Jeffrey K. MacNelly v. Martha S. MacNelly ( 1995 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Baker, Bray and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
JEFFREY K. MacNELLY
v. Record No. 1985-94-4 MEMORANDUM OPINION *
BY JUDGE JOSEPH E. BAKER
MARTHA S. MacNELLY JUNE 6, 1995
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
Michael P. McWeeny, Judge
Charles A. Trainum, Jr. (Trainum, Snowdon & Deane,
P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
Gregory L. Murphy (David C. Schroeder; Murphy,
McGettigan, Richards & West, P.C., on brief), for
appellee.
Jeffrey K. MacNelly (husband) appeals from a decree entered
by the Circuit Court of Fairfax County (trial court). The
primary issue presented is whether he is entitled to offset
spousal support payments made to Martha S. MacNelly (wife), after
her remarriage, against other debts he owes wife pursuant to a
Property, Custody and Support Settlement Agreement (PSA) approved
and incorporated into a decree of divorce that dissolved their
marriage. Other issues raised by both husband and wife relate to
their respective claims concerning attorney fees.
On appeal, the judgment of the trial court is presumed
correct. Steinberg v. Steinberg, 11 Va. App. 323, 326, 398
S.E.2d 507, 508 (1990); Crum v. Udy, 206 Va. 880, 881, 146 S.E.2d
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
878, 879 (1966). We are not fact finders, and this appeal should
not be resolved on the basis of our supposition that one set of
facts is more probable than another. Lutes v. Alexander, 14 Va.
App. 1075, 1077, 421 S.E.2d 857, 859 (1992). Here, the burden is
on the party who alleges reversible error to show by the record
that reversal is the remedy to which that party is entitled.
Kaufman v. Kaufman, 7 Va. App. 488, 489, 375 S.E.2d 374, 380
(1988); see also Crum, 206 Va. at 881, 146 S.E.2d at 879.
FEES
Matters of attorney fees are submitted to the sound
discretion of the trial court and are reviewable on appeal only
for an abuse of discretion. Ingram v. Ingram, 217 Va. 27, 29,
225 S.E.2d 362, 364 (1976); Davis v. Davis, 8 Va. App. 12, 17,
377 S.E.2d 640, 643 (1989); Graves v. Graves, 4 Va. App. 326,
333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). We have examined the record in
this case, reviewed both briefs and authorities cited and
conclude that neither party has met his or her burden to prove
abuse of trial court discretion relating to the award or denial
of requests for attorney fees.
OFFSET
On appeal, we consider the evidence in the light most
favorable to the prevailing party below, and the trial court's
determination will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it. Furr v. Furr, 13 Va. App. 479,
481, 413 S.E.2d 72, 73 (1992); Clark v. Clark, 209 Va. 390, 395,
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164 S.E.2d 685, 689 (1968).
As the parties are familiar with the record, we state
briefly only those facts necessary to an understanding of this
opinion. The final decree of divorce, entered on March 20, 1990,
incorporated the terms of the PSA. In relevant part, that decree
required husband to pay wife (1) $7,000 per month spousal support
until February 1, 1996, (2) $100,000 as her equitable share of
the marital assets, and (3) at least $400,000 by September 30,
1996 for her interest in the syndication and licensing rights in
the comic strip "Shoe."
Following wife's December 5, 1991 remarriage, husband, on
January 29, 1992, ceased making the monthly spousal support
payments ordered by the divorce decree. After a hearing on May
21, 1992, the trial court held that the PSA and divorce decree
required continuation of support payments after wife's
remarriage. When the trial court made that finding, the
following colloquy occurred:
[HUSBAND'S COUNSEL]: Your Honor, we're
likely going to appeal this.
THE COURT: Of course.
[HUSBAND'S COUNSEL]: And I'd like to make
some arrangements that -- my client is
fearful that if he pays the arrearage, that
is continues to pay her when there is an
appeal, he'll never see the money again if
he's successful -- to have some bond set or
something to take care of that.
[WIFE'S COUNSEL]: If I may address that,
your Honor?
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THE COURT: Yes, sir.
[WIFE'S COUNSEL]: As Your Honor will
recognize, there is a large sum that
[husband] owes her marital property rights in
1996. The amount of money he has to pay [in
support payments] between now and then does
not come close to the amount that he's going
to have to pay in 1996. So, I can't
understand him having that fear since he
would obviously seek an offset at that point
in time.
THE COURT: Well, let me see. It does come
close. Unless I've missed something, if [the
spousal support] is paid out we're talking
about $336,000 and --
[WIFE'S COUNSEL]: It's a minimum of
$400,000.
THE COURT: It's a $400,000 minimum.
[WIFE'S COUNSEL]: And he already owes
another $150,000. So that brings it to
$550,000 at this point. So he has a way to
offset it if it ever should occur. That's my
point.
THE COURT: I think it is protected. I'm not
going to require a specific bond in this
matter. I will also not require an appeal
bond on your behalf, sir.
Husband appealed to this Court alleging that it was error to
require him to make spousal support payments to wife after she
had remarried; however, he continued to make the payments pending
that appeal. On November 30, 1993, in MacNelly v. MacNelly, 17
Va. App. 427, 437 S.E.2d 582 (1993), a panel of this Court
reversed the trial court, holding that husband was not obligated
to make the monthly spousal support payments after wife's
remarriage.
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On January 5, 1994, wife filed a show cause petition in the
trial court seeking an order requiring husband to pay the
$100,000 equitable distribution award required by the PSA, which
by February 4, 1994, with accrued interest, had increased in
value to $182,880.77. Husband responded to the show cause order
by asserting that the spousal support payments in the amount of
$171,000, paid by him during the pendency of the appeal, should
be offset against the $100,000 debt as if each payment was a
payment on that debt. The trial court held that husband was not
entitled to credit the spousal support payments made pending his
successful appeal against the $100,000 debt owed to wife.
Citing Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 429 S.E.2d 208 (1993),
wife contends that the trial court lacks authority to require her
to make restitution by offset of the spousal support payments
that had been ordered by the trial court. Husband contends that
Reid is not controlling here, asserting that this case involves
the enforcement of a support obligation made by private contract.
The trial court rejected that contention. The record discloses
that the PSA was incorporated into the divorce decree, thus the
issue arises from the decree, not just the contract.
Husband further contends that the colloquy quoted above, in
which the trial court opined, "I think it is protected,"
contained an agreement that if husband prevailed on appeal he
could offset the spousal support payments made pending the
appeal. The trial court did not agree and refused to find that
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the statements made bound wife to an offset.
Finally, husband urges this Court to hold that equity
requires, under the circumstances of this case, that he be
permitted to offset the spousal support payments made after his
successful November 30, 1993 appeal.
Reasonable persons may disagree as to whether the colloquy
contained language establishing a binding agreement. Thus, the
question was a matter for the trial court to determine. We
cannot say that its decision concerning that issue was plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.
The trial court based its decision upon Reid, where the
issue before the Supreme Court was stated as follows:
In this appeal we consider whether a trial
court may order restitution from a spouse who
received spousal support payments pursuant to
a court order when that order subsequently
was reversed on appeal.
Id. Speaking for the Court, Justice Lacy recognized the
established rule that divorce is strictly a creature of statute.
She then thoroughly examined the statutes controlling divorce
suits as they relate to restitution. In the opinion, restitution
was defined as "the recovery of money already paid." Noting that
"there are significant differences between a spousal support
order and an ordinary money judgment order," Justice Lacy stated
that "[a spousal support order] is based on need [while a money
judgment order is predicated] on entitlement." Id. at 413, 429
S.E.2d at 210. The extent of a divorce court's present authority
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to deal with offsets, which in this case is effectively a request
for restitution, may be found in the following:
Once the amount of spousal support is
determined, the statutes and case law
specifically limit the divorce court's
authority to retroactively modify that
amount, absent fraud on the court, a claim
absent here. Code § 20-109 provides that the
divorce court may modify or terminate spousal
support that "may thereafter accrue," but
makes no provision for modifying an award for
support previously accrued. As noted supra,
retroactive modification is specifically
addressed in Code § 20-112: "No support order
may be retroactively modified, but may be
modified with respect to any period during
which there is a pending petition for
modification, but only from the date that
notice of such petition has been given to the
responding party."
(Emphasis added.) Id. at 414, 429 S.E.2d at 211. The Reid Court
then concluded, "that the General Assembly has not made statutory
provisions for restitution of spousal support paid pursuant to an
order that is later reversed" and held that the trial court "did
[not] have statutory or inherent power to order restitution."
Id. at 415, 429 S.E.2d at 211.
Although matters relating to divorce are currently within
the jurisdiction of circuit courts, and are heard on the equity
side, in the absence of a statutory grant circuit courts are not
authorized to make general equitable judgments as may be rendered
in non-divorce cases.
In accord with Reid, 1 we hold that under the facts of this
1
Appellant also relies upon Hughes v. Hughes, 173 Va. 293, 4
S.E.2d 402 (1939), to distinguish the awarding of credit from an
order of restitution. We distinguish Reid from Hughes insofar
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case, the trial court was without statutory or inherent authority
to find that the spousal support payments made by husband after
wife's remarriage were payments being made on a fixed debt due
wife or that husband was entitled to restitution by way of
offset.
Accordingly, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
that Hughes involved voluntary alimony while Reid involved
spousal support ordered by the trial court.
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