Keith Lamonte Hill v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2002 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bray, Bumgardner and Clements
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    KEITH LAMONTE HILL
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2030-00-1              JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    APRIL 30, 2002
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
    John Edward Clarkson, Judge Designate
    S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Defender (Kevin P.
    Shea; Keith Lamonte Hill, pro se, on briefs),
    for appellant.
    Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
    (Randolph A. Beales, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    A jury convicted Keith Lamonte Hill of credit card forgery,
    uttering a forged credit card sales draft, 1 and credit card
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    1
    Code § 18.2-193(1)(c) provides:
    A person is guilty of credit card forgery
    when:
    *     *     *     *        *   *    *
    [h]e, not being the cardholder or a person
    authorized by him, with intent to defraud
    the issuer, or a person or organization
    providing money, goods, services or anything
    else of value, or any other person, forges a
    sales draft . . . or uses a credit card
    number of a card of which he is not the
    cardholder, or utters, or attempts to employ
    fraud. 2   On appeal, he contends (1) there was no cardholder, (2)
    the indictment named the wrong defrauded party, (3) the term
    "payment device number" was unconstitutionally ambiguous, (4)
    the evidence was insufficient to prove intent to defraud, and
    (5) he was convicted under the wrong statute.    Finding no error,
    we affirm.
    We review the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth granting it all reasonable inferences.        Archer v.
    Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 1
    , 11, 
    492 S.E.2d 826
    , 831 (1997).       On
    July 17, 1999, the defendant obtained credit at Gordon's
    Jewelers by submitting an identification card displaying his
    picture but supplying the name, address, phone number, and
    social security number of Thomas McIntyre, an actual person.
    The defendant obtained a $5,000 line of credit issued to the
    name of Thomas McIntyre.    The credit company provided an account
    access number that permitted immediate draws against the new
    account.    The defendant used that number to make two purchases
    totaling $2,823.59.    He signed the sales draft, "Thomas
    McIntyre."
    as true, such forged draft knowing it to be
    forged.
    2
    Code § 18.2-195(1)(b) provides: "A person is guilty of
    credit card fraud when, with intent to defraud any person, he
    . . . [o]btains . . . goods . . . or anything else of value by
    representing (i) without the consent of the cardholder that he
    is the holder of a specified card or credit card number . . . ."
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    Thomas McIntyre did not apply for credit at Gordon's
    Jewelers, though he later received a plastic charge card through
    the mail with $2,823.59 charged against it.   He did not sign the
    sales draft which was admitted as an exhibit and which bore the
    account access number and McIntyre's name written in the
    defendant's hand.   McIntyre had no connection to the defendant
    but had rented a truck a week earlier from a store where the
    defendant worked.
    The defendant contends the evidence cannot prove he
    committed credit card forgery because there was no cardholder
    since he accessed the account before a credit card could be
    issued.   Alternatively, the defendant maintains if there was a
    cardholder, only he could have been that person.
    The legal definitions of "Credit card" and "Cardholder"
    found in Code § 18.2-191 are considerably more extensive than
    the literal definitions the defendant must employ to make his
    argument.   "Credit card" is "any instrument or device, whether
    known as a credit card . . . or by any other name, issued . . .
    by an issuer for the use of the cardholder in obtaining money,
    goods, services or anything else of value on credit."   Code
    § 18.2-191.   "Cardholder" is "the person . . . named on the face
    of a credit card to whom or for whose benefit the credit card is
    issued by an issuer."   
    Id. A "credit card"
    is not just a
    ubiquitous plastic card but is any device that allows a
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    "cardholder" to obtain anything of value on credit.    In turn, a
    "cardholder" is the person to whom the credit was issued.
    The defendant applied for credit at Gordon's Jewelers by
    representing himself as Thomas McIntyre.    Only the photograph on
    the identity card belonged to the defendant.   The data supplied
    about McIntyre permitted an immediate credit review and resulted
    in credit being issued to the person identified by the data
    employed, McIntyre.    The credit was extended to Thomas McIntyre.
    When the defendant used the account access number, he employed a
    device issued to or for the benefit of someone else.   The
    statute did not require that McIntyre apply for the credit or be
    aware that an application was being made.   Under these facts,
    the jury could reasonably conclude that McIntyre was the
    cardholder.
    The defendant also contends the indictment erred in naming
    Gordon's Jewelers as the party defrauded.   He argues the bank
    that extended the credit was the party defrauded.    However, the
    statutes and indictments do not permit that claim.    Code
    § 18.2-193(1)(c) requires proof of "intent to defraud the
    issuer, or a person or organization . . . providing money,
    goods, services or anything else of value, or any other person
    . . . ."   Code § 18.2-195(1)(b) requires proof of "intent to
    defraud any person."   Each of the indictments charge the
    defendant acted "with intent to defraud Gordon's Jewelers, or
    - 4 -
    any other person . . . ."   The statutes permit, and the
    indictments charge, fraud of either the jeweler or the bank.
    The defendant makes other arguments that we only address
    briefly.   He contends the term "payment device number" is
    "unconstitutionally vague."   We do not address an argument that
    is different than the argument advanced at trial.   Rule 5A:18;
    Jacques v. Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 591
    , 593, 
    405 S.E.2d 630
    ,
    631 (1991).    The defendant contends the evidence failed to prove
    he intended to defraud anyone.    That argument was not presented
    in the petition for appeal nor granted as an issue on appeal.
    McLean v. Commonwealth, 
    30 Va. App. 322
    , 329, 
    516 S.E.2d 717
    ,
    720 (1999).    Finally, the defendant contends the Commonwealth
    should have charged him with identity fraud, Code § 18.2-186.3.
    The Commonwealth elects what charges to place and prosecute.
    Mason v. Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 321
    , 323-24, 
    228 S.E.2d 683
    , 684
    (1976) (felony or misdemeanor).    Moreover, that statute was
    enacted after the defendant committed these offenses.
    Concluding the trial court did not err, we affirm the
    convictions.
    Affirmed.
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