Tina Renee Rosser v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Salem, Virginia
TINA RENEE ROSSER
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2862-99-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
NOVEMBER 28, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PITTSYLVANIA COUNTY
Charles J. Strauss, Judge
George W. Nolley for appellant.
Robert H. Anderson, III, Senior Assistant
Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Tina Renee Rosser (appellant) appeals from her bench trial
convictions for statutory burglary and grand larceny. On
appeal, she contends the trial court erroneously (1) admitted
testimony about the existence and contents of a letter allegedly
written by her; and (2) held the evidence was sufficient to
support her convictions. We hold that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in admitting testimony about the letter's
contents and that the evidence was sufficient to support both
convictions. Therefore, we affirm.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
A.
ADMISSIBILITY OF TESTIMONY ABOUT CONTENTS OF LETTER
The best evidence rule requires that, "when the terms of a
writing or document are material, the original must be produced
unless it be shown that the original is unavailable, in which
case secondary evidence may be introduced to prove the facts."
Myrick v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 333, 339, 412 S.E.2d 176,
179 (1991). "Generally, the sufficiency of the evidence
relating to unavailability of the writing is a preliminary
question addressed to the sound discretion of the trial court."
Bradshaw v. Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 374, 379, 429 S.E.2d 881,
885 (1993). If a dispute develops over whether the original
writing ever existed, "the conflicting evidence . . . must be
presented . . . [and the issue] resolved as a matter of
fact. . . . The test of unavailability is proof with reasonable
certainty." Id. at 379-80, 429 S.E.2d at 885. If the trier of
fact concludes with reasonable certainty that the document
existed and that it is unavailable for admission at trial,
testimony about its contents is admissible, and any remaining
disputes center on the weight to be given the evidence, not its
admissibility. 1 See, e.g., Foley v. Commonwealth, 8 Va. App.
149, 164-65, 379 S.E.2d 915, 924 (1989).
1
We reject the Commonwealth's contention that appellant
failed properly to preserve for appeal her objection to the
admission of testimony about the contents of the letter.
Although appellant did not specifically argue the evidence was
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Here, McFadden and Stone both testified to their receipt
from appellant's stepmother of a letter written by appellant.
They also indicated that the letter had been misplaced or thrown
out and that they had been unable to find it despite
"[t]urn[ing] the[ir] house upside down." Both McFadden and
Stone agreed the letter was from appellant and indicated
appellant's knowledge of the theft. The trial court "ha[d] no
doubt" the letter existed and indicated its only question
concerned the letter's precise contents. Under these
circumstances, the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable
to the Commonwealth, supports the trial court's implicit
finding, by a reasonable certainty, that the letter existed and
was material but that it was unavailable for admission into
evidence at trial. Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its
discretion in admitting into evidence testimony about the
existence and contents of the letter.
insufficient to prove unavailability, she contended the letter
was inadmissible under the best evidence rule. As discussed in
the text, the best evidence rule encompasses the issue of
unavailability. Further, the trial court heard evidence and
argument from the Commonwealth on the issue of unavailability,
and implicitly ruled the letter was unavailable, thereby
satisfying the purpose of Rule 5A:18. See, e.g., Morris v.
Comm. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 13 Va. App. 77, 84 n.2, 408 S.E.2d
588, 592 n.2 (1991).
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B.
SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible
therefrom. See Martin v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 438, 443, 358
S.E.2d 415, 418 (1987). Any element of a crime may be proved by
circumstantial evidence, see, e.g., Servis v. Commonwealth, 6
Va. App. 507, 524, 371 S.E.2d 156, 165 (1988), provided the
evidence as a whole "is sufficiently convincing to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis except that of guilt," Coleman v.
Commonwealth, 226 Va. 31, 53, 307 S.E.2d 864, 876 (1983).
Appellant was convicted for grand larceny and statutory
burglary. "Larceny is the wrongful taking of goods of another
without the owner's consent and with the intention to
permanently deprive the owner of possession of the goods. Once
the crime of larceny is established, the unexplained possession
of recently stolen goods permits an inference of larceny by the
possessor." Bright v. Commonwealth, 4 Va. App. 248, 251, 356
S.E.2d 443, 444 (1987). Possession must be exclusive but may
also be joint. See Moehring v. Commonwealth, 223 Va. 564, 568,
290 S.E.2d 891, 893 (1982). If the value of the goods taken
equals or exceeds $200, the crime is grand larceny. See Code
§ 18.2-95.
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Statutory burglary requires proof that appellant broke and
entered the dwelling house of McFadden and Stone with the intent
to commit larceny therein. See Code §§ 18.2-90, -91. "The
Commonwealth can establish a prima facie case that appellant
broke and entered by (1) proving that goods were stolen from a
house which was broken into; (2) justifying the inference that
both offenses were committed at the same time, by the same
person, as part of the same criminal enterprise; and (3) proving
that the goods were found soon thereafter in the possession of
the accused." Bright, 4 Va. App. at 251, 356 S.E.2d at 444.
The evidence, both direct and circumstantial, is sufficient
to support appellant's convictions. As to the larceny
conviction, ample evidence establishes that the boom box and TV
were stolen and that appellant was the criminal agent. The
victims left their home locked and gave no one permission to
enter it. When they returned home, they found a window open, a
screen missing, and the rear door unlocked. Their boom box and
television set, which had a combined value of at least $450,
were missing. One of the victims testified that appellant wrote
"I'm sorry for taking . . . the boom box and the TV." The other
victim testified that appellant's letter apologized for
"breaking in[to] [their] house." Although the court questioned
precisely what was in the letter appellant wrote to the victims,
it concluded the letter existed. Either version of the letter
implicated appellant and showed her knowledge of the crimes.
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Further, appellant told Deputy Farris "that she was going to
return" the items, and in fact she did so through her
stepmother, demonstrating both her knowledge of the crimes and
her possession of the property. The trial court was entitled to
reject appellant's statement to Deputy Farris that she did not
take the items.
Appellant also had the means and opportunity to commit the
larceny. See Lew v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App. 353, 358, 457
S.E.2d 392, 394-95 (1995). She resided next door to the
victims' home and was present when the victims told her
stepmother they would be out of town. Thus, the only hypothesis
flowing from the evidence was that appellant exercised dominion
and control over the property, even though such exercise may
have been joint, and permitted application of the presumption
that appellant, either alone or with an accomplice, stole the
boom box and TV.
This same evidence also established appellant's guilt for
statutory burglary. "The victim[s] testified that the stolen
items were seen in the house shortly before it was left
unoccupied and the breaking was discovered, and were found
missing shortly thereafter, thus justifying the inference that
the burglary and the larceny were committed at the same time as
part of the same criminal enterprise." Bright, 4 Va. App. at
252, 356 S.E.2d at 445. The contents of the letter showed
appellant's knowledge of the crimes. Further, appellant said
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that she "was going to return" the boom box and TV and did so
through her stepmother, showing that she was in recent
possession of the fruits of the burglary. See id.Under Virginia law, upon proof of a breaking
and entering and a theft of goods, and if
the evidence warrants an inference that the
breaking and entering and the theft were
committed at the same time by the same
person and as part of the same transaction,
"the exclusive possession of the stolen
goods shortly thereafter, unexplained or
falsely denied, has the same efficiency to
give rise to an inference that the possessor
is guilty of the breaking and entering as to
an inference that he is guilty of larceny."
Cannady v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 533, 535, 172 S.E.2d 780, 781
(1970) (quoting Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 210 Va. 201, 203, 169
S.E.2d 577, 579 (1969)).
For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not abuse
its discretion in admitting testimony about the existence and
contents of the letter. We also hold the evidence was
sufficient to establish that the victims' residence was
burglarized and that appellant was the criminal agent, thereby
supporting her convictions for grand larceny and statutory
burglary.
Affirmed.
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