Christopher Javon Norman v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2015 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Humphreys, McCullough and Decker
UNPUBLISHED
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
CHRISTOPHER JAVON NORMAN
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. Record No. 1058-14-1 JUDGE STEPHEN R. McCULLOUGH
APRIL 14, 2015
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHESAPEAKE
John W. Brown, Judge
Terence P. Martin, Senior Assistant Public Defender (Office of the
Public Defender, on brief), for appellant.
Lauren C. Campbell, Assistant Attorney General (Mark R. Herring,
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Christopher Javon Norman challenges his conviction for abduction. He contends that the
evidence was insufficient to establish the elements of the offense. Specifically, he argues that
the evidence fails to show that he used force or intimidation to detain the mother of his child
against her will and that she was not, in fact, intimidated. Guided by the standard of review, we
disagree and affirm.
BACKGROUND
Appellant fathered a child with Maya Wilson. At the time of the charged offense, they
had been together about five years. Maya explained that she and appellant were not living
together, but he would stay at her house five days out of the week. On September 28, 2013,
appellant planned to spend the night with Maya. Appellant did not have a key to the house.
Maya’s sister, Natasha, and Natasha’s boyfriend and children also planned to stay at Maya’s
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
house that night. Following an argument between appellant and Maya, he left the house around
9:00 p.m. Maya fell asleep in her upstairs bedroom. Natasha and her boyfriend were downstairs,
sleeping on a couch.
Natasha awoke when she heard knocking or banging on the front door. It was about
4:00 a.m. She looked outside, through the peephole, but could not see who it was. The porch
light was on, but the person outside was wearing a hoodie and facing his head downward. After
attempting to wake her sister, Natasha returned and opened the front door to look outside but
could not see anyone. She then closed and locked the front door. A few minutes later, Natasha
heard several “booms” coming from the back of the house. She saw the back door come “off of
the hinges, and a form walked past” her. She knew from his voice that it was appellant.
Appellant then kicked in the door to Maya’s upstairs bedroom. Natasha decided to leave
appellant and her sister “to their business.” The Commonwealth introduced into evidence
photographs depicting the damage appellant inflicted on the house’s back door and Maya’s
bedroom door.
Maya testified that she awoke to her sister and appellant standing in front of her, yelling.
She also stated that she was awakened by the loud noise that occurred when appellant kicked in
the door to her room. Maya testified that she did not give appellant permission to come back
into the house.
Natasha heard a “smacking sound” coming from her sister’s bedroom. She went upstairs
to her sister’s bedroom. She observed her sister sitting on the floor and appellant “standing over
top of her.” It appeared to Natasha that appellant was going to strike her sister. Maya was
crying. Natasha could not see any injuries on her sister. Natasha called the police and told Maya
and appellant that she was doing so. Maya asked her to refrain from calling the police.
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Maya and appellant walked out through the back door. As she was walking down the
stairs to leave the house, appellant placed his hand on her head. Maya acknowledged that she
was “crying and really hysterical” as she left. She explained that her emotional state was due to
the way she woke up and to the fact that she was “a little drunk.” She testified that she agreed to
go for a walk with appellant in an effort to defuse the argument. She claimed she voluntarily left
the apartment with him. She said in her trial testimony that she felt safe in her home and walking
with appellant. She denied that he had assaulted her. Maya said she did not recall what she told
the police. She acknowledged that she took out a restraining order against appellant but
explained that she did so at the recommendation of a police officer.
Officer Brian E. Stovall, Jr., responded to Natasha’s 9-1-1 call. He began searching for
the couple. He soon spotted them. Initially, appellant refused to give his name. Appellant stated
that “the two were just out walking and that nothing was going on.” Officer Stovall described
Maya as appearing “very frightened and distraught.” She was weeping at the time.
Appellant was charged with statutory burglary and abduction. Appellant made a motion
to strike the abduction charge at the close of the Commonwealth’s case and renewed it at the
close of the evidence. The court took the motions under advisement. The court later concluded
that the evidence was sufficient and convicted appellant, sentencing him to serve eighteen years’
incarceration with fourteen years and five months suspended.
ANALYSIS
Relying on the account provided by Maya, appellant argues the evidence fails to establish
that he used force or intimidation against her. He points to Maya’s testimony that she was not
intimidated by appellant. He notes that Maya denied that appellant ever struck her and that she
testified that she willingly left the house with appellant. He also points out that Maya’s sister,
Natasha, never observed appellant exert any force against Maya, never observed Maya resisting,
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and did not see any bruises on her sister. Appellant stresses that Maya attributed her crying to
the fact that she had been drinking. In short, he argues, Maya’s testimony “negates every
element of the crime of abduction.”
Code § 18.2-47(A) provides that
[a]ny person who, by force, intimidation or deception, and
without legal justification or excuse, seizes, takes, transports,
detains or secretes another person with the intent to deprive such
other person of his personal liberty or to withhold or conceal him
from any person, authority or institution lawfully entitled to his
charge, shall be deemed guilty of “abduction.”
The established standard of review requires us to “‘examine the evidence that supports
the conviction and allow the conviction to stand unless it is plainly wrong or without evidence to
support it.’” Commonwealth v. McNeal, 282 Va. 16, 20, 710 S.E.2d 733, 735 (2011) (quoting
Vincent v. Commonwealth, 276 Va. 648, 652, 668 S.E.2d 137, 139-40 (2008)). “An appellate
court does not ‘ask itself whether it believes that the evidence at the trial established guilt beyond
a reasonable doubt.’” Williams v. Commonwealth, 278 Va. 190, 193, 677 S.E.2d 280, 282
(2009) (quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 318-19 (1979)). Instead, we must ask
whether “‘any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a
reasonable doubt.’” Id. (quoting Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319). “Furthermore, we ‘accord the
Commonwealth the benefit of all inferences fairly deducible from the evidence.’” Brooks v.
Commonwealth, 282 Va. 90, 95, 712 S.E.2d 464, 466 (2011) (quoting Glenn v. Commonwealth,
275 Va. 123, 130, 654 S.E.2d 910, 913 (2008)). “The credibility of the witnesses and the weight
accorded the evidence are matters solely for the fact finder who has the opportunity to see and
hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 133, 138, 455
S.E.2d 730, 732 (1995). We will not set aside the judgment of the trial court unless it is plainly
wrong or without evidence to support it. Code § 8.01-680; see, e.g., Allen v. Commonwealth,
287 Va. 68, 72, 752 S.E.2d 856, 858-59 (2014).
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Under our precedent, an “[a]bduction ‘may be accomplished by a minimal amount of
force and each case will depend upon the particular facts of the taking.’” Clanton v.
Commonwealth, 53 Va. App. 561, 574, 673 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2009) (en banc) (quoting Stancil v.
State, 553 A.2d 268, 272 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1989)). Abduction may also be accomplished by
“intimidation.” Code § 18.2-47(A); see Sutton v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 654, 663, 324 S.E.2d
665, 669-70 (1985) (defining “intimidation” in the context of a rape case).
Maya and Natasha’s testimony established that appellant left the house after an argument
with Maya. There is no dispute that, several hours after his argument with Maya, appellant
gained entry by kicking in the back door of the residence around 4:00 a.m. and followed that up
by kicking in the door to Maya’s room. Indisputably, such violent acts, particularly at that hour,
can intimidate.
Maya and Natasha provided contrasting accounts. Natasha heard a smack after appellant
forcibly gained entry into Maya’s room. When Natasha arrived in the room, appellant was
“standing over top of” Maya, who was crying. Maya and appellant then left, with appellant
leading her out with his hand placed on her. When Officer Stovall located the couple, Maya
appeared “very frightened and distraught.” She was still crying. She took out a protective order
against appellant that night. From this evidence, the trial court could conclude that appellant
used force and intimidation to compel Maya to leave her house against her will. Appellant’s
violent entry into the house and the bedroom, the time he gained entry, his intimidating pose, and
his guiding her out of the house by placing his hand on her head all combined to frighten Maya
into leaving her house against her will in appellant’s company, thus depriving her of her personal
liberty.
The trial court was not required to accept Maya’s version of the events. Trial courts are
confronted on a daily basis with victims of domestic abuse who are reluctant to bring to justice
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those who frighten and abuse them, whether from motives of affection, financial dependence,
ongoing fear, or some other reason. Trial judges need not blind themselves to these realities
when they make factual determinations. Trial courts may accept or reject the victim’s testimony
as plausible, depending on the facts of each case. The trial court’s factual conclusions here were
neither plainly wrong nor were they without evidence to support them.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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