D'Niqua Keshae Williams v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2022 )


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  •                                              COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Fulton, Ortiz and Raphael
    UNPUBLISHED
    D’NIQUA KESHAE WILLIAMS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.     Record No. 0869-21-1                                          PER CURIAM
    MAY 17, 2022
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
    Bryant L. Sugg, Judge
    (Scott Michael Ehrenworth, on brief), for appellant. Appellant
    submitting on brief.
    (Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Appellant, D’Niqua Keshae Williams, appeals from the decision of the Circuit Court of the
    City of Newport News revoking and resuspending a portion of her previously suspended sentence.
    Appellant contends that the trial court abused its discretion by imposing four months of her ten-year
    suspended sentence because “the absconding amounted to simple confusion on [her] part, [she]
    maintained steady employment, and she avoided incurring any new criminal charges.” Appellant
    waived oral argument but the Commonwealth did not. After examining the briefs and record in this
    case, the panel unanimously holds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the appeal is wholly
    without merit.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a); Rule 5A:27(a). We affirm the decision of the trial court.
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    BACKGROUND
    On May 31, 2019, the trial court convicted appellant of burglary and imposed a sentence of
    ten years’ imprisonment, with all time suspended.1 Appellant’s suspended sentence was
    conditioned on one year of supervised probation, which included appellant “comply[ing] with all
    rules and requirements set by the Probation Officer, to include drug testing/treatment and an anger
    management program.”
    Approximately nine months later, appellant’s probation officer filed a major violation report
    and requested that a capias be issued because appellant had not complied with the conditions of
    probation. Appellant had tested positive for illegal substances, had failed to report for color code,
    had failed to report for intake appointments with South Eastern Family Project, and had not yet
    begun or completed anger management. The trial court issued a rule to show cause. Appellant
    appeared before the court, and the matter was continued. Appellant’s probation officer
    subsequently filed an addendum, reporting that appellant had absconded from supervision. After
    appellant did not appear at the continued hearing, the trial court issued a capias. Appellant was
    arrested and released on bond. Appellant’s probation officer then informed the trial court that
    appellant had failed to report and maintain contact as instructed.
    At the revocation hearing, the trial court received into evidence the probation officer’s major
    violation report and addenda. Appellant acknowledged that she had failed to maintain contact with
    her probation officer for several reasons. Appellant stated that she was “confused” because of the
    various court dates and the changes with her probation officer. Appellant further offered that she
    had broken her foot and was dealing with the death of her sister from coronavirus. She stated that
    she had problems with her mail and had “just recently got the letter” from her probation officer
    1
    The trial court also convicted appellant of misdemeanor assault and battery and imposed
    a sentence of twelve months’ incarceration, with all time suspended.
    -2-
    about a missed meeting. And appellant explained that she had failed to contact her probation officer
    because she was preoccupied with her job and her children.
    At the conclusion of the evidence, the Commonwealth emphasized that it was appellant’s
    “duty to follow up [with her probation officer] and follow the terms and conditions of the [c]ourt.”
    The Commonwealth argued that probation “was not a priority for her, and she needs to face some
    consequences for not making it a priority.” The Commonwealth noted that the guidelines
    recommended an active sentence between three months and one year. It asked the trial court to
    revoke appellant’s previously suspended sentence and impose an active sentence of “at least 3
    months.” Although appellant acknowledged that she did “need to face consequences,” she
    emphasized that she had not “pick[ed] up” any new charges and that she had a job. Appellant asked
    the trial court to deviate downward from the guidelines or sentence her at the low end of the
    guidelines. In allocution, appellant asked the trial court to consider that she was a single mother of
    four “small children,” ranging from one to seven years of age.
    After hearing the evidence and arguments, the trial court advised appellant that she needed
    to stay in contact with her probation officer or to ask her attorney for help. The trial court found
    appellant in violation of her probation, revoked her previously suspended sentence, and resuspended
    all but four months. This appeal followed.
    ANALYSIS
    Appellant argues that the trial court abused its discretion when it revoked her previously
    suspended sentence and imposed an active sentence of four months. After suspending a sentence, a
    trial court “may revoke the suspension of sentence for any cause the court deems sufficient that
    occurred at any time within the probation period, or within the period of suspension fixed by the
    court.” Code § 19.2-306(A). “When a defendant fails to comply with the terms and conditions of a
    suspended sentence, the trial court has the power to revoke the suspension of the sentence in whole
    -3-
    or in part.” Alsberry v. Commonwealth, 
    39 Va. App. 314
    , 320 (2002). “In revocation appeals, the
    trial court’s ‘findings of fact and judgment will not be reversed unless there is a clear showing of
    abuse of discretion.’” Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 
    61 Va. App. 529
    , 535 (2013) (quoting Davis v.
    Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 81
    , 86 (1991)). “The evidence is considered in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, as the prevailing party below.” 
    Id.
    Appellant acknowledges that the trial court had the authority to revoke her suspended
    sentence for failure to comply with the terms of probation. Nevertheless, appellant maintains that
    the trial court’s sentence was “excessively harsh” and “unwarranted under the totality of the
    circumstances.” Appellant argues that although she “undoubtedly violated the conditions of her
    probation by failing to maintain contact with her probation officer, [she] didn’t simply disappear
    and live life on the lam.” Appellant notes that she had “maintained employment . . . , supported her
    four young children as a single parent, and did not incur any new criminal charges, aside from the
    probation violation charge.”
    “The statutes dealing with probation and suspension are remedial and intended to give the
    trial court valuable tools to help rehabilitate an offender through the use of probation, suspension of
    all or part of a sentence, and/or restitution payments.” Howell v. Commonwealth, 
    274 Va. 737
    , 740
    (2007). By continuing to disregard the terms of her suspended sentence, appellant demonstrated
    that she was not amenable to rehabilitation. “When coupled with a suspended sentence, probation
    represents ‘an act of grace on the part of the Commonwealth to one who has been convicted and
    sentenced to a term of confinement.’” Hunter v. Commonwealth, 
    56 Va. App. 582
    , 587 (2010)
    (quoting Price v. Commonwealth, 
    51 Va. App. 443
    , 448 (2008)). Appellant failed to make
    productive use of the grace that had been extended to her.
    The uncontroverted evidence establishes that appellant violated the conditions of her
    probation by failing to maintain contact with her probation officer. At the revocation hearing, the
    -4-
    trial court heard appellant’s testimony about her family circumstances and why she failed to
    maintain contact with her probation officer. Appellant testified that she was “confused . . . [about
    who her] probation officer was” and that she was not receiving her mail. Appellant also expressed
    that she had several personal reasons that kept her preoccupied and unable to contact her probation
    officer, including an injury, her job, caring for her children, and the loss of her sister. It was within
    the trial court’s purview to weigh any mitigating factors appellant presented. Keselica v.
    Commonwealth, 
    34 Va. App. 31
    , 36 (2000). The record establishes that the trial court had
    sufficient cause to revoke appellant’s suspended sentence. Accordingly, we hold that the sentence
    the trial court imposed represents a proper exercise of discretion. See Alsberry, 39 Va. App. at
    321-22 (finding that the court did not abuse its discretion by imposing the defendant’s previously
    suspended sentence in its entirety “in light of the grievous nature of [the defendant’s] offenses
    and his continuing criminal activity”).
    Moreover, to the extent that appellant argues that her sentence was disproportionate, this
    Court declines to engage in a proportionality review in cases that do not involve life sentences
    without the possibility of parole. Cole v. Commonwealth, 
    58 Va. App. 642
    , 653-54 (2011). We
    noted in Cole that the Supreme Court of the United States “has never found a non-life ‘sentence
    for a term of years within the limits authorized by statute to be, by itself, a cruel and unusual
    punishment’ in violation of the Eighth Amendment.” Id. at 653 (quoting Hutto v. Davis, 
    454 U.S. 370
    , 372 (1982) (per curiam)). Cf. Vasquez v. Commonwealth, 
    291 Va. 232
    , 243 (2016)
    (rejecting Eighth Amendment challenge to 133-year active sentence because the sentence was
    imposed for “eighteen separate crimes”).
    CONCLUSION
    For the foregoing reasons, the trial court’s decision is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    -5-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0869211

Filed Date: 5/17/2022

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 5/17/2022