could have
rejected [the appellant’s] theories in his defense and found him guilty of [the charged crime]
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Emerson v. Commonwealth, 43 Va. App. 263, 277 (2004)
(quoting Commonwealth v. Hudson, 265 Va. 505, 513 (2003)). “Whether an alternate
hypothesis of innocence is reasonable is a question of fact and, therefore, is binding on appeal
unless plainly wrong.” Id. (quoting Archer v. Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 1. 12-13 (1997)).
“Merely because defendant’s theory of the case differs from that taken by the Commonwealth
does not mean that every reasonable hypothesis consistent with his innocence has not been
excluded. What weight should be given evidence is a matter for the [factfinder] to decide.”
Haskins v. Commonwealth, 44 Va. App. 1, 9 (2004) (quoting Miles v. Commonwealth, 205 Va.
462, 467 (1964)).
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The jury heard evidence of the numerous injuries to W.A., and a variety of explanations,
from the prosecution and the defense, about the cause of the injuries. In finding appellant guilty,
the jury necessarily accepted the Commonwealth’s evidence, and rejected appellant’s evidence
regarding the cause of W.A.’s injuries. “Determining the credibility of witnesses . . . is within
the exclusive province of the jury, which has the unique opportunity to observe the demeanor of
the witnesses as they testify.” Dalton v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 512, 525 (2015) (quoting
Lea v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 300, 304 (1993)) (alteration in original); see also
Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 22 (2011) (fact finder is entitled to resolve any conflicts
in the evidence). “When ‘credibility issues have been resolved by the jury in favor of the
Commonwealth, those findings will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong.’” Towler
v. Commonwealth, 59 Va. App. 284, 291 (2011) (quoting Corvin v. Commonwealth, 13
Va. App. 296, 299 (1991)).
Appellant argues that there was no evidence that in September, 2016, he caused any of
the injuries later found on W.A.’s body. Acknowledging that he disciplined W.A. in September,
2016, he claims that he did not “admit to crossing a line from acceptable discipline to abuse.”
Notably, however, in his interview with Reyes, appellant said that he realized he had
caused marks on the victim that had just been discovered that day by the authorities.
Specifically, he said that he likely caused the marks on the victim’s legs when he spanked the
child about two weeks earlier. To Reyes and to the grand jury, appellant admitted using a “kid’s
belt” and hitting W.A. four times with it. He further admitted that his conduct exceeded the
boundary of acceptable discipline and was child abuse. Thus, appellant’s own admissions
proved that his conduct in September, 2016, constituted child cruelty under Code
§ 40.1-103.1(A).
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In Virginia, it is well-established that proof of the corpus delicti, that a crime actually
occurred, is essential to any criminal prosecution. See Allen v. Commonwealth, 287 Va. 68, 74
(2014). Under the corpus delicti rule, “an accused cannot be convicted solely on his
uncorroborated extrajudicial admission or confession.” Id. (quoting Watkins v. Commonwealth,
238 Va. 341, 348 (1989)). The Commonwealth must provide “slight corroboration of the
confession” to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the crime was committed. Id. (quoting
Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 305 (1999)). That corroboration may be provided by
circumstantial or direct evidence. See Watkins, 238 Va. at 349. The corroborative evidence is
sufficient if, “when taken along with the confession, it proves the commission of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.” Morning v. Commonwealth, 37 Va. App. 679, 685 (2002). In
determining the sufficiency of the corroboration of a defendant’s statement, inferences drawn
from proven facts “are within the province of the trier of fact so long as those inferences are
reasonable and justified.” Id. at 687.
Dr. Foster and Alley agreed that the variety of injuries suffered by W.A., including over
three dozen bruises, was not consistent with being caused by a fall on a playground or normal
play, but rather were consistent with multiple falls or blunt force trauma. Dr. Foster opined that
the number of W.A.’s injuries and the distinct pattern of many of the bruises, which could take
days or weeks to heal, were consistent with physical abuse.
In addition, the Commonwealth introduced photographs of the numerous injuries on
W.A.’s body that went undiscovered until October 6, 2016. As this Court has observed, “[a]
picture may speak a thousand words, and these do.” Campbell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App.
476, 483 (1991) (en banc). The photographs reveal linear bruises on W.A.’s legs—which
appellant admitted causing—consistent with strikes by a belt and buckle. “Although ‘a parent
has a right to punish a child within the bounds of moderation and reason,’ he or she is not legally
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justified in doing so to the extent that it ‘exceeds due moderation.’” Id. (quoting Carpenter v.
Commonwealth, 186 Va. 851, 861 (1947)).
Where a question is raised as to whether punishment has been
moderate or excessive, the fact is one for the jury to determine
from the attending circumstances, considering the age, size and
conduct of the child, the nature of his misconduct, the nature of the
instrument used for punishment, and the kind of marks or wounds
inflicted on the body of the child.
Carpenter, 186 Va. at 863.
The evidence proved that appellant, an adult who was six feet and six inches tall, struck
four-year-old W.A. four times with a belt for minor misbehavior. The fact that bruises from
appellant’s September, 2016 spanking of W.A. were still visible weeks later speaks volumes to
the force and violence of that incident and that appellant did not discipline the child “within the
bounds of moderation and reason.”
We thus find ample evidence to corroborate appellant’s statement to the police.
Therefore, a reasonable finder of fact could have found beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant
was guilty of committing child cruelty in September, 2016.
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm appellant’s conviction.
Affirmed.
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