Kenneth R. Wood v. Kenneth R. Wood, Sole Prop., etc ( 1999 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Bumgardner
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    KENNETH R. WOOD
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.      Record No. 0470-99-3              JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    DECEMBER 7, 1999
    KENNETH R. WOOD, SOLE PROPRIETOR,
    t/a KRW TRUCKING,
    COMMERCIAL UNION INSURANCE COMPANY,
    NORTH AND SOUTH LINES, INC. AND
    LEGION INSURANCE COMPANY
    FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
    Roger A. Ritchie, Jr. (Roger Ritchie &
    Partners, P.L.C., on brief), for appellant.
    James G. Muncie, Jr. (Midkiff & Hiner, P.C.,
    on brief), for appellees Kenneth R. Wood, t/a
    KRW Trucking and Commercial Union Insurance
    Company.
    Nancy C. Auth (Mark S. Davis; Carr & Porter,
    L.L.C., on brief), for appellees North and
    South Lines, Inc. and Legion Insurance
    Company.
    The Workers' Compensation Commission ruled that Kenneth R.
    Wood sustained a compensable injury by accident on February 16,
    1997.    Wood and KRW Trucking contend, however, that the commission
    erred in finding that on the day of Wood's injury he was employed
    by KRW Trucking, not by North and South Lines, Inc.    Wood further
    contends the commission erred in finding that he was not a
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    statutory employee of North and South and that his employments
    with KRW Trucking and North and South Lines were dissimilar for
    purposes of calculating his average weekly wage.   For the reasons
    that follow, we affirm the commission's award.
    I.
    Our standard of review is well established.
    We do not retry the facts before the
    Commission nor do we review the weight,
    preponderance of the evidence, or the
    credibility of witnesses. If there is
    evidence or reasonable inference that can be
    drawn from the evidence to support the
    Commission's findings, they will not be
    disturbed by this Court on appeal, even
    though there is evidence in the record to
    support contrary findings of fact.
    Caskey v. Dan River Mills, Inc., 
    225 Va. 405
    , 411, 
    302 S.E.2d 507
    , 510-11 (1983).   Thus, on appeal, we are required to view
    the evidence in the light most favorable to the party who
    prevailed at the commission.    See Crisp v. Brown's Tysons Corner
    Dodge, Inc., 
    1 Va. App. 503
    , 504, 
    339 S.E.2d 916
    , 916 (1986).
    So viewed, the evidence proved that North and South is
    engaged in the business of transporting freight by motor
    vehicles.   It owns tractors and trailers for hauling freight and
    occasionally leases equipment for use in its business.     Wood was
    hired by North and South in 1991 as a truck driver.    As a
    driver, Wood was paid a fixed rate for each mile he drove the
    truck.   In 1994, North and South changed Wood's employment from
    truck driver to dispatcher.    As a dispatcher, Wood "spen[t] a
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    considerable amount of time on the telephone talking to drivers,
    solving problems, taking orders from customers, and assigning
    loads" for all North and South trucks and other trucks leased to
    North and South.    He had a predetermined work schedule and was
    paid a salary.
    Shortly after becoming a dispatcher, Wood purchased a
    truck, hired a driver, and began operating an entity known as
    KRW Trucking.    In that capacity, he entered into a contract with
    North and South to lease his truck to North and South for a
    specified rate per mile plus other costs.   Although Wood hired
    and fired KRW Trucking's drivers, North and South interviewed
    those drivers and gave them drug tests.   Under the lease
    agreement, Wood had the responsibility to provide proof that his
    drivers met all federal and state regulations and criteria.
    Pursuant to Department of Transportation rules and regulations,
    however, North and South maintained documents regarding all
    drivers, including drivers of trucks it leased.   KRW Trucking
    had employed only two drivers, both of whom were paid by Wood.
    North and South did not pay KRW Trucking's drivers.
    In February 1997, Wood was still employed by North and
    South as one of several dispatchers.    The evidence also proved
    that on several weekends in 1997, when Wood was not expected to
    be on duty as a dispatcher, he drove North and South trucks to
    earn extra money.   When he drove the trucks, he was paid by
    North and South a fixed rate per each mile he drove the truck.
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    He received this pay in addition to his salary for work he
    performed as dispatcher.
    On February 16, 1997, Wood was on vacation leave from his
    employment as a dispatcher at North and South.   By prior
    arrangement, he was in North and South's garage "to work on [KRW
    Trucking's] truck" and to make cosmetic repairs, such as sanding
    and priming in preparation for painting.   Wood testified that
    KRW Trucking has no garage or repair shop and that he was
    repairing the truck in North and South's garage because North
    and South allowed him to use the garage as a courtesy to him.
    Wood performed no mechanical repair work for North and South.
    After working on the truck, Wood swept and cleaned the area
    he had used.   He then turned off the lights, stepped on a roller
    as he walked away, and fell.   Wood injured his shoulder when he
    hit the floor.
    The commission found that Wood's injury did not arise out
    of or in the course of his employment with North and South.
    Therefore, the commission awarded Wood compensation against KRW
    Trucking and ruled that his average weekly wage was to be
    computed using only his earnings from KRW Trucking.
    II.
    To recover compensation, Wood bore the burden of proving
    that his injury arose out of and in the course of his
    employment.    See Code § 65.2-101; Metcalf v. A.M. Express Moving
    Systems, Inc., 
    230 Va. 464
    , 467, 
    339 S.E.2d 177
    , 179 (1986).
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    Where the evidence establishes merely a "relationship of
    reciprocal gratuity, . . . involving no specific employment
    obligations, . . . and no right of control over the performance
    of claimant's work," the evidence fails to establish employment.
    Behrensen v. Whitaker, 
    10 Va. App. 364
    , 367, 
    392 S.E.2d 508
    , 510
    (1990).
    The commission found as follows:
    Both [Wood] and North and South perceived
    that there was an oral contract in existence
    for KRW [Trucking] to buy the truck at the
    time that [Wood] was performing cosmetic
    repairs on February 16, 1997. This is
    consistent with the fact that [Wood] asked
    for time off from work with North and South
    and his performing repairs on the truck that
    KRW [Trucking] was purchasing, an activity
    he never performed for North and South but
    did routinely perform for KRW [Trucking].
    This shows [Wood] believed that the truck
    was his, as did North and South. [Wood]
    perceived that KRW [Trucking] was a separate
    entity than North and South, as did North
    and South. We find that the evidence
    supports their beliefs and also supports the
    Deputy Commissioner's finding that [Wood]
    had two distinct jobs and that he was acting
    as an employee of KRW [Trucking] at the time
    of his accident.
    The evidence supports these findings because the evidence
    clearly proved that KRW Trucking and North and South Lines, Inc.
    were two distinct business entities.    Wood was the sole owner
    and an employee of KRW Trucking.   Separate from his status as
    owner of KRW Trucking, Wood was also employed by North and South
    as a dispatcher.   On February 16, however, Wood had obtained
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    vacation leave from North and South and was working on a truck
    KRW Trucking had agreed to purchase from North and South.
    The evidence also proved that North and South had removed
    the truck from its use.    Wood testified that the truck "was
    property owned by KRW Trucking and was . . . to be utilized for
    [KRW Trucking] business."    North and South did not employ Wood
    as a mechanic and did not pay him for the work he performed on
    his truck.    Indeed, Wood has never been employed by North and
    South to perform mechanical work.
    Proof that North and South gratuitously allowed Wood to use
    its garage to make cosmetic repairs on a truck that KRW Trucking
    had agreed to purchase and considered its own was insufficient
    to prove Wood was employed at that time by North and South.
    Wood was on vacation leave from his employment with North and
    South, was not conducting the affairs of North and South, and
    was not paid by North and South.    Thus, credible evidence proved
    Wood was solely employed by KRW Trucking when he suffered his
    injury.   Accordingly, we affirm the commission's ruling that he
    was.
    III.
    Wood also contends that the evidence proved he was a
    statutory employee of North and South.    We disagree.
    In pertinent part, Code § 65.2-302 provides as follows:
    When any person (referred to in this section
    as "owner") undertakes to perform or execute
    any work which is a part of his trade,
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    business or occupation and contracts with
    any other person (referred to in this
    section as "subcontractor") for the
    execution or performance by or under such
    subcontractor of the whole or any part of
    the work undertaken by such owner, the owner
    shall be liable to pay to any worker
    employed in the work any compensation under
    this title which he would have been liable
    to pay if the worker had been immediately
    employed by him.
    As the Supreme Court held in Intermodal Services, Inc. v.
    Smith, 
    234 Va. 596
    , 
    364 S.E.2d 221
     (1988), the purpose of this
    statute is to insure compensation coverage for employees of
    independent contractors and subcontractors, but "not the
    subcontractor himself."   
    Id. at 603
    , 
    364 S.E.2d at 225
    .   Thus,
    the commission did not err in ruling that Wood was not a
    statutory employee of North and South.
    IV.
    "[T]he [dissimilar employment] rule is alive and well in
    workers' compensation law."   Uninsured Employer's Fund v.
    Thrush, 
    255 Va. 14
    , 21, 
    496 S.E.2d 57
    , 60 (1998).
    In determining whether two jobs are
    "substantially similar," we look to the
    following: (1) "the duties and skills" of
    each job, and (2) "the primary mission" of
    the employee on each job. [Frederick Fire
    and Rescue v. ]Dodson, 20 Va. App. [440,]
    444-45, 457 S.E.2d [783,] 785 [(1995)]. "In
    every situation where the commission is
    asked to determine whether two or more jobs
    are substantially similar, the commission
    must consider not only the particular duties
    of each job, but also the general nature or
    type of employment of the two jobs."
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    Mercy Tidewater Ambulance v. Carpenter, 
    29 Va. App. 218
    , 224,
    
    511 S.E.2d 418
    , 421 (1999) (quoting Creedle Sales Co. v.
    Edmonds, 
    24 Va. App. 24
    , 28, 
    480 S.E.2d 123
    , 125 (1997)).
    Credible evidence in the record supports the commission's
    findings "that the only common skill [Wood employed for both TRW
    Trucking and North and South] was that of driving, . . . that
    [this common skill] was performed only infrequently for North
    and South . . . [, and that] the other skills did not overlap in
    the two employments."    Wood's primary employment with North and
    South was dispatching the trucks to and from various
    destinations in service of North and South's customers.    His
    employment with KRW Trucking did not include that function.
    Thus, his duties with both entities were so unrelated that we
    cannot say the commission erred in concluding they were not
    substantially similar.
    For these reasons, we affirm the commission's award.
    Affirmed.
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