Patricia A. Hutchings, s/k/a v. Commonwealth of VA ( 1999 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Bray and Bumgardner
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    PATRICIA A. HUTCHINGS, SOMETIMES KNOWN AS
    PATRICIA ANN HUTCHINGS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2066-98-3             JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    NOVEMBER 9, 1999
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
    Charles J. Strauss, Judge
    Greg T. Haymore (Brian H. Turpin, P.C., on
    brief), for appellant.
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Richard B.
    Smith, Assistant Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
    Patricia Ann Hutchings was convicted during a bench trial
    of uttering a forged check and petit larceny in violation of
    Code §§ 18.2-172 and 18.2-96.   The trial court dismissed a
    companion charge of forgery.    The issue on appeal is whether the
    evidence is sufficient to prove that the defendant knowingly
    presented a forged check.   Finding the evidence sufficient, we
    affirm her conviction.
    The defendant presented the owner of G & S Market, Alice
    Bolling, a check for $50 in exchange for merchandise and cash.
    Bolling knew the defendant and had cashed checks for her in the
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    past.    The check, which Bolling said looked like a real check,
    was signed by D.M. McVaughan, typed payable to the defendant,
    and endorsed by her in the store.    Bolling's bank did not honor
    the check because it did not have a bank routing number or an
    account number.
    Bolling left three telephone messages for the defendant and
    sent her a letter demanding payment when she did not return the
    calls.    The defendant wrote Bolling that she would pick the
    check up, but she never did.
    The check purported to be drawn on an account with First
    Federal Savings Bank in Lynchburg.       The vice president and
    branch manager of the successor bank testified that the check
    was not a proper one.    It did not have a routing number and did
    not have a proper account number.    The supposed account number
    designated a savings account that was closed and appeared
    incorrectly at the top right corner.      Two different account
    numbers appeared on the check, and it lacked a federal reserve
    tracking code.    The bank officer could not say when the savings
    account was closed, but said that he would classify the check as
    a counterfeit.
    Sergeant Daniel Dennis investigated the store's complaint
    and spoke with the defendant.    She told him that she received
    the check for work she had done but refused to identify the
    person who gave her the check.    She said she did not want to get
    them into trouble.    When asked if she had any more of these
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    checks, the defendant said, "I don't think any more of these
    checks is out."   The defendant denied knowing anyone named D.M.
    McVaughan.   The defendant paid the check and related fees before
    the warrant was served.
    At trial, the defendant testified that her cousin, Crystal
    Green, had given her the check.   Green lives in New Jersey and
    stayed with the defendant for a few weeks, but had "disappeared
    again."    The defendant testified she did not know that the check
    was drawn on a nonexistent account or that it was counterfeit.
    She admitted signing and endorsing the check in the store, but
    denied telling the investigator that she received it for work
    she had done.
    In her brief, the defendant argues that she cannot be
    convicted of uttering a forged instrument because the trial
    court did not find that the check was forged.   The trial court
    ruled that the evidence was insufficient to prove that she
    forged the check.   The trial court dismissed the forgery charge
    because the defendant had not committed forgery by signing her
    name to endorse the check.   It did not dismiss the charge
    because the Commonwealth failed to prove the writing was a
    forgery.
    The defendant argues the evidence is insufficient to prove
    that she had the requisite intent to commit larceny.   Because
    this issue was not presented to the trial court, we will not
    consider it for the first time on appeal.    See Rule 5A:18.
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    The crimes of forgery and uttering are separate and
    distinct offenses. 1   See Bateman v. Commonwealth, 
    205 Va. 595
    ,
    599, 
    139 S.E.2d 102
    , 105 (1964).    Uttering "is an assertion by
    word or action that a writing known to be forged is good and
    valid."   Id. at 600, 139 S.E.2d at 106.     In order to prove
    uttering the Commonwealth must establish that at the time the
    check was tendered for payment, the defendant knew it to be
    forged.   Possession of a forged check permits the inference that
    the defendant knew it was forged.       See Denis v. Commonwealth,
    
    144 Va. 559
    , 590-92, 
    131 S.E. 131
    , 140-41 (1926) (trial court
    properly refused instruction which stated that defendant's
    possession of forged instrument does not raise presumption that
    he forged it); Walker v. Commonwealth, 
    25 Va. App. 50
    , 59, 
    486 S.E.2d 126
    , 131 (1997).
    When drawing reasonable inferences from the facts, the fact
    finder "was entitled to weigh the defendant's contradictory
    statements," Toler v. Commonwealth, 
    188 Va. 774
    , 781, 
    51 S.E.2d 210
    , 213 (1949), and to infer that she was attempting to conceal
    her guilt.   See Black v. Commonwealth, 
    222 Va. 838
    , 842, 
    284 S.E.2d 608
    , 610 (1981).    This rule is consistent with the
    appellate court's duty to "discard the evidence of the accused
    1
    Code § 18.2-172 provides, in part, that "[i]f any person
    forge any writing . . . to the prejudice of another's right, or
    utter, or attempt to employ as true, such forged writing,
    knowing it to be forged, he shall be guilty of a Class 5
    felony."
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    in conflict with that of the Commonwealth, and to regard as true
    all the credible evidence favorable to the Commonwealth and all
    favorable inferences to be drawn therefrom."      Parks v.
    Commonwealth, 
    221 Va. 492
    , 497, 
    270 S.E.2d 755
    , 759 (1980)
    (emphasis in original).   See LaPrade v. Commonwealth, 
    191 Va. 410
    , 418, 
    61 S.E.2d 313
    , 316 (1950).     The trial court's ruling
    will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or
    unsupported by the evidence.     See Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987).
    Viewed in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth, the
    evidence established that the defendant possessed a check with
    two different account numbers on it, purportedly drawn on a
    Lynchburg bank, typed payable to her, and signed by D.M.
    McVaughan, whom she did not know.    The check, an exhibit
    available to the fact finder, looked spurious:     all characters
    were in the same plain font with the bank name and address in
    boldface, account numbers were incorrectly placed, and a full
    row of "x"s appeared across the bottom of the check.     The
    defendant tendered the check in a store where she was known and
    had cashed checks previously.    She informed the investigator
    that she received the check for work she had done, but would not
    name the person who gave it to her.      She stated that there were
    no other checks like this one.    When asked to explain that
    statement, the defendant responded, "[t]hat was just an
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    expression.   I mean, I don't know. . . . I mean I didn't have
    another check."
    At trial, the defendant testified that she got the check
    from her cousin.    Despite the fact that the cousin resided in
    New Jersey, the defendant did not question the cousin's
    possession of a check drawn on a Lynchburg account typed payable
    to the defendant.   She denied telling the investigator that she
    received the check in payment for work performed.
    The bank officer testified the check was counterfeit.
    Though the defendant argues the testimony was a lay opinion, she
    made no objection at trial.   We will not consider it now.    See
    Rule 5A:18.   The bank officer's testimony was not the only
    evidence that the check was counterfeit.   It looked like a fake,
    and the trial court could see that for itself.
    Considering all the evidence, we find it sufficient to
    prove that the defendant knew the check was forged.
    Accordingly, we affirm her conviction for uttering.
    Affirmed.
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    Benton, J., concurring.
    Based upon her negotiation of a purported negotiable
    instrument, see Code § 8.3A-104, Patricia Ann Hutchings was
    indicted on charges of forgery, see Code § 18.2-172, uttering,
    see id., and grand larceny, see Code § 18.2-96.   I agree with
    the majority that the trial judge's finding that Hutchings was
    not guilty of forgery did not dispose of the uttering charge.
    The charges of uttering and forgery are separate and distinct.
    See Code § 18.2-172.   Thus, "one [may] be found guilty of
    forgery and of uttering the forged check."   Bateman v.
    Commonwealth, 
    205 Va. 595
    , 599-600, 
    139 S.E.2d 102
    , 105-06
    (1964).   The trial judge found that Hutchings negotiated a check
    knowing it was forged but that she did not forge the check.
    The evidence proved that the check Hutchings negotiated at
    the store was "returned unpaid" because the check did not
    contain the federal reserve bank "routing number" and "[did not]
    have the proper account number on it."   The Vice President of
    First Federal Savings Bank, the payor bank that is now known as
    One Valley Bank, testified that "[t]here was a statement savings
    account with that number on it."   When asked whether that
    account was closed, he responded, "I'm not sure about the
    closure of it."
    This evidence does not prove the check was forged.      It only
    proves that the check was drawn on a First Federal Savings Bank
    account, which was closed at an undisclosed time, and that the
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    check lacked the routing numbers that would identify the bank
    using the usual Federal Reserve Bank numerical designations.    I
    believe, however, that other evidence tends to prove Hutchings
    negotiated the check knowing it was a forgery.
    During the investigation, Hutchings told the police officer
    that "she got the check for some work she had done."   She
    refused to disclose the name of the person who gave her the
    check because "she didn't want to get them in trouble."   At
    trial, Hutchings testified that the check was not hers.   She
    testified that she received the check from her cousin, Crystal
    Green, who lived in New Jersey and was staying with Hutchings
    for a few weeks.   Hutchings negotiated the check "because [she
    was] . . . trying to help [her cousin]."   She also testified
    that she did not know D.M. McVaughan, the purported maker of the
    check.   Further, she denied having told the police officer that
    she received the check for work she had performed.
    This evidence was sufficient for the trier of fact to find
    that Hutchings knew the check was a forgery.   Although the check
    was payable to her, she said it was not her check.   Furthermore,
    the check was drawn on the Lynchburg bank account of a person
    she did not know, and it was given to her by a cousin for no
    apparent reason.   See Fitzgerald v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 171
    ,
    174, 
    313 S.E.2d 394
    , 395 (1984) (noting that the circumstances
    may prove knowledge of forgery).   The act of putting the check
    into circulation knowing it was forged "constituted an uttering
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    . . . within the prohibition of [the] Code."   Moore v.
    Commonwealth, 
    207 Va. 838
    , 842, 
    153 S.E.2d 231
    , 234 (1967).
    Accordingly, I concur in affirming the conviction.
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