Christopher Foreman v. Fairfax Co. Dept.Family Svcs ( 1999 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:    Judges Bray, Annunziata and Frank
    CHRISTOPHER FOREMAN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION *
    v.   Record No. 1432-99-4                       PER CURIAM
    DECEMBER 14, 1999
    FAIRFAX COUNTY DEPARTMENT
    OF FAMILY SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    Henry E. Hudson, Judge
    (Mark Bodner, Guardian ad litem, on brief),
    for appellant.
    (David P. Bobzien, County Attorney; Robert
    Lyndon Howell, Deputy County Attorney;
    Dennis R. Bates, Senior Assistant County
    Attorney; Darrell D. Jackson, Assistant
    County Attorney, on brief), for appellee.
    Christopher Foreman (Foreman) appeals the decision of the
    circuit court terminating his parental rights to Roxanne Cierra
    Sheppard.    The circuit court found that the Fairfax County
    Department of Family Services (DFS) presented clear and convincing
    evidence establishing the statutory requirements set out in Code
    § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2) for termination of Foreman's parental
    rights.    On appeal, Foreman contends that the trial court erred in
    finding DFS presented sufficient evidence to prove that (1) the
    child suffered as a result of neglect and that the neglect
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    presented a serious and substantial threat to the child's
    development; and (2) DFS made reasonable and appropriate efforts
    to communicate with Foreman and to strengthen the parent-child
    relationship.   Foreman also raises a challenge under Code
    § 16.1-283(A) to the circuit court's jurisdiction to hear the DFS
    petition.   Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the parties, we
    conclude that this appeal is without merit.    Accordingly, we
    summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.   See Rule 5A:27.
    According to the evidence, Foreman left Roxanne, who was four
    years old at the time, with her mother while he went to a party.
    When he returned at 2:00 a.m., the mother was gone.    Foreman
    allegedly asked a neighbor to watch the child while he searched
    for the mother.   However, on August 10, 1997, the police,
    responding to a call of unattended children, found Roxanne and a
    two-year-old boy wandering outside at 2:30 a.m.   Foreman called
    DFS on August 11, 1997, seeking custody of Roxanne.    Foreman was
    denied custody following a hearing in the juvenile and domestic
    relations district court on August 15, 1997.   By district court
    order entered September 4, 1997, Roxanne was found to be "an
    abused and/or neglected child as defined in Va. Code
    § 16.1-228(5)."   A foster care plan with the goal of returning
    Roxanne home was developed, under which, among other items,
    Foreman was required to participate in parenting classes; complete
    an alcohol and drug abuse evaluation, follow any recommended
    treatment, and submit to random drug and alcohol tests;
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    participate in family counseling; and undergo a psychosocial
    assessment.   Evidence also indicated that Foreman and the mother
    had previous dealings with DFS and that their parental rights to
    several other children had previously been terminated.
    Foreman testified at trial that he saw his daughter every
    week after she was taken into foster care.    The DFS worker
    testified that Foreman first saw the child on July 23, 1998 and
    saw her six more times before September 2, 1998.   Foreman was
    incarcerated on September 9, 1998 on habitual offender charges,
    with an anticipated release date in August 1999.   Foreman
    testified that he had completed a parenting class and had
    partially completed a drug and alcohol class prior to his
    incarceration.   DFS presented evidence that Foreman was dismissed
    from the drug and alcohol class for non-compliance and that
    similar services were available while Foreman was in prison.
    Foreman's mother testified that Roxanne and Foreman were
    welcome to live in her home and that she would assist him.     She
    acknowledged that she works and that her husband is too ill to
    care for the child.   No additional childcare arrangements were
    currently planned.
    Standard of Review
    "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
    termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the
    paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best
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    interests."    Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Development,
    
    13 Va. App. 123
    , 128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 463 (1991).
    "In matters of a child's welfare, trial
    courts are vested with broad discretion in
    making the decisions necessary to guard and
    to foster a child's best interests." The
    trial court's judgment, "when based on
    evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
    disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
    without evidence to support it."
    
    Id.
     (citations omitted).
    The trial court found that DFS presented clear and
    convincing evidence meeting the statutory requirements set out
    in Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2) (Michie 1999).    "Code
    § 16.1-283 embodies 'the statutory scheme for the . . .
    termination of residual parental rights in this Commonwealth'
    [which] . . . 'provides detailed procedures designed to protect
    the rights of the parents and their child,' balancing their
    interests while seeking to preserve the family."    Lecky v. Reed,
    
    20 Va. App. 306
    , 311, 
    456 S.E.2d 538
    , 540 (1995) (citations
    omitted).
    Code § 16.1-283(C)(1) provides, in pertinent part, that the
    residual parental rights of a parent of a child placed in foster
    care may be terminated if the court finds by clear and
    convincing evidence that it is in the best interests of the
    child and that:
    The parent . . . [has], without good cause,
    failed to maintain continuing contact with
    and to provide or substantially plan for the
    future of the child for a period of six
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    months after the child's placement in foster
    care notwithstanding the reasonable and
    appropriate efforts of social, medical,
    mental health or other rehabilitative
    agencies to communicate with the parent or
    parents and to strengthen the parent-child
    relationship. Proof that the parent . . .
    [has] failed without good cause to
    communicate on a continuing and planned
    basis with the child for a period of six
    months shall constitute prima facie evidence
    of this condition.
    Alternatively, Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides, in pertinent
    part, that the parent's parental rights may be terminated if the
    court finds by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the
    best interests of the child and that
    [t]he parent . . ., without good cause,
    [has] been unwilling or unable within a
    reasonable period not to exceed twelve
    months from the date the child was placed in
    foster care to remedy substantially the
    conditions which led to or required
    continuation of the child's foster care
    placement, notwithstanding the reasonable
    and appropriate efforts of social, medical,
    mental health or other rehabilitative
    agencies to such end. Proof that the parent
    . . . , without good cause, [has] failed or
    been unable to make substantial progress
    towards elimination of the conditions which
    led to or required continuation of the
    child's foster care placement in accordance
    with their obligations under and within the
    time limits or goals set forth in a foster
    care plan filed with the court or any other
    plan jointly designed and agreed to by the
    parent . . . and a public or private social,
    medical, mental health or other
    rehabilitative agency shall constitute prima
    facie evidence of this condition. The court
    shall take into consideration the prior
    efforts of such agencies to rehabilitate the
    parent or parents prior to the placement of
    the child in foster care.
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    Neglect
    Foreman contends that the trial court erred by finding that
    the child suffered as a result of neglect and that the neglect
    she suffered presented a serious and substantial threat to the
    child's development.   Foreman's argument arises under Code
    § 16.1-283(B)(1).   The trial court made no finding under this
    section and, therefore, this contention is without merit.
    Nonetheless, we note that the initial determination that the
    child was an abused and/or neglected child was based upon the
    circumstances under which the child was taken into custody.     The
    child, then four, and a two-year-old boy were allegedly left in
    the care of a ten-year-old boy for a number of hours by the
    child's mother while Foreman attended a party until 2:00 a.m.
    The child was found wandering the streets, unattended, at
    2:30 a.m.   According to the testimony of Amy Yeates, the DFS
    worker who removed the child, Foreman admitted that he did not
    live in the home with the child or her mother; that he saw them
    about once a month; that he and the mother had bouts of domestic
    violence; and that he drank.   The proposed foster care plan
    contained specific steps through which Foreman could address
    both his parental responsibilities and his abuse of alcohol.     We
    find sufficient evidence in the record supporting a finding that
    the child was neglected and that the neglect posed a serious and
    substantial threat to the child's development.
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    Reasonable and Appropriate Efforts on the Part of DFS
    Appellant also contends that the trial court erred in
    finding that DFS presented clear and convincing evidence that it
    made appropriate efforts to assist him to alleviate the
    conditions resulting in the child's foster care placement.     We
    find no error.
    The foster care plan initially prepared in 1997 included
    specific steps that were aimed at improving Foreman's parenting
    skills and addressing his ongoing problems with alcohol.     While
    Foreman contended that he completed a parenting skills class,
    the evidence indicated that this was a four class "Introduction
    to Parenting" course, rather than the required twenty-six week
    parenting class.   In the nearly two years since the child's
    placement in foster care, Foreman failed to complete a
    recommended drug and alcohol abuse class.   At trial, he argued
    that he would be able to complete one in just a few more months.
    We find substantial evidence in the record supporting the
    trial court's finding that DFS made appropriate and reasonable
    efforts to help Foreman regain custody of his daughter.    DFS had
    attempted to provide services to Foreman and the mother in the
    past, with little result.   In this instance, DFS provided
    Foreman with an initial referral packet to complete, which he
    never returned.    Foreman began drug and alcohol services through
    the county in an intensive outpatient group, but failed to
    contact his counselor when he was incarcerated, despite the
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    requirement that participants notify the counselor if they are
    unable to attend.   Alcohol and drug services were available to
    him while he was incarcerated.    Therefore, the record
    demonstrates that appropriate services were offered by DFS but
    Foreman made little or no effort to respond to those offers.
    "The law does not require the [DFS] to force its services upon
    an unwilling or disinterested parent."    Barkey v. Commonwealth,
    
    2 Va. App. 662
    , 670, 
    347 S.E.2d 188
    , 192 (1986).
    Jurisdiction of the Circuit Court
    Foreman also contends that the trial court lacked
    jurisdiction because DFS failed to file with the juvenile and
    domestic relations district court the necessary foster care plan
    documenting termination of his parental rights as in the child's
    best interests prior to filing its petition seeking termination,
    in violation of the requirements of Code § 16.1-283(A).      Foreman
    admits that this issue is raised for the first time on appeal.
    However, challenges to subject matter jurisdiction may be raised
    at any time, even for the first time on appeal.       See generally
    Morrison v. Bestler, 
    239 Va. 166
    , 170, 
    387 S.E.2d 753
    , 756
    (1990).
    The record demonstrates that the revised foster care plan
    with the changed goal of adoption was filed in the juvenile and
    domestic relations district court on March 18, 1998.      The
    petition seeking termination of parental rights was filed on
    March 30, 1998.   Therefore, this issue is without merit.
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    The evidence presented below demonstrated that the child
    was in a stable foster home where she was loved and cared for.
    The foster parents expressed an interest in adopting the child
    if that option were available.    The child had emotional and
    learning difficulties arising from the lack of stability in her
    earlier years that the foster parents were addressing.       She had
    seen Foreman only sporadically since coming into foster care.
    She had seen her grandmother only three times since 1997.
    Foreman admitted that he had little or no contact with his
    other six children; he was unsure whether his parental rights
    had been terminated.   He indicated to the trial court that he
    had discussed with his mother having Roxanne come to live with
    her only a month or two before the trial.       His prospective plans
    were unclear and his past history unpersuasive that he would
    make the necessary changes in his life to provide for the child
    if she were returned to him.   "It is clearly not in the best
    interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting
    to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of
    resuming . . . responsibilities."        Kaywood v. Halifax County
    Dep't of Social Servs., 
    10 Va. App. 535
    , 540, 
    394 S.E.2d 492
    ,
    495 (1990).
    Evidence in the record supports the trial court's decision
    that DFS presented clear and convincing evidence proving that
    termination of Foreman's parental rights was in the best
    interest of the child and meeting the requirements of Code
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    § 16.1-283(C)(1) and (2).   Accordingly, the decision of the
    circuit court is summarily affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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