Charles D. Bennett v. Commonwealth, DSS ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Overton
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
CHARLES D. BENNETT
v. Record No. 1364-95-4 OPINION BY
JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA, JULY 16, 1996
VIRGINIA DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES,
DIVISION OF CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT,
ex rel. AUDREY BENNETT
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Robert W. Wooldridge, Jr., Judge
Yvonne DeBruyn Weight (Eric Michael Weight;
Weight & Weight, on briefs), for appellant.
Anne Wren Garrett, Special Counsel (Betsy S.
Elliott, Senior Special Counsel; Nancy J.
Crawford, Regional Special Counsel, Division
of Child Support Enforcement; James S.
Gilmore, III, Attorney General; William H.
Hurd, Deputy Attorney General; Siran S.
Faulders, Senior Assistant Attorney General;
Craig M. Burshem, Regional Special Counsel,
on brief), for appellee.
Charles D. Bennett appeals the trial court's order which
refused to modify his monthly child support obligation. He
contends that the trial court erred by (1) requiring him to prove
a material change in his former wife's circumstances, in addition
to the change in his circumstance, before considering the issue
of imputing income to her, (2) not imputing income to her, (3)
not including in her gross income the social security and federal
housing benefits that she receives, and (4) retroactively
modifying his child support obligation for October 1994. We find
no reversible error and affirm the trial court's order.
- 2 -
FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Charles D. Bennett (father) and Audrey Bennett (mother)
married in 1983 and separated in 1988. They had three children.
The three children have resided with their mother following the
separation. Isaac, the youngest child, suffers from Downs
Syndrome.
Following the initial support order, the father filed a
motion for abatement of support because his job was being
terminated as a result of corporate downsizing. At the
modification hearing, the parties stipulated that they had no
extraordinary medical expenses, no day care expenses, and no
health insurance expenses. They also stipulated that the mother
1
receives $731 per month in Section 8 federal housing benefits
and $330 per month in Supplemental Security Income (SSI) benefits
for Isaac's disability. 2 At the time of the hearing, Isaac was
attending school about three hours each weekday, but the court
found he "require[d] a high level of monitoring and attention"
from the mother.
As a consequence of the foregoing proceeding, the trial
court reduced the father's monthly child support obligation to
$170. In that proceeding, the court refused to impute income to
the unemployed father, but the judge stated in his letter opinion
that he "will continue this matter for six months . . . to review
1
See 42 U.S.C. § 1437f(a).
2
See 42 U.S.C. § 1381.
- 3 -
(among other matters) [the father's] efforts to find employment."
Also, in that proceeding, the trial judge refused to include as
part of the mother's gross income the social security benefits or
federal housing benefits which she receives for Isaac's
disability, and refused to impute income to the mother because
she was "fully and properly occupied with the demands and special
needs of Isaac."
Following that proceeding, on December 14, 1994, the father
accepted permanent employment with MFSI, Inc. Just before doing
so, he had earned, on a one-time basis during October 1994,
$2,554.96 from temporary employment with Stephens Engineering
Company.
On January 17, 1995, the mother filed a motion for review of
child support, alleging a material change in circumstance. At a
February 9, 1995 hearing, the parties stipulated that, after the
mother had obtained approval in August 1994 from the Prince
William County public school system to teach the children at
home, she had removed the two oldest children from public school.
They also stipulated that as of the date of the filing of the
motion, Isaac was attending school all day for three days per
week and was in day care the other two days.
By decree dated May 22, 1995, the trial court increased the
father's monthly child support obligation to $841, based on the
presumptive child support guidelines in Code § 20-108.2 for his
gross monthly income of $2,933 and the mother's gross monthly
- 4 -
income of $100. The court also ordered that he pay "a one time
adjustment" of $574 for child support based upon his October 1994
income. The trial court included the $574 with the $13,884.53
arrearage in child and spousal support found to be due. The
court further found that "there has been no material change in
[the mother's] circumstances such as to impute income to [her]."
MATERIAL CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCE
A party moving to modify a support decree must prove a
material change in circumstance following the last support order
before the trial court is required to consider modifying the
support award. See Thomas v. Thomas, 217 Va. 502, 505, 229
S.E.2d 887, 889-90 (1976). The change in circumstance also must
warrant a modification of the support. Furr v. Furr, 13 Va. App.
479, 481, 413 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1992). The father contends that the
trial court erroneously found "there ha[d] been no material
change in [the mother's] circumstances" by virtue of Isaac being
in school or day care the entire day, and therefore, erred by
refusing to consider whether to impute income to the mother.
The mother's petition to increase support was based on the
change in condition arising from the father's permanent
employment. The trial court did not refuse to impute income to
the mother because the mother had filed the petition or because
the father had not alleged or proved a change in her
circumstances. In fact, the judge stated that he considered the
father's argument as "a motion to reconsider." The judge
- 5 -
thereafter ruled that the changed condition of Isaac being in
school and day care did not warrant a finding that the mother was
voluntarily unemployed. Accordingly, the court refused to impute
income to her. Thus, the trial judge did not impose an
additional burden on the father to prove changes in both his and
the mother's circumstances and did not refuse to consider whether
to impute income to the mother.
IMPUTATION OF INCOME
In November 1994, the court refused to impute income to the
mother because it found that she was "fully and properly
occupied" with caring for Isaac. However, at the February 9,
1995 hearing, the parties stipulated that as of that date Isaac
was spending three weekdays in school and the remaining two days
in day care at state expense. The father contends, therefore,
that because the mother is no longer required to remain at home
to care for Isaac, the trial court erred by declining to impute
income to the mother in calculating their respective child
support obligations. Consequently, he argues that he is being
required to pay a disproportionate amount of support for the
children.
Both parents owe a duty of support to their minor children.
Code § 20-61; Featherstone v. Brooks, 220 Va. 443, 448, 258
S.E.2d 513, 516 (1979). A trial court has discretion to impute
income to either or both the custodial or noncustodial parent who
is voluntarily unemployed, provided that income may not be
- 6 -
imputed to a custodial parent except when the child is in school
or child care services are available. See Code § 20-108.1(B)(3);
Sargent v. Sargent, 20 Va. App. 694, 703, 460 S.E.2d 596, 600
(1995) ("A trial court may impute income to the spouse receiving
child . . . support under appropriate circumstances") (emphasis
added). The trial court's decision to not impute income to the
mother will be upheld on appeal unless it is "'plainly wrong or
unsupported by the evidence.'" Id. at 703, 460 S.E.2d at 600
(quoting Calvert v. Calvert, 18 Va. App. 781, 784, 447 S.E.2d
875, 876 (1994)).
When the 1994 support order was entered, which did not
impute income to the mother, the trial court found that Isaac
attended school for approximately three hours each weekday and
that "[h]e requires a high level of monitoring and attention."
The mother's time and responsibility in caring for Isaac have
changed. Isaac attends school and day care all day each weekday.
Although the evidence does not show the frequency or extent to
which Isaac's mother must take him home from school or day care
or respond to his problems, the mother's counsel avowed that
[s]ometimes [Isaac] doesn't respond well to
[the instruction and care he is given at
school] and his mother has to go to the
school and intervene or be with him. When he
goes to day care, if he can't sustain the day
care situation she has to be there and
intervene or take him home.
In Hamel v. Hamel, 18 Va. App. 10, 13, 441 S.E.2d 221, 223
(1994), we held that the trial court erred by refusing to impute
- 7 -
income to the noncustodial parent who had voluntarily quit her
job. In Brody v. Brody, 16 Va. App. 647, 650-51, 432 S.E.2d 20,
22-23 (1993), we held that the trial court erred by not imputing
income to the noncustodial parent who voluntarily left her job to
stay home and care for a child from another marriage. A
custodial parent has no less responsibility to provide support to
a minor child than does the noncustodial parent. Thus, the trial
court shall impute income to a custodial parent who is
voluntarily unemployed or underemployed where the age of the
child and circumstances permit the custodial parent to be
gainfully employed. Code § 20-108.1(B)(3).
The facts here are distinguishable from those in Hamel and
Brody. Here, the mother has custody of a profoundly disabled
child who "requires a high level of monitoring and attention."
She did not voluntarily leave a job to assume this
responsibility. Although Isaac is in school and day care each
weekday, the mother has to be available to respond to his needs
or to take him home on occasion. Although the evidence does not
show the frequency and extent to which the mother is called to
take Isaac out of school or day care, Isaac is profoundly
disabled and only recently had his school days and day care
extended beyond three hours. The trial judge was familiar with
Isaac's condition and previously had found that he required a
high level of monitoring and attention even when Isaac was in
school only three hours each weekday.
- 8 -
The father introduced no evidence to show the availability
of a job that would tolerate absences or leaving on unscheduled
intervals. Furthermore, after Isaac comes home each day, the
mother must devote her full time and attention to caring for him.
Although the mother cannot absolve herself of the legal
obligation to support her dependent children by voluntarily home
schooling them, and thereby effectively removing herself from the
labor market, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion by
considering that in addition to caring for a profoundly disabled
child, the mother is home schooling two other children.
Furthermore, the mother has not worked for over ten years
and no evidence was introduced regarding the availability of jobs
for her or the amount of income she could earn. See Sargent, 20
Va. App. at 704, 460 S.E.2d at 600-01 ("No evidence was presented
about the availability of a factory position or the hours or
shifts that would be required"). The party contending that
income must be imputed is required "to produce evidence that [is]
sufficient to 'enable the trial judge reasonably to project what
amount could be anticipated' had the mother [procured]
employment." Brody, 16 Va. App. at 651, 432 S.E.2d at 22
(quoting Hur v. Div. of Child Support Enforcement ex rel Klopp,
13 Va. App. 54, 61, 409 S.E.2d 454, 459 (1991)).
On these facts, the trial judge did not abuse his discretion
by declining to impute income to the mother.
SSI AND FEDERAL HOUSING BENEFITS
- 9 -
Code § 20-108.2(C) defines "gross income" broadly for
purposes of calculating child support. "'[G]ross income' shall
mean all income from all sources." Id. However, "gross income"
does "not include benefits from public assistance programs as
defined in § 63.1-87, federal supplemental security income
benefits, or child support received." Id. "'Assistance' and
'public assistance' mean and include aid to dependent children,
auxiliary grants to the aged, blind and disabled, medical
assistance, food stamps, general relief, fuel assistance, and
social services." Code § 63.1-87. The father contends that the
social security and federal housing benefits the mother receives
do not fall within the exception in Code § 20-108(C) to "gross
income."
In Whitaker v. Colbert, 18 Va. App. 202, 205, 442 S.E.2d
429, 431 (1994), on which the father relies, we held that social
security benefits received by a parent for a personal disability
are income for purposes of Code § 20-108.2. See also
Commonwealth v. Skeens, 18 Va. App. 154, 158, 442 S.E.2d 432, 435
(1994) ("The payment of money to the child's custodian in the
form of Social Security payments is an indirect payment from the
obligor parent for which the parent should receive credit"). The
father's reliance on Whitaker is misplaced because the father is
not the disabled party. In Whitaker, we stated that
[t]he social security benefits received by
the children are not gratuities, but are
entitlements earned by [the parent] through
his earlier employment. They are a
substitute for his lost ability to provide
- 10 -
for the children through the fruits of future
employment.
18 Va. App. at 205, 442 S.E.2d at 431. Here, Isaac's benefits
are not based upon the father's future employment and they do not
substitute for the father's loss of earnings or support.
Although the parents' income is taken into account in
determining a disabled child's eligibility and amount of benefits
under the SSI program, the primary purpose of the program is to
provide special assistance to disabled children in low-income
households. See H.R. Rep. No. 231, 92d Cong., 2d Sess.,
reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4989, 5133-34. "SSI benefits
received by a disabled child are intended to supplement other
income, not substitute for it . . . [and] the noncustodial
parent's child support obligation is not impacted by the receipt
of SSI on the behalf of a disabled child." Kyle v. Kyle, 582
N.E.2d 842, 846 (Ind. Ct. App. 1991). Accordingly, the father is
not entitled to a credit or reduction in his child support
obligation as a result of the SSI benefits the mother receives
for Isaac's disability. See Code § 20-108.2(C) (providing that
gross income does not include "federal supplemental security
income benefits"); see also Lovett v. Lovett, 428 S.E.2d 874, 876
(S.C. 1993) (holding that "Husband was not entitled to offset his
support obligation by the amount of Social Security benefits
awarded children as a result of [Wife's] disability").
Like SSI benefits, Section 8 federal housing benefits are
also supplemental in nature because they are intended to provide
- 11 -
special assistance to low-income families. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1437f(a) ("For the purpose of aiding low-income families in
obtaining a decent place to live and of promoting economically
mixed housing, assistance payments may be made with respect to
existing housing in accordance with the provisions of this
section"); 24 C.F.R. § 880.101(a)(1). Therefore, we hold that
the federal housing benefits the mother receives qualify as
"public assistance" under Code § 63.1-87, and that the trial
court did not err by declining to include the SSI benefits and
the housing benefits in the mother's gross income.
OCTOBER 1994 INCOME
The trial court ordered that the father's child support
obligation shall include a "one time adjustment of $574.00" for
income he earned during October 1994 "on which he paid nothing
for the support of his family." Accordingly, the court included
that amount in the total arrearage of $14,458.53 as of February
1, 1995. The father contends that the court exceeded its
authority by retroactively modifying the support order as it
applied to the month of October 1994. He argues that the past
support obligation, which included October 1994, was vested and
fixed by judgment.
A trial court may not retroactively modify a child support
decree to cancel a support arrearage or to relieve a parent of an
accrued support obligation. Cofer v. Cofer, 205 Va. 834, 838-39
140 S.E.2d 663, 666-67 (1965); Taylor v. Taylor, 10 Va. App. 681,
- 12 -
683-84, 394 S.E.2d 864, 866 (1990). Past due installments become
vested and are not subject to change. Taylor, 10 Va. App at 683,
394 S.E.2d at 865-66. A court may only modify a support order to
be effective prospectively. Id. The order may be made effective
"with respect to any period during which there is a pending
petition for modification, but only from the date that notice of
such petition has been given to the responding party." Code
§ 20-108. The court may modify its support order upon motion of
any party in interest or upon its own motion. Id. We hold that
the prohibition announced in Cofer against retroactive
modifications to relieve support obligations applies with equal
force to prevent a trial court from retroactively modifying its
support order to increase a party's past support obligation.
We do not, however, view the trial court's one time award of
$574 as a retroactive modification or increase in a past due or
vested amount of support. Rather, we view the trial court's
award, which was predicated on its own motion pursuant to the
authority granted by Code § 20-108, as ordering the father to pay
on a one time basis, an amount based on recent earnings as part
of his current support obligation. The fact that the court's
award was based on past earnings does not render it a
modification of a prior order or award or prevent the court from
making a one-time lump sum child support award when the
circumstances so justify. See Carter v. Thornhill, 19 Va. App.
501, 507, 453 S.E.2d 295, 299 (1995). Frequently, a one-time
- 13 -
past event, such as an inheritance or liquidation of an asset or
other windfall that has already occurred, will justify a
prospective one-time award of support. Such an award or
modification operates prospectively, not retroactively. By
declaring the amount due and payable and including it in the
arrearage, the court did not retroactively modify its support
order. See Dziarnowski v. Dziarnowski, 14 Va. App. 758, 762, 418
S.E.2d 724, 726 (1992) ("When a trial court reaches the correct
result for the wrong reason, its judgment will be upheld on
appeal"). Therefore, we affirm the trial court's order
establishing a one-time monthly child support obligation of $574.
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court's
order.
Affirmed.
- 14 -
Benton, J., concurring.
I join in the opinion except a portion of the section styled
Imputation of Income.
The evidence established that the youngest child, who is
disabled, attends school and day care all day each weekday. I
find nothing in the record that established that the mother has
any greater need to visit the youngest child's school than any
other working parent who has children in school. No evidence
proved either the frequency of her visits or the length of her
visits to the school.
The evidence further established that the mother voluntarily
removed the two older children from the public school system to
"home school" them herself. I believe that the record proved
that the mother's unavailability to seek employment was based
solely upon her voluntary decision to "home school" two of her
children. In deciding to remove the two older children from
school, she voluntarily chose "the convenience or personal
preference . . . to remain unproductive . . . so as to avoid
support obligations." Hur v. Virginia Dep't of Social Servs., 13
Va. App. 54, 60, 409 S.E.2d 454, 458 (1991). Thus, I would hold
that her decision to "home school" her children was a voluntary
decision taken "to the detriment of [her] support obligations to
the children." Brody v. Brody, 16 Va. App. 647, 651, 432 S.E.2d
20, 22 (1993).
I concur in the judgment, however, because I agree with the
- 15 -
majority's additional rationale that the father failed to
establish that the mother, who has been unemployed since 1985,
could find employment. The statement of facts recites that
"[n]either party presented evidence as to employment available to
[the mother] given her skills and experience." Thus, I would
hold, not that the evidence failed to prove a material change in
circumstance, but that the evidence failed to prove the
availability of employment and was insufficient to "enable the
trial judge reasonably to project what amount [of income] could
be anticipated" if employment was available to the mother. Hur,
13 Va. App. at 61, 409 S.E.2d at 459. Accordingly, I would
uphold the trial judge's ruling with respect to imputed income
only because, as he found, "there was insufficient evidence of
any income that could be imputed to [the mother]."
Except as stated above, I concur in the remainder of the
opinion and would affirm the judgment.
- 16 -