Robert Ryan Grasty v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2017 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED
Present: Judges Humphreys, Russell and Senior Judge Bumgardner
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
ROBERT RYAN GRASTY
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0281-17-1 JUDGE ROBERT J. HUMPHREYS
DECEMBER 5, 2017
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Bryant L. Sugg, Judge
Jessica E. B. Crossett, Deputy Public Defender (Daniel B. Winegard,
Assistant Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
J. Christian Obenshain, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R.
Herring, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Robert Ryan Grasty (“Grasty”) appeals the December 7, 2015 decision of the Circuit
Court of the City of Newport News (the “circuit court”) convicting him of a third or subsequent
offense of driving on a suspended or revoked license, in violation of Code § 46.2-301(B). Grasty
argues that the circuit court erred in convicting him of driving on a suspended license, third or
subsequent offense because at the time of the offense, he qualified for the exemption to the
driver’s license requirements provided for commercial fishermen through Code §§ 46.2-300,
46.2-303, and 46.2-674.
I. BACKGROUND
On April 17, 2015, Grasty was driving a pickup truck with commercial waterman
(“commercial fisherman”) license plates when he was involved in a two-vehicle accident.
Newport News Police Officer Andrew Scott (“Officer Scott”) investigated the accident. When
Officer Scott asked for Grasty’s driver’s license and insurance information, Grasty notified
Officer Scott that he did not have a valid driver’s license. A subsequent check of Grasty’s
information with the Department of Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) revealed that Grasty’s driving
privileges were suspended. Grasty, however, produced a copy of Code § 46.2-303 for Officer
Scott and asserted that he did not need a driver’s license under the circumstances because, at the
time of the accident, he was a commercial fisherman operating a commercial fisherman’s
vehicle. Apparently unpersuaded by Grasty’s roadside legal analysis, Officer Scott issued Grasty
a summons for a third or subsequent offense of driving on a suspended or revoked license, in
violation of Code § 46.2-301(B).
On December 7, 2015, following a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Grasty. At
trial, the Commonwealth introduced into evidence, without objection, Grasty’s DMV transcript
reflecting two prior convictions for driving while suspended in Isle of Wright County.
Additionally, Grasty’s DMV transcript revealed that, on the day of the accident, Grasty’s driver’s
license was suspended indefinitely and that Grasty had notice of the suspension. The
Commonwealth did not dispute that Grasty was operating his vehicle as a commercial fisherman.
Nevertheless, the Commonwealth argued and the circuit court agreed that, notwithstanding his
status as a commercial fisherman, Grasty’s suspended driver’s license operated as a complete bar
to his privilege to drive.
Following Grasty’s conviction, the circuit court continued disposition of the matter until
June 13, 2016, at 10:00 a.m., to allow Grasty time to obtain a valid driver’s license. On January
26, 2017, however, the circuit court found that Grasty was not able to obtain a valid driver’s
license. Accordingly, the circuit court sentenced Grasty to 180 days in jail, with 170 days
suspended, a ninety-day suspension of his privilege to drive, and a $500 fine, which was also
suspended. This appeal followed.
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II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of Review
The assignment of error presented in this appeal raises a question of statutory
construction, which we review de novo. See Barden v. Commonwealth, 64 Va. App. 700, 706,
771 S.E.2d 699, 702 (2015). “The primary objective of statutory construction is to ascertain and
give effect to legislative intent. The plain, obvious, and rational meaning of a statute is to be
preferred over any curious, narrow, or strained construction.” Turner v. Commonwealth, 67
Va. App. 46, 63, 792 S.E.2d 299, 307 (2016) (quoting Commonwealth v. Zamani, 256 Va. 391,
395, 507 S.E.2d 608, 609 (1998)). Consequently, courts apply the plain meaning of a statute
“unless the terms are ambiguous or applying the plain language would lead to an absurd result.”
Tisdale v. Commonwealth, 65 Va. App. 478, 483, 778 S.E.2d 554, 557 (2015) (quoting Baker v.
Commonwealth, 284 Va. 572, 576, 733 S.E.2d 642, 644 (2012)).
B. Whether the Suspension of the Privilege to Drive Prohibits Driving as a
Commercial Fisherman
Grasty was charged and convicted of a third or subsequent offense of driving on a
suspended or revoked license, in violation of Code § 46.2-301(B). Specifically, Code
§ 46.2-301(B) states the following:
Except as provided in §§ 46.2-304 and 46.2-357, no resident or
nonresident (i) whose driver’s license, learner’s permit, or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or revoked
or (ii) who has been directed not to drive by any court or by the
Commissioner, or (iii) who has been forbidden, as prescribed by
operation of any statute of the Commonwealth or a substantially
similar ordinance of any county, city or town, to operate a motor
vehicle in the Commonwealth shall thereafter drive any motor
vehicle or any self-propelled machinery or equipment on any
highway in the Commonwealth until the period of such suspension
or revocation has terminated or the privilege has been reinstated or
a restricted license is issued pursuant to subsection E. . . .
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Violation of this statute is a Class 1 misdemeanor. See Code § 46.2-301(C). Grasty notes,
however, that Code § 46.2-300 exempts commercial fishermen from the need to have a driver’s
license at all under certain parameters. As a result, Grasty argues that a suspension of the
privilege to drive does not prevent one who qualifies for an exemption to the licensing
requirement as a commercial fisherman from driving, despite their suspended or revoked status.
In support of his assignment of error, Grasty relies on Code §§ 46.2-300, 46.2-303, and
46.2-674. Generally, Virginia requires drivers travelling on any highway of the Commonwealth
to possess a valid driver’s license, pursuant to Code § 46.2-300. As a narrow exception to this
rule, however, Code § 46.2-300 exempts certain individuals from Virginia’s general driver’s
license requirements. Specifically, Code § 46.2-300 states as follows:
No person, except those expressly exempted in §§ 46.2-303
through 46.2-308, shall drive any motor vehicle on any highway in
the Commonwealth until such person has applied for a driver’s
license, as provided in this article, satisfactorily passed the
examination required by § 46.2-325, and obtained a driver’s
license, nor unless the license is valid.
(Emphasis added).
Grasty’s argument then proceeds to Code § 46.2-303, one of the exemptions listed by
Code § 46.2-300. Specifically, Code § 46.2-303 provides that “[n]o person shall be required to
obtain a driver’s license for the purpose of operating any farm tractor, farm machinery, or
vehicle defined in §§ 46.2-663 through 46.2-674, temporarily drawn, moved, or propelled on the
highways.” (Emphasis added).
Code § 46.2-674, the last statute in the chain that Grasty relies on, defines vehicles used
by commercial fishermen. Specifically, the statute characterizes vehicles used by commercial
fishermen as “any motor vehicle, trailer, boat trailer, or semitrailer, or any combination thereof
not having a gross vehicle weight exceeding 12,000 pounds used by commercial fishermen, their
agents, or employees for [three specific purposes].” Code § 46.2-674. The specific purpose
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implicated in Grasty’s case is described in subsection three of the statute, which permits
“[t]ransporting harvested seafood no more than 50 miles between the place where the seafood is
first brought ashore and the transporter’s place of business or the location of the seafood’s first
point of sale.” Code § 46.2-674(3). The Commonwealth does not contest that, at the time of the
instant offense, Grasty was a commercial fisherman transporting a recent catch to market within
fifty miles from the place the fish were caught. Thus, we assume without deciding that, at the
time of the offense, Grasty qualified for an exemption of the requirement that he be a licensed
driver. However, that does not end the analysis.
Grasty contends that, because he did not need a license to operate his vehicle at the time
of the offense, the trial court erred in convicting Grasty of a third or subsequent offense of
driving on a suspended or revoked license. However, the statute that we must initially construe
is the one that formed the basis for Grasty’s conviction. Code § 46.2-301(B) provides in
pertinent part that:
Except as provided in §§ 46.2-304 and 46.2-357, no resident or
nonresident (i) whose driver’s license, learner’s permit, or
privilege to drive a motor vehicle has been suspended or
revoked . . . shall thereafter drive any motor vehicle or any
self-propelled machinery or equipment on any highway in the
Commonwealth until the period of such suspension or revocation
has terminated or the privilege has been reinstated or a restricted
license is issued . . . .
(Emphasis added). In other words, with the exception of the two statutory exemptions found in
this statute, the General Assembly has prohibited all others whose license has been suspended or
revoked from driving on the highways of the Commonwealth while such suspension or
revocation is in effect, unless they obtain a restricted license. We need not resolve any conflict
between these various statutes because we see no conflict.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Triplett v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 649, 186 S.E.2d 16
(1972), a case not cited by either of the parties, also guides our analysis in this case. In Triplett,
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the defendant had been adjudicated a “habitual offender” under the Virginia Habitual Offender
Act (the “Act”).1 See id. at 651, 186 S.E.2d at 18. The order declaring the defendant a habitual
offender prohibited the defendant from operating any motor vehicle on the highways of the
Commonwealth, and stated that no “license to operate a motor vehicle could be issued to him for
[at] least ten years.” Id. at 652, 186 S.E.2d at 18. Several years after being adjudicated a
habitual offender, the defendant was arrested and convicted of driving on a suspended or revoked
license. See id. at 651, 186 S.E.2d at 17. Specifically, a police officer witnessed the defendant
drive a short distance along a secondary road in a regular model half-ton pickup truck. See id.
The defendant’s pickup truck did not display license plates, but instead had the words “Farm
Use” painted on each side. See id. On appeal, the defendant argued that, under the Act, “it was
not unlawful for him to operate a ‘farm use’ vehicle since the operator of such a vehicle is not
required to have an operator’s or chauffeur’s license.” Id. at 651, 186 S.E.2d at 17-18.
Examining the Act, the Supreme Court held that under Code § 46.1-387.8, a statute now
repealed, “[t]he order declaring [the defendant] an habitual offender prohibited him from
operating any motor vehicle on the highways of the [Commonwealth] . . . .” Id. at 651-52, 186
S.E.2d at 18 (emphasis added). The single exemption to the prohibition, as noted by the
Supreme Court, provided that an order designating an individual as a habitual offender:
[S]hall not operate to prevent or prohibit such person from
operating a farm tractor upon the highways when it is necessary to
move such tractor from one tract of land used for agricultural
purposes to another tract of land used for the same purposes,
1
See Code §§ 46.1-387.1-46.1-387.12 (repealed 1989). Under the version of the Act in
effect at the time of the Triplett decision, a habitual offender was defined as any person whose
DMV record reflected that he or she has been convicted of three or more separate and distinct
specified offenses, within a ten-year period. See Code § 46.1-387.2 (repealed 1989). A person
adjudicated a habitual offender could not be licensed to operate a motor vehicle for a period of
ten years. See Code § 46.1-387.9 (repealed 1989); see also Note, The Virginia Habitual
Offender Act, 26 Wash. & Lee L. Rev. 271, 272 (1969) (summarizing the various provisions of
the Virginia Habitual Offender Act).
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provided that the distance between the said tracts of land shall not
exceed five miles.
Id. at 652, 186 S.E.2d at 18; see also Code § 46.1-387.8 (repealed 1989).
Though lacking an in-depth explanation of its holding, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Triplett is controlling in the present case. Triplett stands for the proposition that, under then
existing law, adjudication as a habitual offender barred an individual’s privilege to drive any
motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth, regardless of whether the operator was
required to possess a valid driver’s license in the first place. Additionally, the Supreme Court’s
conclusion that the defendant in Triplett was operating an ordinary pickup truck, and not a farm
tractor within the meaning of the exemption, did not alter its holding. See Triplett, 212 Va. at
651-52, 186 S.E.2d at 17-18.
The only rationale that can be inferred from the Supreme Court’s decision in Triplett is
also applicable here. Driving a motor vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth is a
privilege subject to regulation. It seems evident to us that the legislative intent embodied by
Code § 46.2-300 is to generally allow those who obtain a valid license and those, such as Grasty,
who qualify for an exemption to the license requirements to exercise that privilege to drive on
the Commonwealth’s highways. However, the legislative intent plainly expressed in Code
§ 46.2-301(B) is that, subject only to the specific exemptions provided in Code § 46.2-301 and
defined in §§ 46.2-304 and 46.2-357,2 anyone and everyone else permitted the privilege to drive,
whether obtained through a license or through a statutory exemption, can have their privilege to
drive revoked or suspended for various reasons. In short, an exemption from the licensing
requirement is not the equivalent of legislative immunity from any and all consequences of
violating the rules of the road.
2
Neither of these statutory exceptions apply to Grasty.
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We therefore hold that the suspension of Grasty’s privilege to drive under Code
§ 46.2-301(B) prohibited him from operating any motor vehicle on the highways of the
Commonwealth. As in Triplett, Grasty’s privilege to drive was suspended indefinitely and
Grasty had notice of his suspension. Following the holding in Triplett, the suspension of
Grasty’s privilege to drive under Code § 46.2-301(B) barred Grasty from operating any motor
vehicle on the highways of the Commonwealth, regardless of the fact that Grasty was a
commercial fisherman operating a commercial fisherman’s vehicle within the parameters
permitted by Code §§ 46.2-300, 46.2-303, and 46.2-674.
III. CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the circuit court convicting Grasty of a third
or subsequent offense of driving on a suspended or revoked license, in violation of Code
§ 46.2-301(B) is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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