Julie Harris, etc. v. Commonwealth ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Coleman, Willis and Senior Judge Hodges
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
JULIE HARRIS, S/K/A
JULIE JOY HARRIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1201-96-1 JUDGE WILLIAM H. HODGES
JUNE 17, 1997
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Wilford Taylor, Jr., Judge
Charles E. Haden for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Julie Harris appeals the decision of the circuit court
finding her guilty of one count of felony child neglect in
violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(A). Harris contends that there
was insufficient evidence to prove that she willfully permitted
injury to her child. We affirm the decision of the trial court.
Code § 18.2-371.1(A) provides:
Any parent, guardian, or other person
responsible for the care of a child under the
age of eighteen who by willful act or
omission or refusal to provide any necessary
care for the child's health causes or permits
serious injury to the life or health of such
child shall be guilty of a Class 4 felony.
For purposes of this subsection, "serious
injury" shall include but not be limited to
(i) disfigurement, (ii) a fracture, (iii) a
severe burn or laceration, (iv) mutilation,
(v) maiming, (vi) forced ingestion of
dangerous substances, or (vii)
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
life-threatening internal injuries.
"On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom." Martin v. Commonwealth,
4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358 S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). So viewed, the
evidence established that, beginning January 12, 1995, appellant
was aware that Tyler was suffering from a series of injuries
while in her husband's care. From January 12, 1995 until
appellant took the child to the emergency room on February 20,
1995, appellant's son suffered bruises, tender limbs, and swollen
lips. X-rays indicated that the three-month-old child had
incurred five "chip fractures or avulsion fractures" of his arms
and legs, "caused by rotational wrenching type of injury about
the joint." The extent of healing of the injuries indicated that
some had occurred several weeks earlier while others occurred
within hours or days.
Mary Hinkle provided day care for appellant's son three or
four hours a day, five days a week. Hinkle testified that on
January 12, 1995, appellant and her husband pointed out a bruise
on Tyler's head which appellant explained was caused when Tyler
rolled off a waterbed while in her husband's care. Towards the
end of January, Hinkle noticed that the child was not using his
right arm. In mid-February, he screamed when she tried to
straighten his left leg. During that same period in
mid-February, the child arrived at day care with a swollen lip.
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Appellant told Hinkle that her husband did not want her to take
the child to the emergency room because he was afraid he would be
put in jail.
While appellant contends that the evidence was insufficient
to prove her guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, we find that the
evidence demonstrated that she knew her son was at risk but, by
"omission or refusal" to act, allowed the abuse to continue for a
period of weeks. Inaction when action was necessary to protect
the health and well-being of her child was culpable and was
precisely the type of behavior the section was designed to
criminalize. It was appellant's duty to protect her son from
abuse which the evidence showed she knew was taking place.
Therefore, there was sufficient credible, competent evidence
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that, by her willful omission,
appellant permitted her child to suffer serious injuries, in
violation of Code § 18.2-371.1(A).
For the reasons stated, we affirm the decision of the trial
court.
Affirmed.
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