Joseph S. Kost v. Roberta E. Kost ( 1999 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata
    Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
    JOSEPH S. KOST
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0116-99-1       CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
    DECEMBER 14, 1999
    ROBERTA E. KOST
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF YORK COUNTY
    N. Prentis Smiley, Jr., Judge
    Nancy J. Luchs (Furlong & Luchs, on brief), for
    appellant.
    No brief or argument for appellee.
    In this domestic relations case, Joseph S. Kost (husband)
    appeals the trial court's equitable distribution order.     On
    appeal, he contends the trial court erred:     (1) in making an
    equitable distribution award based on the written proffers of
    the parties and without properly considering the statutory
    factors of Code § 20-107.3; (2) in awarding fifty-percent of the
    marital property to wife and in making various other awards,
    including in-kind marital property, distribution of IRA accounts
    and permanent spousal support; (3) in its calculation of
    pendente lite support; (4) in declining to postpone the
    equitable distribution hearing until a court reporter arrived;
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    (5) by including a "hold harmless" provision in the award of
    real property to husband; (6) in requiring husband to maintain a
    survivor benefit plan for wife under his military retirement;
    and (7) in continuing pendente lite support after the entry of
    the divorce decree and equitable distribution award. 1
    I.    BACKGROUND
    On appeal, we construe the evidence in the light most
    favorable to wife, the prevailing party below, granting to her
    evidence all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.
    See Donnell v. Donnell, 
    20 Va. App. 37
    , 39, 
    455 S.E.2d 256
    , 257
    (1995) (citing McGuire v. McGuire, 
    10 Va. App. 248
    , 250, 
    391 S.E.2d 344
    , 346 (1990)).
    So viewed, the evidence established that the parties were
    married October 23, 1971 in Devon, Pennsylvania.     Husband served
    in the United States Air Force for approximately 26 years, and
    he retired August 1, 1998.      Wife worked as an office manager for
    approximately ten years.   The parties separated October 1, 1996.
    Following an initial pendente lite support hearing, husband
    was ordered to pay wife temporary support in the amount of
    $2,797 per month.   On August 5, 1998, husband moved the court to
    1
    In his opening brief, husband alleged fourteen assignments
    of error. Some of his arguments are repetitive and, accordingly,
    we have combined his arguments in this appeal.
    - 2 -
    reduce the award of temporary spousal support. 2   Following the
    direct examination of husband, the hearing was continued to
    August 19, 1998 ("August hearing").
    At the August hearing, both husband and wife testified as
    to their income and financial obligations.    Based upon the
    evidence presented, the trial court reduced wife's award of
    temporary support to $2,473 per month. 3   At that time, the trial
    court also conducted a pretrial hearing, in which the parties
    discussed the disputed issues and the trial court advised the
    parties of its method of equitable distribution.
    The equitable distribution hearing was held on November 5,
    1998 ("November hearing").   Adhering to the pretrial schedule,
    the parties presented testimony and the trial court reviewed
    their written proffers.   Throughout the hearing, the trial judge
    made various oral rulings, to which husband did not object.    At
    the conclusion of the November hearing, husband's counsel was
    asked to prepare the order reflecting the trial court's
    decisions.
    On December 15, 1998 ("December hearing"), the parties
    appeared before the trial court to resolve undetermined issues,
    2
    Husband failed to file in the trial court the transcript of
    the August 5, 1998 hearing and, therefore, we are unable to
    determine what occurred at that hearing.
    3
    On September 21, 1998, the parties appeared before the
    trial court because they disputed the previous pendente lite
    support award. However, husband failed to include this transcript
    in the Appendix.
    - 3 -
    including equitable distribution of life insurance policies,
    husband's military pension, and various claims for personal
    property.    Husband objected to the trial court's rulings from
    the November hearing.    After considering arguments, the trial
    court held that the objections were untimely and, therefore,
    waived.
    Ms. Luchs, I'm baffled by your today's
    position. We went through -- and although
    this may be your first case in the Ninth
    Circuit, you certainly went through an
    educational process in September when we did
    our pretrial. The Court explained to you
    how that would happen.
    *      *      *      *      *      *      *
    . . . And I have a note that there are
    no facts in dispute under the factors, and
    we would have resolved that on August 19,
    1998.
    Ms. Luchs, in all due respect to you
    and your concern about the procedure of the
    Court, when there's no facts in dispute
    under the factors, there's nothing to try
    except what we set forth on other types of
    issues such as the classification issues,
    and we assign burdens of proof on those.
    . . . Everything else under classification
    was agreed.
    *      *      *      *      *      *      *
    Now, we've spent an hour this morning
    discussing or retrying the case. The Court
    will enter an order of divorce, retain the
    matter on the docket for further
    determination as to . . . permanent support
    . . . .
    In its decree entered December 15, 1998, the trial court granted
    the parties a divorce.    The trial court "expressly retain[ed]"
    - 4 -
    its jurisdiction to determine the issue of permanent spousal
    support and ordered that pendente lite support continue "until
    further modified."    In a separate order, the trial court awarded
    equitable distribution of the property.
    II.   RULE 5A:18
    Rule 5A:18 provides that "[n]o ruling of the trial court
    . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the
    objection was stated together with the grounds therefor at the
    time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the
    Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice."   Rule 5A:18;
    see also Taylor v. Taylor, 
    27 Va. App. 209
    , 212, 212 n.1, 
    497 S.E.2d 916
    , 917, 917 n.1 (1998); Smith v. Smith, 
    18 Va. App. 427
    , 433, 
    444 S.E.2d 269
    , 273-74 (1994).
    The main purpose of requiring timely
    specific objections is to afford the trial
    court an opportunity to rule intelligently
    on the issues presented, thus avoiding
    unnecessary appeals and reversals. In
    addition, a specific, contemporaneous
    objection gives the opposing party the
    opportunity to meet the objection at that
    stage of the proceeding.
    Weidman v. Babcock, 
    241 Va. 40
    , 44, 
    400 S.E.2d 164
    , 167 (1991)
    (citation omitted).
    The "ends of justice" exception is "narrow and is to be
    used sparingly. . . ."    Patrick v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 655
    , 660, 
    500 S.E.2d 839
    , 842 (1998) (citations omitted).   "In
    order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must
    affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred,
    - 5 -
    not that a miscarriage might have occurred."        Redman v.
    Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 215
    , 221, 
    487 S.E.2d 269
    , 272 (1997)
    (emphasis in original).
    In the instant case, many of husband's assignments of error
    were not properly preserved in the trial court proceedings and,
    thus, Rule 5A:18 bars our consideration of them on appeal.
    III.    EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION HEARING
    A.   Use of Written Proffers
    Husband argues that the trial court erred in making an
    equitable distribution award based on the submitted written
    proffers of the parties and in limiting his presentation of
    evidence.
    Husband did not request that he be allowed to call
    witnesses on his behalf, and he failed to object to the trial
    court's method of taking evidence at the November hearing.      It
    was not until the conclusion of the December hearing that
    husband made the following objection:    "[O]ne of my objections
    is that I did not have an opportunity to conduct
    cross-examination.   I don't see how Your Honor can make a ruling
    on written proffers alone without eliciting testimony,
    permitting cross-examination or argument of counsel." 4
    4
    In finding that the parties were given a reasonable
    opportunity to present evidence, the trial court noted the
    following: "And you had that opportunity . . . to reduce your
    facts to writing, and the Court did a pretrial [conference] and
    I asked what facts are legitimately in dispute so that we can
    set those aside for ore tenus consideration."
    - 6 -
    Husband's objection was not timely made.    "In order to be
    considered on appeal, an objection must be timely made and the
    grounds stated with specificity."     McLean v. Commonwealth, 
    30 Va. App. 322
    , 329, 
    516 S.E.2d 717
    , 720 (1999) (en banc).
    "To be timely, an objection must be made when the occasion
    arises -- at the time the evidence is offered or the statement
    made."   
    Id.
    Without a contemporaneous objection from counsel at the
    time the evidence was offered by the parties, husband's argument
    is procedurally barred on appeal.     See Crawley v. Commonwealth,
    
    29 Va. App. 372
    , 375, 
    512 S.E.2d 169
    , 171 (1999) ("Because
    appellant registered no hearsay objection to the admissibility
    of the cards, he waived the right to contest their admissibility
    on appeal."); Newton v. Commonealth, 
    29 Va. App. 433
    , 459-60,
    
    512 S.E.2d 846
    , 858-59 (1999) (holding that defendant's
    objection to the trial court's statement to the jury was
    procedurally barred because he failed to contemporaneously
    object at the time the statement was made); see also Woodson v.
    Commonwealth, 
    211 Va. 285
    , 288-89, 
    176 S.E.2d 818
    , 821 (1970)
    ("A litigant may not, in a motion to strike, raise for the first
    time a question of admissibility of evidence.").
    Next, husband argues that the trial court's method of
    taking evidence denied him due process.    This claim is also
    barred by Rule 5A:18 because "he failed to raise this argument
    before the trial judge and, therefore, denied the judge the
    - 7 -
    opportunity to consider the question."       Yiaadey v. Commonwealth,
    
    29 Va. App. 534
    , 546, 
    513 S.E.2d 446
    , 452 (1999); see Patrick,
    
    27 Va. App. at 660
    , 500 S.E.2d at 842 ("Rule 5A:18 applies to
    bar even constitutional claims.").       Additionally, the record
    does not show affirmatively that a miscarriage of justice
    occurred and, therefore, provides insufficient grounds for
    invocation of the ends of justice exception.
    B.    Statutory Factors
    Husband next contends that the trial court erred by failing
    to consider the statutory factors of Code § 20-107.3 in
    determining the equitable distribution award.      He argues that
    the trial court "never considered each of the statutory factors
    in any sort of one-by-one basis but only in the aggregate."
    Husband did not object to the trial court's decision at the
    conclusion of the November hearing and, in fact, was asked
    without objection to prepare the equitable distribution order.
    Having failed to properly preserve this issue, husband's
    argument is barred.   See Rule 5A:18.      Additionally, the evidence
    established that the trial court considered the statutory
    factors.
    IV.   EQUITABLE DISTRIBUTION AWARD
    A.    Division of Property
    Husband next argues that the trial court erred in dividing
    the marital property equally, awarding a fifty-percent
    distribution to each party.     He contends that the parties did
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    not agree upon the percentage and that the trial court proceeded
    on this mistaken assumption.
    At the November hearing, husband failed to timely object to
    the fifty-percent division of marital property and agreed to an
    equal split of the marital property.         At the conclusion of the
    December hearing, the trial court asked counsel whether she had
    previously objected to the fifty-percent division.
    COURT: Did you say that that wasn't
    correct?
    MS. LUCHS:      No, sir, I did not.
    COURT:    You did not dispute it?
    MS. LUCHS:      No, sir.
    (Emphasis added).   Husband ultimately conceded that his
    objection was untimely, stating the following:        "I did not make
    at the time the objections that I should have made, and I admit
    that quite readily." 5    We conclude that under these
    5
    When the trial court reconsidered counsel's argument, the
    following colloquy took place:
    COURT: So we had an agreement to begin
    with, is that what it was?
    MR. WOOD:      That's the point.
    MS. LUCHS: No. As we addressed each issue,
    Your Honor ruled on that issue. That's
    throughout the transcript.
    COURT:    And it was 50 percent throughout?
    MS. LUCHS:     That was Your Honor's ruling.
    - 9 -
    circumstances, having failed to timely object to the trial
    court's use of a fifty-percent figure throughout the proceedings
    when the division of property was made, husband waived any
    objection to the award.      See Rule 5A:18.
    B.   In-Kind Marital Property
    Husband argues that the trial court erred by making an
    award of in-kind marital property.         At the time of the November
    hearing, wife was in possession of the parties' china, crystal
    and silverware.     After the parties separated, but prior to these
    proceedings, wife gave husband a box containing jewelry.
    Husband lost the jewelry and filed an insurance claim in the
    amount of $6,943.    In its equitable distribution award, the
    trial court awarded wife her marital share of the value of the
    jewelry.   Additionally, the court ordered wife to appraise the
    COURT: And that was the agreement of the
    parties?
    MS. LUCHS: It was not the agreement of the
    parties, Your Honor.
    COURT: When you say "it was not the
    agreement," but you never made it an issue;
    is that correct?
    MS. LUCHS:     That is correct, Your Honor.
    COURT:    So you're making it an issue today?
    MS. LUCHS:     Yes, sir.
    COURT:    Overruled.   Too late.
    (Emphasis added).
    - 10 -
    parties' china, crystal and silverware and pay husband his
    marital share of its value.
    At the November hearing, husband did not object to the
    trial court's in-kind division of the china, crystal and
    silverware.   In fact, husband's counsel implicitly agreed to the
    disposition of this marital property, stating the following:
    MS. LUCHS: So you're physically awarding
    her these items?
    COURT: That is correct, marital property
    untitled. I believe the Court has the
    authority to award in-kind marital property
    which is untitled.
    MS. LUCHS: I'm not disputing the Court's
    authority, Your Honor. I just want to make
    sure I fully understanding your ruling, sir.
    COURT:    Okay.
    *       *       *      *      *    *   *
    COURT: Now, did you have another issue you
    wished to bring to mind?
    MS. LUCHS:       No, sir.
    (Emphasis added).   Having failed to timely object to the trial
    court's decision, husband's claim is barred on appeal.     See Rule
    5A:18.
    C.    IRA Accounts
    Husband contends that the parties did not discuss the
    division of their respective IRA accounts and that the trial
    court erred by including this property in the equitable
    distribution award.    However, at both the November and December
    - 11 -
    hearings these accounts were discussed by the parties.    The
    record affirmatively establishes that the parties discussed the
    inclusion of this property in the equitable distribution award
    and, in fact, husband included both IRA accounts in his written
    proffers:   "IRA: Husband, $69,315; Wife, $45,000."
    Additionally, at the December hearing the parties debated
    at length the division of the IRA accounts.   The trial court
    specifically asked husband's counsel what his position was on
    this issue.   Counsel stated:
    I think each should benefit from their
    respective contributions. In fact, Mr. Kost
    made substantial contributions to Mrs.
    Kost's IRA. She's contributed to her own
    IRA through her employer. Mr. Kost has
    totally funded his own IRA. I don't see
    where she should benefit from those efforts
    on his behalf to fund his own IRA.
    Contrary to counsel's assertion, this issue was clearly
    addressed by the trial court.
    Additionally, husband offered no evidence that the deposits
    into either of the parties' IRA accounts were his separate
    property.   Absent credible evidence establishing the separate
    nature of at least a portion of the funds, we cannot hold that
    the trial court erred in classifying these accounts as marital
    assets or in distributing them to the parties equally.    See
    Luczkovich v. Luczkovich, 
    26 Va. App. 702
    , 715, 
    496 S.E.2d 157
    ,
    163 (1998); Marion v. Marion, 
    11 Va. App. 659
    , 670, 
    401 S.E.2d 432
    , 439 (1991) (holding that husband's IRA account was subject
    - 12 -
    to equitable distribution because it was purchased during
    marriage, creating presumption of marital property, and no
    evidence in record indicated that it was his separate property).
    D.   Permanent Spousal Support
    Husband argues that the trial court erred in awarding, sua
    sponte, permanent spousal support.      "Surely it is an abuse of
    discretion to insert into a final order an issue which neither
    party has asked the court to consider, . . . ."
    Because wife requested in her Answer to the Bill of
    Complaint "that she be awarded temporary and permanent spousal
    support," the issue of permanent spousal support was properly
    before the trial court's consideration. 6    More importantly, the
    record establishes that the trial court did not make an award of
    permanent spousal support in the divorce decree.     Rather, it
    "expressly retain[ed] jurisdiction to determine the issue of the
    payment of spousal support" and its previous award of pendente
    lite support was ordered to "remain in full force and effect
    until further modified."
    Here, we conclude the trial court did not err in retaining
    its jurisdiction to later consider the issue of permanent
    spousal support.   See Rogers v. Damron, 
    23 Va. App. 708
    , 715,
    
    479 S.E.2d 540
    , 543 (1997) (noting that the trial court may
    reserve "consideration of support, custody, or property issues"
    6
    Husband did not include the Answer and Cross-Bill in the
    Appendix.
    - 13 -
    to provide "the parties additional time to resolve their
    differences" (emphasis added)); Zipf v. Zipf, 
    8 Va. App. 387
    ,
    390, 
    382 S.E.2d 263
    , 265 (1989) ("That order specifically
    continued the cause, retaining jurisdiction to determine issues
    of spousal support and maintenance, . . . .      By it's very
    language, that order did not purport to dispose of all issues
    remaining in the suit." (emphasis added)).
    V.   PENDENTE LITE SUPPORT
    A.   Imputed Income
    Husband asserts the trial court erred in finding that he
    was "voluntary unemployed" and by imputing income to him for
    purposes of determining pendente lite support.         At the
    conclusion of the parties' evidence at the August 19, 1998
    hearing for temporary support, the trial court made the
    following findings:
    The Court finds that the income of the wife
    has changed. It is now $1,926. The Court
    finds that the income of the husband has
    changed to $4,213 per month but that the
    income is voluntary unemployment income.
    *      *         *       *      *       *       *
    Therefore, there has been a substantial
    change of circumstance. Pendente lite
    support will be pursuant to the Ninth
    Circuit guidelines, income of the wife
    $1,926, income of the husband $7,474.
    Accordingly, the trial court awarded wife temporary support in
    the amount of $2,473 per month.      Husband's counsel prepared the
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    order, which was signed by the trial court and endorsed by both
    parties.
    Husband did not object to the award of temporary support at
    the August 19, 1998 hearing or when he endorsed the trial
    court's pendente lite support order.    Indeed, at a later hearing
    on September 21, 1998 to discuss the trial court's award of
    temporary support, husband was given another opportunity to
    object to the order, but failed to do so.   The trial court
    stated the following:
    COURT: All right. If you'll make those
    changes. Ms. Luchs, I think you and Mr.
    Wood can probably resolve these issues based
    upon this discussion this morning, and I'd
    ask that you endorse the order. And you
    make your notes to whatever you object to
    relevant to that.
    MS. LUCHS:   Yes, sir.
    COURT: On the order, if in fact you have
    any objection. I think we may have resolved
    that for you. And I thank you for coming
    this morning. I'm sorry to put you to that
    trouble.
    (Emphasis added).
    The record establishes that husband did not object at the
    time of the trial court's ruling, at the time counsel was asked
    to prepare the order, or at the time the trial court gave him
    another opportunity to do so at the September 21, 1998 hearing.
    Having failed to timely object to the trial court's award of
    pendente lite support, his argument is barred on appeal.      See
    Rule 5A:18.
    - 15 -
    B.   Overstated Income
    Husband also argues that the trial court erred in modifying
    his income for purposes of determining pendente lite support.
    He contends that when the trial court calculated the support
    award, husband's income was "overstated."   Husband argues that
    the trial court later recognized this error and at the August
    19, 1998 hearing the court agreed to "credit the husband from
    the April 29, 1998, order wherein the income was overstated."
    Our review of the record indicates that there is no trial
    court order dated April 29, 1998.   Additionally, husband failed
    to include a copy of the August 5, 1998 hearing transcript in
    the Appendix, and it appears from the record that a copy of that
    transcript was not filed in the trial court.    Accordingly, we
    are unable to determine whether any income was "overstated" in a
    previous order of the trial court and, therefore, we are unable
    to properly decide this issue.    See Twardy v. Twardy, 
    14 Va. App. 651
    , 654, 
    419 S.E.2d 848
    , 850 (1992) (en banc) ("[A]n
    appellant has the primary responsibility of ensuring that a
    complete record is furnished to an appellate court so that the
    errors assigned may be decided properly."); Id. at 658, 
    419 S.E.2d at 852
     ("The trial court's judgment is presumed to be
    correct, and 'the burden is on the appellant to present to us a
    sufficient record from which we can determine whether the lower
    court has erred.'").
    - 16 -
    Significantly, when husband's counsel prepared the order
    for pendente lite support he did not object to the trial court's
    calculations.    Even if the trial court mistakenly failed to
    credit husband the claimed amount, husband agreed to and signed
    the order without objection.      Accordingly, his argument is
    barred on appeal.    See Rule 5A:18.
    VI.   COURT REPORTER
    Husband argues that the trial court erred in declining to
    postpone the November 5, 1998 hearing until a court reporter
    arrived to transcribe the proceedings.      However, husband did not
    object to the trial court's decision, and he conceded that no
    substantive issues had been discussed during the ten-minute
    absence of the court reporter.      When the parties discussed this
    issue at the December 15, 1998 hearing, husband's counsel stated
    the following:
    But, again, during that ten minutes, as I
    recall, no substantive issues were
    discussed, and that's probably reflected in
    your notes. Certainly, in the beginning of
    the transcript, Your Honor notified the
    court reporter of what had been discussed to
    the point of her arrival, . . . .
    Accordingly, husband waived any objection to the absence of a
    court reporter during the beginning of the November 5, 1998
    hearing.   See Rule 5A:18.
    VII.   HOLD HARMLESS PROVISION
    Husband argues that trial court's final order is flawed
    under various federal bankruptcy provisions and laws.     In its
    - 17 -
    order the trial court awarded husband real property located in
    Blacksburg, Virginia, and ordered wife to execute a deed
    conveying her marital interest in that property to husband.    The
    trial court valued the Blacksburg property at $80,000, with a
    debt of $72,048, resulting in an equity value of $7,951.
    Accordingly, husband was ordered to pay wife $3,975, her marital
    share of the equity value.
    In addition, the trial court noted that "[husband] shall
    hold [wife] harmless for the mortgage payment on said property
    and shall make a good faith effort to refinance the property
    thereby relieving [wife] and the parties' daughter 7 of the debt."
    On appeal, husband argues that this hold harmless provision
    violates federal bankruptcy laws.
    Husband's claim of error is procedurally barred because he
    failed to make a timely objection to the trial court's ruling.
    See Rule 5A:18.   At the November hearing, husband testified that
    he was going to refinance the Blacksburg property to get a lower
    interest rate and to release his daughter from any liability as
    a named party to the original deed.    Because the trial court did
    not want to order husband to refinance the property if it was
    not possible, the court only required that he make a "good faith
    7
    The evidence established that in addition to husband and
    wife the parties' daughter was named in the original deed of the
    Blacksburg property.
    - 18 -
    effort" to do so.   Additionally, the trial court ruled as
    follows:
    COURT: And you will hold Mrs. Kost harmless
    from that debt. For instance, if it was
    foreclosed on and there was a deficiency and
    they came after both of you, it's your
    responsibility to hold her harmless on that
    debt.
    MR. WOOD: I would like the order to reflect
    that hold harmless to the extent that she
    would have to pay any of that debt, that
    would transfer into the nature of spousal
    support; and therefore, not dischargeable in
    bankruptcy.
    COURT:   So ordered.
    Husband did not object to the trial court's ruling and,
    therefore, his argument is barred on appeal.         See Rule 5A:18.
    VIII.   HUSBAND'S MILITARY RETIREMENT
    Lastly, husband argues that the trial court abused its
    discretion by requiring him to maintain the survivor benefit
    plan under his military retirement.        Husband did not object to
    the court's decision at that time and, therefore, his argument
    is barred on appeal.      Additionally, husband did not object at
    the December hearing when the parties were discussing the
    military pension.   Having failed to timely object, husband's
    argument is barred on appeal.      See Rule 5A:18.
    IX.    CONTINUATION OF SUPPORT
    Husband argues that the trial court erred in requiring him
    to continue paying pendente lite support after the entry of the
    divorce decree and equitable distribution award.        Husband did
    - 19 -
    not raise this issue at any time during the proceedings and his
    only objection was raised in his exceptions to the order.
    As noted above, the trial court expressly retained
    jurisdiction to determine permanent spousal support and,
    therefore, continued pendente lite support "until further
    modified."    Because the trial court correctly reserved
    jurisdiction to further consider the issue, we find no abuse of
    discretion.    See Rogers, 
    23 Va. App. at 715
    , 
    479 S.E.2d at 543
    ;
    Zipf, 8 Va. App. at 390, 
    382 S.E.2d at 265
    .
    For the foregoing reasons, the order of the trial court
    awarding equitable distribution of marital property and
    retaining jurisdiction for consideration of permanent spousal
    support is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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