Tramil Jackson v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Chief Judge Decker, Judges Huff and Callins
TRAMIL JACKSON
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 0984-22-2 PER CURIAM
JANUARY 24, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF PETERSBURG
Dennis M. Martin, Sr., Judge
(Marlene A. Harris, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
on brief.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Mason D. Williams, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Tramil Jackson entered conditional guilty pleas to charges of possessing a controlled
substance with intent to distribute, simultaneously possessing a controlled substance and a
firearm, and two counts of contributing to the delinquency of a minor, in violation of Code
§§ 18.2-248, -308.4, and -371. On appeal, he contends that the trial court erred in denying his
pretrial motion to suppress evidence seized as a result of a search warrant. The trial court denied
the motion “for the reasons stated [on] the record” at the suppression hearing. However, due to a
break in the audio transcript of the hearing, the transcript does not contain the grounds for the
trial court’s ruling or any of its related findings of fact. The appellant did not file a written
statement of facts to supplement the record. See Rule 5A:8. We conclude that this missing
portion of the transcript is indispensable to resolving the sole assignment of error. As a result, we
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
cannot reach his assignment of error. See id. Consequently, we hold that the appeal is wholly
without merit and affirm the trial court’s judgment.1
BACKGROUND
On August 15, 2019, Petersburg Special Investigations Officer D. Dean presented the
magistrate with an affidavit to obtain a search warrant for the appellant’s residence in Petersburg for
items related to the distribution of controlled substances. The affidavit provided that Officer Dean
had received information from two confidential informants in the preceding two months that the
appellant was selling cocaine and marijuana from his residence.
According to the affidavit, within the previous 60 days, the first confidential informant
advised Dean that he or she saw the appellant sell “a large amount of suspected cocaine” at the
residence. Officer Dean followed up by having that informant conduct “a [c]ontrolled narcotics
buy.” The informant and the appellant arranged a meeting at a different location and then
“exchanged the . . . [c]urrency for suspect[ed] cocaine.” The confidential informant “then traveled
back to” Officer Dean and “handed over the suspected cocaine.”
Officer Dean further averred that “[w]ithin the last 24 hours,” he received information from
a second confidential informant pertaining to the appellant’s criminal activities. The second
confidential informant told Dean that the appellant “was selling illegal narcotics out of” the
residence, that the informant bought suspected marijuana at the residence, and that the informant
“observed a large amount of suspected marijuana in” the appellant’s possession.
In addition, Officer Dean indicated in the affidavit that law enforcement records reflected
that the appellant “was currently [w]anted” on an outstanding capias. The affidavit further noted
that the appellant had two previous drug-related convictions.
1
After examining the briefs and record in this case, the panel unanimously agrees that
because “the appeal is wholly without merit,” oral argument is unnecessary. Therefore, we
dispense with oral argument in accordance with Code § 17.1-403(ii)(a) and Rule 5A:27(a).
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The magistrate issued the requested search warrant, and Officer Dean executed it five days
later, on August 20, 2019, seizing narcotics and a firearm from the residence.
The appellant made a motion to suppress the evidence, contending that the search warrant
affidavit entirely lacked probable cause and did not support application of the good faith
exception. He further contended that “[a]lthough the affidavit used to obtain the search warrant
specified the time period in which the police obtained information, it did not specify the time
period in which the confidential informant(s) themselves witnessed the alleged narcotics
dealing.”
At the suppression hearing, the appellant argued that the information about the alleged
drug transactions was stale and thus did not establish a nexus between the residence and
controlled substances. The Commonwealth countered that, considering the information in the
affidavit as a whole and giving due deference to the issuing magistrate’s probable cause
determination, the warrant was valid. Further, the Commonwealth argued alternatively that the
exclusionary rule did not apply because the affidavit contained sufficient indicia of probable
cause to allow Officer Dean to rely on the magistrate’s determination.
The trial court denied the motion to suppress. In an order entered February 24, 2022, the
court noted its denial was “for the reasons stated to the record.”
Following the decision, the appellant entered conditional guilty pleas, reserving his right
to appeal the suppression ruling. The trial court found the appellant guilty and sentenced him to
10 years and 24 months in prison with 8 years and 30 months suspended.
ANALYSIS
The appellant argues that the trial court should have granted his motion to suppress
because the search warrant was not supported by probable cause and the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule did not apply.
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An appellant bears the burden of supplying this Court with an adequate record to evaluate
his claim. If “the appellant fails to ensure that the record contains transcripts or a written statement
of facts necessary to permit resolution of appellate issues, any assignments of error affected by such
omission will not be considered.” Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii). “This Court has no authority to make
exceptions to the filing requirements set out in the Rules.” Shiembob v. Shiembob, 55 Va. App. 234,
246 (2009) (quoting Turner v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 96, 99 (1986)); accord Bay v.
Commonwealth, 60 Va. App. 520, 528-29 (2012).
The trial court’s order reflects it denied the appellant’s motion to suppress for “the reasons
stated to the record.” The record before this Court, however, does not contain any of the court’s
factual findings underpinning its ruling. In fact, the relevant portion of the transcript contains only
the following information: “NOTE: SHORT BREAK IN THE AUDIO TRANSCRIPT HERE.”
The appellant did not file a written statement of facts to supplement the record. See Rule 5A:8(c).
Accordingly, we must consider whether the missing portion of the transcript is indispensable
to resolving the assignment of error. See Bay, 60 Va. App. at 528-29; Anderson v. Commonwealth,
13 Va. App. 506, 508 (1992). “Whether the record is sufficiently complete to permit our review on
appeal is a question of law subject to our de novo review.” Bay, 60 Va. App. at 529.
The Court concludes in this case that a transcript or written statement of facts containing the
grounds for the trial court’s ruling and its underlying factual findings is indispensable to resolving
the appellant’s assignment of error challenging the denial of his motion to suppress. See Smith v.
Commonwealth, 32 Va. App. 766, 772 (2000). The appellate court reviews de novo the
overarching question of whether a search or seizure violated the Fourth Amendment. Glenn v.
Commonwealth, 275 Va. 123, 130 (2008). Although the Court reviews de novo “the ultimate
question[]” of probable cause, “we ‘review findings of historical fact only for clear error and . . .
give due weight to inferences drawn from those facts by resident judges and local law
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enforcement officers.’” Long v. Commonwealth, 72 Va. App. 700, 712 (2021) (second alteration
in original) (footnote omitted) (quoting Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699 (1996)). “It
is the appellant’s burden to show that when viewing the evidence” in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, “the trial court committed reversible error.” Aponte v. Commonwealth, 68
Va. App. 146, 156 (2017) (quoting Hairston v. Commonwealth, 67 Va. App. 552, 560 (2017)).
As noted above, the parties litigated two issues at the suppression hearing: whether the
warrant was supported by probable cause and, if it was not, whether the good-faith exception to
the exclusionary rule applied. See generally United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 923 (1984)
(explaining that a warrant cannot be relied on in good faith if it lacks indicia of probable cause).
The record before this Court does not contain the grounds for the trial court’s ruling. It is true
that “[a]n appellate court is not limited to the grounds offered by the trial court in support of its
decision, and it is ‘entitled to affirm the court’s judgment on alternate grounds, if such grounds
are apparent from the record.’” Perry v. Commonwealth, 280 Va. 572, 582 (2010) (quoting MM
v. Sch. Dist. of Greenville Cnty., 303 F.3d 523, 536 (4th Cir. 2002) (emphasis added)). “In order
for a reviewing court to apply this legal principle, certain conditions must be met.” Vandyke v.
Commonwealth, 71 Va. App 723, 731-32 (2020). The first condition is that the record must
reflect that the “evidence necessary to that ground was before the [trial] court.” Banks v.
Commonwealth, 280 Va. 612, 617 (2010). The second condition, critical to our ability to resolve
the issue in this appeal, is that “if that evidence was conflicting, then the record must show how
the . . . court resolved the dispute.” Id.Due to the missing portion of the transcript, this Court does not know what factual
findings the trial court made related to its order denying the appellant’s motion to suppress.
Although we review all legal issues de novo, we must defer to the trial court’s factual findings
unless those findings are clearly erroneous. See Long, 72 Va. App. at 712. Given the current
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state of the record, we lack the necessary information to determine the trial court’s factual
findings to which deference is owed. Requiring this Court to engage in guesswork does not
satisfy the appellant’s burden to supply the appellate court with an adequate record to evaluate
his claim. Cf. Tynes v. Commonwealth, 49 Va. App. 17, 22 (2006) (noting the requirement of a
proper proffer, even if the Court is “not totally in the dark” concerning the nature of the claim).
The appellant failed to ensure that the record contains the material necessary to permit the
Court to resolve the sole assignment of error he presents on appeal. See Rule 5A:8(b)(4)(ii).
Consequently, we cannot consider it and affirm the judgment of the trial court. See Browning v.
Browning, 68 Va. App. 19, 30 (2017) (holding that a Rule 5A:8 error requires affirmance rather
than dismissal because it is non-jurisdictional).
CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the trial court’s judgment. We remand the matter to
the trial court for the sole purpose of correcting a clerical error in the sentencing order.2
Affirmed and remanded.
2
The sentence summary in the final sentencing order inconsistently tallies the suspended
portion of the sentence as 3 years and 30 months. We remand to the trial court for the limited
purpose of correcting this inconsistency in the final sentencing order. See Code § 8.01-428(B)
(governing the correction of clerical errors by the trial court).
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