Katherine Louise Carter v. Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center ( 2023 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
PUBLISHED
Present: Judges Huff, Athey and White
Argued at Salem, Virginia
KATHERINE LOUISE CARTER,
EXECUTOR OF THE ESTATE OF
WORTH HARRIS CARTER, JR., DECEASED
OPINION BY
v. Record No. 0309-22-3 JUDGE KIMBERLEY SLAYTON WHITE
MARCH 7, 2023
WAKE FOREST UNIVERSITY BAPTIST
MEDICAL CENTER AND WAKE FOREST
UNIVERSITY HEALTH SCIENCES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
G. Carter Greer, Judge
Monica T. Monday (David R. Berry; James W. Haskins; Scott C.
Wall; Gentry Locke; Young, Haskins, Mann, Gregory & Wall, P.C.,
on briefs), for appellant.
S. Virginia Bondurant Price (Nicholas J. Giles; Alicia M. Penn;
Matthew E. Kelley; McGuireWoods LLP; Frith Anderson & Peake,
on briefs), for appellees.
Appellant Katherine Louise Carter challenges the circuit court’s dismissal of appellees
Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center and Wake Forest University Health Sciences for
lack of personal jurisdiction. Finding appellees’ contacts with Virginia insufficient under the
Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
In early 2016, Worth Carter (“Mr. Carter”) sought treatment from a Virginia
dermatologist, Dr. Judith M. Szulecki, for a rash and infection affecting his groin area.
Following approximately six months of treatment with no resolution, Mr. Carter’s primary care
physician referred Mr. Carter to Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center (“WFUBMC”)
in Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
On June 24, 2016, Mr. Carter first visited Dr. Kevin P. High, a North Carolina doctor
employed by Wake Forest University Health Sciences (“WFUHS”) located at WFUBMC
(collectively “Wake Forest”), regarding the rash and infection affecting his groin area. Nearly a
week later, Katherine Louise Carter (“Ms. Carter”), Mr. Carter’s daughter, contacted Dr. High
requesting updates on her father’s condition. Dr. High responded to her inquiry and offered
suggestions regarding pain relief. In response, Ms. Carter asked for a prescription to be sent to
their local pharmacy in Virginia. These contacts were made through an online patient portal,
myWakeHealth.
In early July, Ms. Carter contacted Dr. High, again using the myWakeHealth portal,
further updating Dr. High on Mr. Carter’s worsening condition. In response, Dr. High responded
that the worsening condition may, in fact, result from congestive heart failure. Thereafter,
Mr. Carter sought treatment for congestive heart failure at Johns Hopkins Hospital. Upon
discharge, Mr. Carter was referred back to Wake Forest, for the same condition affecting his
groin area.
Mr. Carter visited Dr. Steven R. Feldman, a dermatologist at Wake Forest, on five
separate occasions between August of 2016 and December of 2016. In addition to these visits,
Mr. Carter and his daughter communicated with Dr. Feldman by initiating telephone
conversations and text messages regarding his condition, follow-up treatment, and prescriptions.
On August 26, 2016, Mr. Carter saw Dr. William Brown Applegate at Wake Forest who,
upon examination of Mr. Carter, made an assessment that he needed constant care and forwarded
this information to Dr. Feldman. Because of the continuing condition affecting Mr. Carter’s
groin area, Dr. Applegate referred Mr. Carter to Dr. Lucian G. Vlad, a wound care specialist,
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also located at Wake Forest. Mr. Carter first visited Dr. Vlad on September 22, 2016, and
Mr. Carter would visit Dr. Vlad an additional ten times between September 2016 and February
2017. During this time, Mr. Carter and his daughter initiated phone calls to Dr. Vlad and
communicated with him through the patient portal regarding Mr. Carter’s condition and
treatment options.
In January of 2017, Mr. Carter was hospitalized in Virginia. Ms. Carter contacted
Dr. Vlad regarding her father’s condition. In response, Dr. Vlad suggested Mr. Carter obtain a
biopsy while he was hospitalized. Ms. Carter later informed Dr. Vlad that a biopsy could not be
obtained in Virginia for months without a referral to another dermatologist. In response,
Dr. Vlad made clear he did not want Mr. Carter seeing another dermatologist and that a biopsy
could be obtained in North Carolina during Mr. Carter’s next visit.
Mr. Carter obtained a biopsy at Wake Forest on February 27, 2017. Following the
biopsy, Mr. Carter returned to Wake Forest for additional MRI, CT, and bone scans. The tests
revealed that Mr. Carter suffered from metastatic cancer. Mr. Carter passed away on April 7,
2017.
On March 8, 2019, Ms. Carter, as executor of Mr. Carter’s estate, filed suit in the Circuit
Court of the City of Martinsville against Wake Forest and four North Carolina doctors—
Dr. High, Dr. Feldman, Dr. Applegate, and Dr. Vlad (collectively “the North Carolina
doctors”)—in addition to Mr. Carter’s Virginia dermatologist, Dr. Szulecki. The summons and
complaint were served on WFUBMC’s registered agent in Virginia.1 WFUHS and the North
Carolina doctors were served through the Secretary of the Commonwealth.
Wake Forest University Baptist Medical Center secured authorization to transact
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business in Virginia on March 7, 2017.
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Wake Forest and the North Carolina doctors moved, by special appearance, to dismiss for
lack of personal jurisdiction on May 3, 2019. On September 18, 2019, pursuant to Code
§ 8.01-277.1(B)(3), the circuit court authorized jurisdictional discovery. Subsequently, on April
28, 2020, the circuit court directed the parties to finish jurisdictional discovery by June 1, 2020.
On May 26, 2020, Ms. Carter nonsuited the four North Carolina doctors leaving only Wake
Forest and Dr. Szulecki as defendants.
Wake Forest filed an amended motion to dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by
special appearance on July 22, 2020, following the conclusion of jurisdictional discovery. The
circuit court conducted a hearing in Martinsville, Virginia, on April 27, 2021. No live testimony
was presented during the hearing. Rather, the parties relied on their briefs and the exhibits
attached thereto. Following the hearing, the circuit court granted Wake Forest’s motion to
dismiss for lack of personal jurisdiction by order dated July 22, 2021. Specifically, the circuit
court found that application of Virginia’s long-arm statute was not consistent with the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. In coming to
that conclusion, the circuit court made the following undisputed findings of fact:
1. WFUBMC is a corporation organized and existing under the
laws of North Carolina with its principal place of business in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
2. WFUHS is a corporation organized and existing under the laws
of North Carolina with its principal place of business in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
3. Dr. High, Dr. Feldman, Dr. Applegate, and Dr. Vlad (“North
Carolina physicians”) were at all pertinent times employees of
WFUHS, and they saw the decedent at their offices in
Winston-Salem, North Carolina.
4. The decedent, who first sought medical care from WFUBMC in
1999, did not rely on any advertising or solicitation from the
defendants or the North Carolina physicians. Dr. Lewis referred
the decedent to Dr. High, and the physicians at Johns Hopkins
referred him to Dr. Feldman.
5. None of the North Carolina physicians was licensed to practice
medicine in the Commonwealth of Virginia during the relevant
time period.
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6. The telephone calls from Dr. Feldman and Dr. Vlad to the
plaintiff while she and the decedent were in Virginia were in
response to inquiries from the plaintiff.
7. The text messages that Dr. Feldman sent to the plaintiff were in
response to text messages that the plaintiff had sent to him.
8. The messages that Dr. High and Dr. Vlad sent to the plaintiff on
MyWakeHealth “were in response to messages initiated by her,
without her stating where she was located.” Amended Motion to
Dismiss for Lack of Personal Jurisdiction by Special Appearance,
p. 10.
9. The North Carolina physicians wrote various prescriptions and
sent them electronically to the decedent’s pharmacy in Rocky
Mount, Virginia, at the decedent’s request.
10. The North Carolina physicians sent copies of their office notes
to Dr. Lewis at the decedent’s request.
11. On March 7, 2017, the State Corporation Commission issued
to WFUBMC a certificate of authority to transact business in the
Commonwealth of Virginia.
12. On June 15, 2020, the plaintiff filed a complaint in Superior
Court of Forsythe County, North Carolina, naming as defendants
Baptist, WFUHS, WFUBMC, Dr. High, Dr. Feldman,
Dr. Applegate, and Dr. Vlad. The lawsuit seeks compensatory
damages for the wrongful death of the decedent.
Ms. Carter later filed a motion for entry of partial final judgment pursuant to Rule 1:2 on
December 2, 2021. Wake Forest filed their response in opposition to Ms. Carter’s motion for
partial final judgment on January 6, 2022. On February 3, 2022, the circuit court entered a
partial final judgment order granting Ms. Carter’s motion and rendering the circuit court’s July
22, 2021 order a final order as to defendant Wake Forest. As such, Ms. Carter filed this appeal
on February 23, 2022.
ANALYSIS
Ms. Carter challenges the dismissal of Wake Forest for lack of personal jurisdiction. She
argues that Wake Forest’s contacts suffice to comport with due process therefore placing Wake
Forest within the reach of Virginia’s long-arm statute. In reviewing and ruling on Wake Forest’s
motion to dismiss by special appearance, the circuit court treated the motion like a demurrer,
without objection from any party. Notwithstanding, the circuit court also allowed evidence that
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had been provided in the discovery process to be presented in support and in opposition to the
motion, by agreement of the parties. Nonetheless, we review “issues of statutory and
constitutional interpretation under a de novo standard of review.” Bergaust v. Flaherty, 57
Va. App. 423, 429 (2011) (citing Cabaniss v. Cabaniss, 46 Va. App. 595 (2005)).
First, we address Virginia’s long-arm statute. Code § 8.01-328.1 states, in relevant part,
personal jurisdiction may be exercised by “transacting any business” in the Commonwealth or by
“causing tortious injury in this Commonwealth by an act or omission outside this
Commonwealth if he regularly does or solicits business, or engages in any other persistent course
of conduct, or derives substantial revenue from goods used or consumed or services rendered, in
this Commonwealth.” Our Supreme Court has construed Code § 8.01-328.1 broadly, finding
that it “is a single-act statute requiring only one transaction in Virginia to confer jurisdiction on
our courts.” Peninsula Cruise, Inc. v. New River Yacht Sales, Inc., 257 Va. 315, 319 (1999)
(quoting Nan Ya Plastics Corp. U.S.A. v. DeSantis, 237 Va. 255, 260 (1989)). In other words,
“[i]t is manifest that the purpose of Virginia’s long arm statute is to assert jurisdiction over
nonresidents who engage in some purposeful activity in this State to the extent permissible under
the due process clause.” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting John G. Kolbe, Inc. v. Chromodern
Chair Co., 211 Va. 736, 740 (1971)). Given that Virginia’s long-arm statute coincides with the
limitations imposed by the Fourteenth Amendment, “[both] inquiries essentially become one.”
Bergaust, 57 Va. App. at 430 (quoting Young v. New Haven Advoc., 315 F.3d 256, 261 (4th Cir.
2002)).
“[D]ue process requires only that in order to subject a defendant to a judgment in
personam, if he be not present within the territory of the forum, he have certain minimum
contacts with it such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend ‘traditional notions of fair
play and substantial justice.’” Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., Off. of Unemployment Comp. &
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Placement, 326 U.S. 310, 316 (1945) (quoting Milliken v. Meyer, 311 U.S. 457, 463 (1940)).
This “limits the power of a state court to render a valid personal judgment against a nonresident
defendant.” World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 291 (1980). The primary
focus of the due process inquiry is on “the defendant’s relationship to the forum State.” Ford
Motor Co. v. Mont. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 141 S. Ct. 1017, 1024 (2021) (quoting Bristol-Myers
Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of Cal., San Francisco Cnty., 137 S. Ct. 1773, 1779 (2017)). As
such, there are two kinds of personal jurisdiction: general and specific. Id.General jurisdiction exists when a defendant is “essentially at home” in the forum state.
Id. (quoting Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S. A. v. Brown, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011)).
This broader jurisdiction, in the context of corporate defendants, exists where the defendant is
incorporated or has its principal place of business. Id. (citing Daimler AG v. Bauman, 571 U.S.
117, 137 (2014)). Here, general jurisdiction is inapplicable.
Specific jurisdiction, however, is entirely different. Id. Specific jurisdiction requires that
the defendant act “by which [it] purposefully avails itself of the privilege of conducting activities
within the forum State.” Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 253 (1958). These acts, or contacts,
cannot be “random, isolated, or fortuitous.” Keeton v. Hustler Mag., Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774
(1984). Rather, “[t]hey must show that the defendant deliberately ‘reached out beyond’ its
home.” Ford, 141 S. Ct. at 1025 (quoting Walden v. Fiore, 571 U.S. 277, 285 (2014)). Put
differently, “‘there must be “an affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy,
principally, [an] activity or an occurrence that takes place in the forum State and is therefore
subject to the State’s regulation.”’” Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Bristol-Myers, 137 S. Ct.
at 1780).
Although not binding on this Court, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit has helpfully organized the due process requirements of specific personal jurisdiction into
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a three-prong test: “(1) the extent to which the defendant purposefully availed itself of the
privilege of conducting activities in the State; (2) whether the plaintiffs’ claims arise out of those
activities directed at the State; and (3) whether the exercise of personal jurisdiction would be
constitutionally reasonable.” UMG Recordings, Inc. v. Kurbanov, 963 F.3d 344, 352 (4th Cir.
2020) (quoting Consulting Eng’rs Corp. v. Geometric Ltd., 561 F.3d 273, 278 (4th Cir. 2009)),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 1057 (2021).
Addressing the first prong, purposeful availment, requires the Court to determine if, and
to what extent, the “defendant [has] purposefully avail[ed] himself of the privilege of conducting
business under the laws of the forum state.” Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting
Consulting Eng’rs Corp., 561 F.3d at 278). “Relevant to this analysis are the quality and nature
of the defendant’s connections, not merely the number of contacts between the defendant and the
forum state.” Id. The following list of nonexclusive factors have been considered helpful in
determining whether a defendant has purposefully availed themselves:
(1) whether the defendant maintained offices or agents in the State;
(2) whether the defendant maintained property in the State;
(3) whether the defendant reached into the State to solicit or
initiate business; (4) whether the defendant deliberately engaged in
significant or long-term business activities in the State; (5) whether
a choice of law clause selects the law of the State; (6) whether the
defendant made in-person contact with a resident of the State
regarding the business relationship; (7) whether the relevant
contracts required performance of duties in the State; and
(8) the nature, quality, and extent of the parties’ communications
about the business being transacted.
Id. (quoting Sneha Media & Ent., LLC v. Associated Broad. Co. P. Ltd., 911 F.3d 192, 198-99
(4th Cir. 2018) (citing Consulting Eng’rs Corp., 561 F.3d at 278)).
Here, all but one of the factors are entirely absent. Wake Forest maintained no offices or
agents or property in Virginia prior to litigation; did not solicit or initiate business with
Mr. Carter in Virginia; did not deliberately engage in long-term business activities in Virginia;
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had no choice of law provision; had no in-person contact in Virginia; and had no relevant,
contractual duties that require performance in the state.
As for the nature, quality, and extent of the parties’ communications about the business
being transacted, there is scant evidence of a deliberate attempt, by Wake Forest, to purposefully
avail themselves of Virginia. Ms. Carter alleges that Mr. Carter received additional, virtual
treatment from Wake Forest, but the evidence bears out that this “treatment” consisted of
follow-up conversations—in an online portal that acted as an in-house email server—regarding
Mr. Carter’s condition after the treatment he had received in person from Wake Forest in North
Carolina. Moreover, the only other alleged contacts consist of phone calls and text messages
regarding scheduling appointments, following up on Mr. Carter’s condition, or filling
prescriptions at local Virginia pharmacies. These contacts were initiated by Ms. Carter—not
Wake Forest.
At the onset of the evaluation and treatment of Mr. Carter’s condition, he availed himself
of the North Carolina jurisdiction, not the other way around. The North Carolina physicians, as
is expected and as is required, engaged in communication that constituted advice and care that
amounted to follow up to the evaluation and treatment that took place in North Carolina. Rather
than a case about Wake Forest reaching into Virginia, this is a case of a plaintiff reaching back
into North Carolina.
To hold otherwise would impact the care that Virginians now receive from out-of-state
providers. In fact, in her brief, Ms. Carter asserts that Wake Forest “could have declined his
[Mr. Carter’s] referral, referred him elsewhere, or insisted on in-person care” in order to avoid
availing itself of personal jurisdiction in Virginia. Our ruling does not place Virginians in that
quandary.
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The ruling in this case is consistent with other courts concluding that follow-up care does
not confer personal jurisdiction upon a non-resident physician nor upon a hospital:
Follow up consultation ancillary to the examination and treatment
made by the out-of-state doctor, telephone calls about the status of
an out-of-state patient, or arrangements for a patient to continue
with medication prescribed by that doctor do not reach the
minimum contacts necessary for the satisfaction of due process.
Prince v. Urban, 57 Cal. Rptr. 2d 181, 184 (Cal. Ct. App. 1996). The same conclusion was
reached in Bradley v. Mayo Found., No. CIV.A. 97-204, 1999 WL 1032806, at *9 (E.D. Ky.
Aug. 10, 1999),
Writing prescriptions, sending letters confirming diagnoses
previously made, and telephone consultations are routine actions
taken by medical practitioners regardless of where their patients
are located. Such routine actions, when incidental to treatment in
the physician’s home state, should not subject the physician or his
employer to jurisdiction in any state in which his patient happens
to reside.
Even accepting every allegation in the complaint as true, the evidence fails to establish
purposeful availment: the actual treatment Mr. Carter received all occurred in North Carolina and
not in Virginia; Mr. and Ms. Carter, as follow up to the out-of-state treatment, initiated contact
with Wake Forest and their doctors in North Carolina from Virginia via text messages, phone
calls, and the myWakeHealth portal; and Wake Forest maintained no presence in the
Commonwealth of Virginia, did not solicit business, nor sought protection under its laws. Given
that the facts fail to show Wake Forest purposefully availed themselves of the privilege of
conducting business in Virginia, we end our inquiry.
CONCLUSION
Ms. Carter has failed to meet her burden in establishing that personal jurisdiction exists
under Virginia’s long-arm statute and that the exercise of such jurisdiction does not offend the
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Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. We affirm the circuit court’s decision
granting Wake Forest’s motion to dismiss.
Affirmed.
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