Reginald Conrad Collard v. Patricia Ann Collins ( 2017 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Alston, Chafin and Senior Judge Haley
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Fredericksburg, Virginia
REGINALD CONRAD COLLARD
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 0406-17-4 JUDGE TERESA M. CHAFIN
NOVEMBER 14, 2017
PATRICIA ANN COLLINS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
Jeanette A. Irby, Judge
Jon D. Huddleston (Sevila, Saunders, Huddleston & White, P.C., on
brief), for appellant.
Patricia Ann Collins, pro se.
On December 2, 2016, the Circuit Court of Loudoun County entered a final decree of
divorce dissolving the marriage of Patricia Ann Collins and Reginald Conrad Collard. In the
final decree, the circuit court ordered Collard to pay Collins $2,625 per month in spousal
support. Collard challenges the circuit court’s spousal support decision on appeal. He contends
that the circuit court erred by awarding Collins spousal support in the absence of any evidence
establishing his income or his ability to pay the support at issue. He also argues that the circuit
court erred by relying on his payment of certain expenses pursuant to a pendente lite order to
determine that he had the ability to pay spousal support and to establish the amount of the
spousal support award. For the reasons that follow, we agree with Collard’s arguments and
reverse the circuit court’s spousal support decision.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
I. BACKGROUND
“When reviewing a trial court’s decision on appeal, we view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prevailing party, granting it the benefit of any reasonable inferences.”
Congdon v. Congdon, 40 Va. App. 255, 258, 578 S.E.2d 833, 835 (2003). So viewed, the
evidence is as follows.
Collins and Collard were married on August 27, 1999. They separated sometime in July
of 2012. On September 10, 2015, Collins filed a complaint for divorce and requested, among
other things, for the circuit court to award her both pendente lite and permanent spousal support.1
She filed a separate motion for pendente lite spousal support on September 15, 2015. Collard
filed a cross-complaint for divorce on October 8, 2015.
On January 6, 2016, the circuit court entered a consent order addressing Collins’s request
for pendente lite relief. In pertinent part, that order obligated Collard to make certain monthly
payments on behalf of Collins. Specifically, Collard was required to pay Collins’s rent, electric
bill, DirecTV bill, car loan payment, and car insurance payment. The pendente lite order,
however, expressly stated that these payments were not intended to be construed as spousal
support payments and that “no spousal support . . . shall be paid between the parties.” Pursuant
to Code § 20-103(E), the order also stated that its terms had “no presumptive effect” and that it
was not “determinative when adjudicating the underlying cause.”
The circuit court held a hearing on the parties’ divorce complaints on October 20, 2016.
Although Collins was initially represented by counsel in this matter, she proceeded at the hearing
pro se. At the hearing, Collins attempted to present her evidence by submitting a folder of
documents to the circuit court. These documents included a written narrative of Collins’s
1
Collins filed an amended complaint on May 23, 2016, and again requested pendente lite
and permanent spousal support.
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intended testimony, a document setting forth her monthly income and expenses, financial
documents, and various bills. The majority of these documents were admitted into evidence.
The evidence presented by Collins focused exclusively on her needs and circumstances.
It established her income, expenses, and employment capacity. The evidence, however, failed to
establish the current financial circumstances of Collard. Notably, Collins failed to present any
evidence establishing Collard’s income or his ability to pay spousal support. While Collard
presented evidence to establish the statutory requirements for his divorce, he did not present
evidence regarding his income or financial circumstances.
At the conclusion of evidence, Collins requested the circuit court to award her spousal
support in the amount of $6,500 per month. Collard argued that Collins had failed to present any
evidence establishing his ability to pay spousal support, and asked the circuit court to deny
Collins’s request on that basis.
The circuit court acknowledged that the parties had presented “limited” evidence
pertaining to their financial resources, and expressly recognized that neither party presented any
evidence establishing Collard’s income. The circuit court, however, noted that Collard had
previously made payments to Collins pursuant to the pendente lite order. As Collard had failed
to present any evidence establishing that he could not continue to make these payments, the
circuit court awarded Collins spousal support in the amount of $2,625 per month, an amount
equivalent to Collard’s pendente lite payments. The circuit court also granted the parties a
divorce and divided their property and debt. Collard objected to the circuit court’s spousal
support decision, and this appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
On appeal, Collard argues that the circuit court erred by awarding Collins spousal support
based on the evidence presented in this case. Collard contends that the evidence failed to
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establish his income or his ability to pay the spousal support award at issue. Collard also
contends that the circuit court erred by relying on the payments he made pursuant to the pendente
lite order to presume that he had the ability to pay spousal support and to set the amount of his
spousal support obligation. We agree with Collard’s arguments.
A. THE SPOUSAL SUPPORT AWARD
“When making an award of spousal support, the trial court must consider all the factors
enumerated in Code § 20-107.1(E) and set forth findings or conclusions identifying the statutory
factors supporting that award.” Andrews v. Creacey, 56 Va. App. 606, 634, 696 S.E.2d 218, 231
(2010). “A party seeking spousal support bears the burden of proving all facts necessary for an
award . . . .” Robbins v. Robbins, 48 Va. App. 466, 484, 632 S.E.2d 615, 624 (2006).
“Whether and how much spousal support will be awarded is a matter of discretion for the
trial court.” Congdon, 40 Va. App. at 262, 578 S.E.2d at 836 (quoting Northcutt v. Northcutt, 39
Va. App. 192, 196, 571 S.E.2d 912, 914 (2002)). “On appeal, a trial court’s decision on this
subject will not be reversed ‘unless there has been a clear abuse of discretion.’” Id. “An abuse
of discretion . . . exists if the trial court fails to consider the statutory factors required to be part
of the decisionmaking process, or makes factual findings that are plainly wrong or without
evidence to support them.” Id. at 262, 578 S.E.2d at 836-37 (citations omitted).
Code § 20-107.1(E) required the circuit court to consider Collard’s ability to pay spousal
support before it awarded spousal support to Collins. Specifically, Code § 20-107.1(E)(1)
required the circuit court to consider “[t]he obligations, needs and financial resources of the
parties, including but not limited to income from all pension, profit sharing or retirement plans,
of whatever nature.” While the circuit court concluded that Collard had the ability to meet his
spousal support obligation, this decision was not supported by the evidence presented in this
case.
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In the present case, Collins failed to present any evidence establishing Collard’s income
or his ability to pay the spousal support award at issue. All of the evidence that Collins
presented focused on her own financial needs, and the evidence presented by Collard did not
address his financial circumstances or ability to pay spousal support. Although the evidence
established that Collard owned a construction business, Collins did not provide any evidence
regarding Collard’s income or the financial condition of his business.2
Under these circumstances, we conclude that the circuit court abused its discretion by
awarding spousal support to Collins. The circuit court’s determination that Collard had the
ability to pay the spousal support award at issue was not supported by the evidence.
Accordingly, we reverse the circuit court’s spousal support decision.
While we acknowledge that the circuit court based its spousal support decision on the
payments that Collard made pursuant to the pendente lite order, we conclude that its reliance on
the pendente lite payments was improper for several reasons.
First, the pendente lite order had no presumptive effect on the circuit court’s
determination of the final spousal support award. Pursuant to Code § 20-103(E) and the express
terms of the pendente lite order, the pendente lite order was not determinative in the adjudication
of the spousal support issue. See Code § 20-103(E) (“An order entered pursuant to this section
shall have no presumptive effect and shall not be determinative when adjudicating the underlying
cause.”). Thus, the circuit court erred by relying on the pendente lite order to establish a
presumptive amount of Collins’s spousal support award.
2
The evidence established that Collard lived with his daughter and that they split their
rent and other household bills. The evidence further established that Collard and Collins had
declared bankruptcy twice during their marriage. The circuit court acknowledged that both
parties had “limited financial resources.”
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Second, the determination of a pendente lite spousal support award and the determination
of a final spousal support award involve the consideration of different circumstances.
Code § 20-107.1 contains nine factors which the court must
consider in awarding spousal support upon dissolution of a
marriage. Code § 20-103 requires no such considerations, except
that such sums awarded are “necessary for the maintenance and
support of the petitioning spouse” or “to enable such spouse to
carry on the suit.” Pendente lite support may be awarded
irrespective of the spouse’s right to receive support following the
dissolution of the marriage. Spousal support awards under Code
§ 20-107.1 may also exceed what is “necessary” to maintain the
spouse as the term is used in Code § 20-103. Thus, an award of
Code § 20-107.1 spousal support made pursuant to Code § 20-103
criteria would be erroneous as would an award of Code § 20-103
pendente lite support based upon the criteria of Code § 20-107.1.
Weizenbaum v. Weizenbaum, 12 Va. App. 899, 903-04, 407 S.E.2d 37, 40 (1991) (emphasis
added).
Third, and most importantly, the pendente lite spousal support award did not reflect
Collard’s present ability to pay the spousal support award at issue. The pendente lite award was
entered on January 6, 2016, over ten months before the circuit court made its spousal support
decision in this case. Numerous circumstances could have changed between the entry of the
pendente lite order and the final spousal support decision, and Collard’s ability to pay may have
changed drastically. Thus, in the absence of additional evidence pertaining to Collard’s current
financial condition, the pendente lite order and the payments made pursuant to it failed to
establish Collard’s continued ability to pay spousal support.
Pursuant to Code § 20-107.1(E), a party requesting spousal support must present
evidence establishing the opposing party’s ability to pay a spousal support award. See Robbins,
48 Va. App. at 484, 632 S.E.2d at 624. In the present case, Collins failed to present any evidence
beyond the pendente lite order to establish Collard’s financial circumstances. In the absence of
any additional evidence establishing Collard’s present ability to pay the spousal support award at
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issue, we conclude that the spousal support award was not adequately supported by the evidence
and we reverse the circuit court’s decision on that basis.
B. ATTORNEY’S FEES
Collard has requested the award of appellate attorney’s fees and the costs of the appeal.
The rationale for the appellate court being the proper forum to
determine the propriety of an award of attorney’s fees for efforts
expended on appeal is clear. The appellate court has the
opportunity to view the record in its entirety and determine
whether the appeal is frivolous or whether other reasons exist for
requiring additional payment.
O’Loughlin v. O’Loughlin, 23 Va. App. 690, 695, 479 S.E.2d 98, 100 (1996).
We conclude that an award of costs and attorney’s fees is not appropriate under the
circumstances of this case. Accordingly, we deny Collard’s request.
III. CONCLUSION
In summary, we conclude that the evidence presented by Collins failed to establish
Collard’s ability to pay the spousal support award at issue. We also conclude that the circuit
court erred by awarding Collins spousal support based on the terms of the pendente lite order.
Therefore, we reverse the circuit court’s spousal support decision and remand this case to the
circuit court for the entry of an order consistent with this opinion. We also deny Collard’s
request for costs and attorney’s fees.
Reversed and remanded.
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