Cynthia Margoupis v. Thomas Margoupis ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Annunziata, Bumgardner and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
CYNTHIA MARGOUPIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1168-98-4 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
FEBRUARY 23, 1999
THOMAS MARGOUPIS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
F. Bruce Bach, Judge
Morgan Brooke-Devlin for appellant.
David E. Jones for appellee.
Cynthia Margoupis (wife) appeals the decision of the circuit
court vacating its original decree of divorce and granting Thomas
Margoupis (husband) a new trial based upon newly-discovered
evidence. Wife raises the following issues on appeal:
(1) whether the trial court erred by vacating the first
final decree of divorce and granting husband a new
trial;
(2) whether the trial court erred by granting husband's
motion for suspension of support pending appeal;
(3) whether evidence supports the trial court's award of
equitable distribution, spousal support, and child
support;
(4) whether the trial court abused its discretion in
awarding husband attorney's fees and denying her
attorney's fees when husband failed to sustain his
burden of proof at the retrial; and
(5) whether wife should be awarded attorney's fees and
costs incurred in this appeal.
In his response, husband raises two additional issues. Husband
contends that the trial court erred (1) in granting a divorce on
the ground of a one-year separation despite the fact that no
*Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
evidence supported wife's exceptions to the commissioner's
finding that she deserted the marriage; and (2) by awarding wife
spousal support. Husband also contends that wife's request for
appellate attorney's fees is not justiciable. We find no error,
and affirm the decision of the trial court.
Evidence on the grounds for divorce was heard by a
commissioner in chancery. The trial court received the
additional evidence ore tenus. On appeal, under familiar
principles,
we view [the] evidence and all reasonable
inferences in the light most favorable to the
prevailing party below. Where, as here, the
court hears the evidence ore tenus, its
finding is entitled to great weight and will
not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it.
Martin v. Pittsylvania County Dep't of Social Servs., 3 Va. App.
15, 20, 348 S.E.2d 13, 16 (1986).
Vacation of Divorce Decree and Grant of New Trial
The party seeking a new trial based upon a claim of
newly-discovered evidence has the burden of establishing that the
evidence
(1) appears to have been discovered
subsequent to the trial; (2) could not have
been secured for use at the trial in the
exercise of reasonable diligence by the
movant; (3) is not merely cumulative,
corroborative or collateral; and (4) is
material, and such as should produce opposite
results on the merits at another trial.
Odum v. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 123, 130, 301 S.E.2d 145, 149
(1983). See Carter v. Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 507, 512-13, 393
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S.E.2d 639, 642 (1990). The granting of such a motion is not
favored, considered with special care and caution, and awarded
with great reluctance. See Odum, 225 Va. at 130, 301 S.E.2d at
149. Whether a new trial will be granted is a matter committed
to the sound discretion of the trial court, and its decision will
not be reversed except for an abuse of discretion. See Carter,
10 Va. App. at 514, 393 S.E.2d at 642.
In a motion filed within twenty-one days of the entry of the
final divorce decree, husband alleged that newly-discovered
photographs demonstrated that wife misrepresented the nature of
her relationship with Mountain Kim. Husband supported his motion
with an affidavit. The trial court ruled that the allegations,
if true, could have a bearing on the spousal support and
equitable distribution trial, and vacated the final decree. We
find no error in the trial court's action to preserve the matter
for further consideration of husband's allegation.
We also find no merit in wife's contention that the trial
court erred as a matter of law by failing to make the necessary
findings prior to ordering a new trial. Both the transcript of
the hearing on husband's motion and the court's order of January
24, 1997, demonstrated that the trial court made sufficient
findings.
Throughout the first proceeding, wife denied any financial
or romantic relationship with Kim. She testified that she paid
Kim rent, that she received no money from him, that they took two
specific trips together, and that they were not romantically
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involved. At the second trial, after the photographs were
discovered but returned to wife in settlement of the criminal
complaint she registered against Kim's son, wife asserted her
Fifth Amendment rights in response to questions concerning her
relationship with Kim and their travels. Evidence presented at
the second trial demonstrated that payments to Kim's business
were endorsed to wife, who then deposited the checks into her
account.
Contrary to wife's contentions on appeal, the
after-discovered evidence was relevant to the accuracy of wife's
testimony at the first trial and to her claimed expenses. We
find no error in the trial court's decision to grant husband's
motion for a new trial.
Suspension of Support
Wife contends that the trial court erred when it suspended
wife's spousal support while she appealed its order vacating the
final decree. We disagree. "The orderly administration of
justice demands that when an appellate court acquires
jurisdiction over the parties involved in litigation and the
subject matter of their controversy, the jurisdiction of the
trial court from which the appeal was taken must cease." Greene
v. Greene, 223 Va. 210, 212, 288 S.E.2d 447, 448 (1982). After
the appellate court acquires jurisdiction over a matter,
modifications can be made only with leave of the appellate court.
See id.- 4 -
However, modification of an order is distinct from
suspension of the order. Code § 8.01-676.1 provides that "[t]he
court from which an appeal is sought may refuse to suspend the
execution of decrees for support and custody, and may also refuse
suspension when a judgment refuses, grants, modifies, or
dissolves an injunction." The Supreme Court noted that
the General Assembly specifically has
addressed the suspension of a support order
pending appeal. Generally, a party appealing
an ordinary judgment is entitled to have the
execution of the judgment suspended pending
an appeal upon the filing of a sufficient
appeal bond or irrevocable letter of credit.
Code § 8.01-676.1(C). In contrast, a party
is not entitled as a matter of course to
suspension of a judgment for spousal support
pending appeal. Code § 8.01-676.1(D)
authorizes a court to refuse to suspend such
orders.
Reid v. Reid, 245 Va. 409, 414, 429 S.E.2d 208, 211 (1993).
Thus, a trial court may, but is not required to, refuse to
suspend an award of spousal support pending appeal. This Court
noted that Code § 8.01-676.1(D) empowers "the trial court in a
civil proceeding . . . to suspend or refuse to suspend the
execution of its judgment, decree or order during the pendency of
an appeal." Decker v. Decker, 17 Va. App. 562, 564, 440 S.E.2d
411, 412 (1994) (emphasis added).
The trial court's final decree was vacated by order entered
January 24, 1997. The trial court lost jurisdiction to modify
this order when wife's appeal was filed with this Court.
However, the trial court retained authority to suspend its order
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of spousal support during the pendency of the appeal. Code
§ 8.01-676.1(D).
Sufficient Evidence
Wife contends that insufficient evidence supports the trial
court's decision on equitable distribution, spousal support, and
child support. We disagree. The trial court found that evidence
presented by husband at trial was sufficient to demonstrate that
wife failed to truthfully describe the nature of her relationship
with Kim. The trial court specifically found that it did not
believe wife's testimony concerning the payments she received
from Kim: "As far as spous[al] support, I've reconsidered
spous[al] support, enlightened by my findings of what your real
expenses were as opposed to what you testified to, and I am
setting spous[al] support at One Hundred Fifty Dollars per
month." The trial court considered the evidence presented by
husband concerning the financial benefits wife received from Kim
and whether those benefits affected the amount of spousal support
to which wife was entitled. See Collier v. Collier, 2 Va. App.
125, 129, 341 S.E.2d 827, 829 (1986). Evidence in the record
supports the trial court's decision to adjust the amount of
spousal support previously ordered. We find no error.
Because the amount of child support was readjusted pursuant
to the modified spousal support award, we also find no error in
the child support award.
The trial court granted husband an additional five percent
share of his 401(k) pension plan as reimbursement for earnings
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lost due to a loan taken from the pension during the marriage.
While on appeal wife objects to this ruling, she did not specify
how it was erroneous. "Fashioning an equitable distribution
award lies within the sound discretion of the trial judge and
that award will not be set aside unless it is plainly wrong or
without evidence to support it." Srinivasan v. Srinivasan, 10
Va. App. 728, 732, 396 S.E.2d 675, 678 (1990). "Unless it
appears from the record that the trial judge has not considered
or has misapplied one of the statutory mandates, this Court will
not reverse on appeal." Ellington v. Ellington, 8 Va. App. 48,
56, 378 S.E.2d 626, 630 (1989). Evidence supports the trial
court's equitable distribution decision, as modified.
There was no error in the trial court's decision to limit
the issues on retrial to those possibly tainted by wife's failure
to testify accurately. While wife alleged that husband's income
was underreported, she did not file a motion to bring that issue
before the court and the trial court ruled that it would not
consider that issue in the absence of any motion. The trial
court considered the evidence before it. Therefore, the trial
court's decision on equitable distribution, spousal support and
child support will not be set aside.
Attorney's Fees
An award of attorney's fees is a matter submitted to the
sound discretion of the trial court and is reviewable on appeal
only for an abuse of discretion. See Graves v. Graves, 4 Va.
App. 326, 333, 357 S.E.2d 554, 558 (1987). The key to a proper
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award of counsel fees is reasonableness under all the
circumstances. See McGinnis v. McGinnis, 1 Va. App. 272, 277,
338 S.E.2d 159, 162 (1985).
Wife contends that the trial court erred by awarding husband
attorney's fees incurred in the second trial while denying her
additional fees. We disagree. Wife's misrepresentations on
material and relevant facts warranted the new trial. Contrary to
wife's assertion on appeal, the trial court found that husband's
allegations were meritorious. We cannot say that the award was
unreasonable or that the trial judge abused his discretion in
making the award.
Attorney's Fees on Appeal
We find no merit in wife's appeal. Therefore, we decline
her request for appellate attorney's fees. However, we reject
husband's contention that wife raised a non-justiciable matter by
seeking appellate attorney's fees. See O'Loughlin v. O'Loughlin,
23 Va. App. 690, 479 S.E.2d 98 (1996).
Grounds for Divorce
The trial court granted the parties a divorce on the basis
of a one-year separation. Husband contends that the trial court
abused its discretion by rejecting the commissioner's finding
that husband proved wife deserted the marriage because there was
no factual basis for wife's exceptions to the commissioner's
report. "It is well established that 'where dual or multiple
grounds for divorce exist, the trial judge can use his sound
discretion to select the grounds upon which he will grant the
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divorce.'" Williams v. Williams, 14 Va. App. 217, 220, 415
S.E.2d 252, 253 (1992) (citation omitted). Evidence supported
the ground on which the trial court granted the divorce. We find
no abuse of discretion in the trial court's decision not to award
husband a divorce on the ground of desertion.
Award of Spousal Support
Husband also contends that the trial court erred by awarding
wife any spousal support in light of the evidence that she
deserted the marriage. Assuming without deciding that the
evidence supported a finding of desertion by wife, her fault
would not necessarily bar spousal support. See Code § 20-107.1.
Wife testified she was working three jobs. The trial court
reduced the amount of spousal support wife received after
determining she failed to accurately disclose her income and
expenses. Based upon the evidence, the trial court found that
wife was entitled to $150 in monthly spousal support. Husband
has failed to demonstrate that the trial court erred in making
that award.
In conclusion, we affirm the decision of the trial court
granting husband a new trial, suspending spousal support pending
wife's first appeal and retrial, modifying spousal support and
child support, modifying the equitable distribution award, and
awarding husband attorney's fees incurred in the second trial.
We find no error in the trial court's decision to award the
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parties a divorce on the ground of a one-year separation or to
award reduced spousal support to wife.
Affirmed.
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