Tanya Dionne Edwards v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Overton
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    TANYA DIONNE EDWARDS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0773-99-2                 JUDGE NELSON T. OVERTON
    MAY 16, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
    George F. Tidey, Judge
    Wayne R. Morgan, Jr., for appellant.
    Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    In a bench trial, the circuit court convicted Tanya Dionne
    Edwards, appellant, of grand larceny, forgery, and uttering a
    forged instrument.     On appeal, appellant contends that the
    evidence was insufficient to support the convictions.     We
    disagree, and affirm.
    "On appeal, 'we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.'"     Archer v.
    Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 1
    , 11, 
    492 S.E.2d 826
    , 831 (1997)
    (citation omitted).
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    So viewed, the evidence proved that appellant's twin
    sister, Tonya Edwards (Tonya), was working as a caretaker for
    the sister of Laura Robelen.    Robelen and her sister lived
    together.     Tonya stole three checks from Robelen.   She cashed
    one check at a bank in the presence of appellant.      The check was
    made payable to "Tanya Edwards" and was endorsed "Tanya
    Edwards." 1   Tonya used appellant's identification to cash the
    check.
    Appellant contends that the Commonwealth's evidence proved
    nothing more than her presence at the bank when Tonya cashed the
    check.    On the contrary, the evidence, viewed in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, proved that the check was made
    payable to "Tanya Edwards," was endorsed "Tanya Edwards," that
    appellant allowed Tonya to use appellant's identification to
    cash the check, and that appellant stood next to Tonya when
    Tonya cashed the check.    This evidence was sufficient to prove
    beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant, at a minimum, was a
    principal in the second degree to the commission of these
    crimes.     See, e.g., Ramsey v. Commonwealth, 
    2 Va. App. 265
    , 269,
    
    343 S.E.2d 465
    , 468 (1986) ("A principal in the second degree is
    a person who is present, aiding and abetting, by helping some
    way in the commission of the crime.").
    1
    Tonya testified that the check was made payable to her.
    However, the trial court stated that it believed otherwise.
    Furthermore, the check, which was entered as an exhibit, clearly
    shows that it was made payable to and endorsed Tanya, not Tonya.
    - 2 -
    Furthermore, we reject appellant's contention that the
    trial court erred in convicting her because the evidence is
    susceptible of two interpretations--one innocent and one not.
    Appellant's "innocent" interpretation is that she was merely
    present while Tonya cashed the check and that she did not know
    that Tonya was cashing a stolen check when she lent her
    identification to Tonya.   However, this interpretation of the
    evidence springs solely from the testimony of appellant and
    Tonya.   The fact finder rejected that testimony.   "In its role
    of judging witness credibility, the fact finder is entitled to
    disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused [and her
    witnesses] and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal
    his guilt."   Marable v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 505
    , 509-10,
    
    500 S.E.2d 233
    , 235 (1998).   Having rejected appellant's
    evidence as not worthy of belief, no "innocent" interpretation
    of the evidence remained before the court.
    Affirmed.
    - 3 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0773992

Filed Date: 5/16/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014