Jamara Claiborne v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
UNPUBLISHED
Present: Judges O’Brien, Ortiz and Raphael
JAMARA CLAIBORNE
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. Record No. 1165-22-2 PER CURIAM
FEBRUARY 28, 2023
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
Claire B. Cardwell, Judge
(Maureen L. White, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
on brief.
(Jason S. Miyares, Attorney General; Justin B. Hill, Assistant
Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
Appealing her criminal sentence, Jamara Claiborne argues that Code § 53.1-187 required
the trial court to credit her for time served while on home-electronic monitoring, awaiting trial.
We squarely held in Maryland v. Commonwealth, 75 Va. App. 483 (2022), that the statute does
not permit such sentencing credit. Accordingly, after examining the briefs and record, the panel
unanimously finds that oral argument is unnecessary because “the dispositive issue” in this
appeal has been “authoritatively decided, and the appellant has not argued that the case law
should be overturned, extended, modified, or reversed.” Code § 17.1-403(ii)(b); Rule 5A:27(b).
BACKGROUND
Claiborne was arrested in May 2021 on multiple assault and firearms charges after
directing her brother to shoot at her children’s father. Claiborne was granted bail on a cash bond
of $2,500 and released on home-electronic monitoring while awaiting trial. In October 2021, the
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
trial court amended the terms of release to permit Claiborne “to seek and maintain verified
employment while on the home electronic monitor program.” In March 2022, pursuant to a plea
agreement, the trial court convicted Claiborne of two counts of unlawful wounding (Code
§ 18.2-51) and one count of cruelty and injuries to children (Code § 40.1-103). In May, the court
sentenced Claiborne to fifteen years’ imprisonment, with thirteen years and five months
suspended. The court denied Claiborne’s request that she be given credit for time served while
on home-electronic monitoring. This appeal followed.
ANALYSIS
Claiborne argues that the trial court violated Code § 53.1-187 by failing to credit her for
time served while on home-electronic monitoring. The interpretation of the statute presents a
question of law that we review de novo. Maryland, 75 Va. App. at 487. Code § 53.1-187
provides, in pertinent part:
Any person who is sentenced to a term of confinement in a
correctional facility shall have deducted from any such term all
time actually spent by the person in a state hospital for
examination purposes or treatment prior to trial, in a state or local
correctional facility awaiting trial or pending an appeal, or in a
juvenile detention facility . . . .
In no case shall a person be allowed credit for time not actually
spent in confinement or in detention. In no case is a person on bail
to be regarded as in confinement for the purposes of this statute.
(Emphases added).
This Court recently held in Maryland that “[t]he language in Code § 53.1-187 is clear,
unambiguous, and does not permit credit for time ‘not actually spent in confinement or in
detention.’ Code § 53.1-187 states that ‘[i]n no case is a person on bail to be regarded as in
confinement for the purposes of this statute.’” 75 Va. App. at 488 (quoting Code § 53.1-187).
We read the term “confine” to mean “the state of being imprisoned or restrained.” Id. (quoting
Bing v. Haywood, 283 Va. 381, 387 (2012)). We concluded that “Code § 53.1-187 grants a trial
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court no authority to grant credit against a sentence for the time a defendant was admitted to
pretrial bail and was not actually confined,” even when the defendant was on home-electronic
monitoring. Id.
Like the defendant in Maryland, Claiborne was admitted to bail while awaiting trial and
placed on home-electronic monitoring as a condition of release. Thus, we find no basis to
distinguish this case from Maryland.1 To her credit, Claiborne’s counsel noted that the appeal in
Maryland had been argued and was pending when she filed her appellate brief here on
September 19, 2022. Maryland, decided the very next day, now binds this Court under the
interpanel-accord doctrine. E.g., Butcher v. Commonwealth, 298 Va. 392, 397 n.6 (2020).
CONCLUSION
Under Maryland, the trial court correctly rejected Claiborne’s argument that she had a
right to credit for time served while on home-electronic monitoring.
Affirmed.
1
Like the defendant in Maryland, Claiborne relies on King v. Commonwealth, 73
Va. App. 349, 353-54 (2021), arguing that being on home-electronic monitoring meant that she
was in “custody” while awaiting trial. But Maryland made clear that King involved the felony-
escape statute, “Code § 18.2-479(B), which applies to any person who is charged or convicted of
a felony and ‘in the custody of any court, officer of the court, or of any law-enforcement
officer.’” 75 Va. App. at 489. We explained that “the definition of ‘custody’ under Code
§ 18.2-479, as construed in King, was not synonymous with actual ‘confinement’ as stated in
Code § 53.1-187.” Id. at 490.
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