Timothy Craighead v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Frank and Humphreys
Argued at Salem, Virginia
TIMOTHY CRAIGHEAD
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0204-00-3 JUDGE LARRY G. ELDER
NOVEMBER 28, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FRANKLIN COUNTY
William N. Alexander, II, Judge
Carolyn H. Furrow for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Timothy Craighead (appellant) appeals from his bench trial
conviction for possession of cocaine with intent to distribute
in violation of Code § 18.2-248. On appeal, he contends the
court erroneously denied his motion to suppress the evidence as
the product of an unreasonable search. We hold the reliable
informant's tip, coupled with police corroboration and
independent knowledge of related facts, provided probable cause
for appellant's warrantless arrest and the search incident
thereto. Therefore, we affirm appellant's conviction.
At a hearing on a defendant's motion to suppress, the
Commonwealth has the burden of proving the challenged action did
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not
designated for publication.
not violate the defendant's constitutional rights. See Simmons
v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 200, 204, 380 S.E.2d 656, 659 (1989).
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prevailing party, here the Commonwealth, granting to it all
reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See
Commonwealth v. Grimstead, 12 Va. App. 1066, 1067, 407 S.E.2d
47, 48 (1991). "[W]e are bound by the trial court's findings of
historical fact unless 'plainly wrong' or without evidence to
support them," McGee v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 193, 198, 487
S.E.2d 259, 261 (1997) (en banc), but we review de novo the
trial court's application of defined legal standards such as
probable cause to the particular facts of the case, Ornelas v.
United States, 517 U.S. 690, 699, 116 S. Ct. 1657, 1663, 134
L. Ed. 2d 911 (1996).
"[T]he test of constitutional validity [of a warrantless
arrest] is whether at the moment of arrest the arresting officer
had knowledge of sufficient facts and circumstances to warrant a
reasonable man in believing that an offense has been committed."
Bryson v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 85, 86-87, 175 S.E.2d 248, 250
(1970). "Probable cause to arrest must exist exclusive of the
incident search. So long as probable cause to arrest exists at
the time of the search, however, it is unimportant that the
search preceded the formal arrest if the arrest '"followed
quickly on the heels of the challenged search."'" Carter v.
Commonwealth, 9 Va. App. 310, 312, 387 S.E.2d 505, 506 (1990)
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(citation omitted). "Probable cause exists where 'the facts and
circumstances within [the arresting officers'] knowledge and of
which they had reasonably trustworthy information [are]
sufficient in themselves to warrant a man of reasonable caution
in the belief that' an offense has been or is being committed."
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160, 175-76, 69 S. Ct. 1302,
1310-11, 93 L. Ed. 1879 (1949) (citation omitted). Courts must
view and weigh the evidence supporting probable cause "'as
understood by those versed in the field of law enforcement.'"
Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 231-32, 103 S. Ct. 2317,
2328-29, 76 L. Ed. 2d 527 (1983) (quoting United States v.
Cortez, 449 U.S. 411, 418, 101 S. Ct. 690, 695, 66 L. Ed. 2d 621(1981)).
When the factual basis for probable cause is provided by an
informant, the informant's (1) veracity, (2) reliability, and
(3) basis of knowledge are "highly relevant" factors in the
overall totality-of-the-circumstances probable cause analysis.
See id. at 230, 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2328, 2329.
[A] deficiency in [either veracity or basis
of knowledge] may be compensated for, in
determining the overall reliability of a
tip, by a strong showing as to the other, or
by some other indicia of reliability. If,
for example, a particular informant is known
for the unusual reliability of his
predictions of certain types of criminal
activities in a locality, his failure in a
particular case, to thoroughly set forth the
basis of his knowledge surely should not
serve as an absolute bar to a finding of
probable cause based on his tip.
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Id. at 233, 103 S. Ct. at 2329-30 (citations omitted). "When an
officer receives from a known reliable informant a report that a
felony is being committed that is so detailed as to raise an
inference either of personal observation or of acquisition of
the information in a reliable way then the officer has probable
cause to arrest." McKoy v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 224, 227, 183
S.E.2d 153, 156 (1971).
We applied these principles in Jefferson v. Commonwealth,
27 Va. App. 1, 497 S.E.2d 474 (1998), in which we held that
overlapping tips from two separate reliable informants, based on
their firsthand knowledge and coupled with police corroboration
of Jefferson's description and location, provided probable cause
to arrest him. See id. at 13-14, 497 S.E.2d at 480. In
Jefferson, Officer Hoyt became acquainted with the two
informants when they were arrested on previous occasions. See
id. at 7, 497 S.E.2d at 477. Both provided Hoyt with
information about Jefferson in the hope of obtaining leniency on
pending charges. See id. Hoyt had worked with the second
informant "maybe a dozen times" over three or four months during
which time he had provided information which had led to several
arrests but which had not yet resulted in any convictions. See
id. at 7-8, 497 S.E.2d at 477.
Although the facts in Jefferson are not identical to those
in appellant's case, we hold they are sufficiently analogous to
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support the trial court's denial of appellant's motion to
suppress. In Jefferson, two different informants observed
Jefferson sell drugs, whereas in appellant's case, only one
informant furnished Officer Hubbard with information about
appellant's drug transactions and did not specifically state
that he observed the transactions take place. However, the
overall degree of reliability of the informant in appellant's
case was higher than that of the two informants combined in
Jefferson, and additional facts known to and observed by
Officers Hubbard and Agee strengthened the finding of probable
cause.
In appellant's case, in contrast to Jefferson, no evidence
indicated that the informant gave the information in the hope of
obtaining leniency on an outstanding charge, and the informant
had a longer and stronger track record, having previously
provided information leading to nine arrests and resulting in
eight convictions. Although the informant in appellant's case
did not state that he personally observed appellant selling
drugs, he identified appellant and his companion by name and
gave police a detailed description of appellant's attire and
location. Officer Hubbard, who had known appellant for several
years and knew his companion by name, as well, was able to
confirm all this information, excepting appellant's possession
and distribution of drugs, within twenty-five minutes of the
informant's call. See McKoy, 212 Va. at 227, 183 S.E.2d at 156
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(noting proof that information was obtained first-hand is not
required when reliable informant gives tip "so detailed as to
raise an inference either of personal observation or of
acquisition of the information in a reliable way"). In
Jefferson, by contrast, the officers did not arrive at the scene
until over three hours after receiving the tip. See 27 Va. App.
at 7-8, 497 S.E.2d at 477. Upon their arrival, they found
Jefferson exiting the rear of the house at 101 North Virginia
Avenue rather than on the nearby street corner where he had been
seen by the informants, see id., and no evidence established
whether he was in the company of the two individuals with whom
he had previously been seen. None of the officers knew
Jefferson personally, and they identified him by description
only. See id.Finally, additional facts known to and observed by Officer
Hubbard strengthened the showing of probable cause in
appellant's case. Separate and apart from the tip Hubbard
received from the reliable informant, Hubbard knew appellant to
have been "connected with" and "in the presence of known drug
users and drug dealers at times." In addition, when Hubbard
arrived on the scene and confirmed all of the informant's tip
except appellant's possession and distribution of cocaine,
appellant appeared "very nervous," backed away from Hubbard as
if "he didn't want [Hubbard] to get very close to him," and
eventually tried to flee. Although these factors were not
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dispositive, they were relevant considerations in the
totality-of-the-circumstances analysis.
The details of the reliable informant's tip, coupled with
the officers' prompt verification of those details, independent
knowledge of appellant's association with drug users and
dealers, and appellant's conduct when approached by the
officers, provided them with probable cause to arrest appellant
and to search him incident to that arrest. See also United
States v. Liang, 538 F.2d 83, 84-85 (4th Cir. 1976); cf. Wright
v. Commonwealth, 222 Va. 188, 190-92, 278 S.E.2d 849, 851-52
(1981) (applying more stringent Aguilar-Spinelli test).
For these reasons, we hold the trial court did not err in
denying appellant's motion to suppress, and we affirm
appellant's conviction.
Affirmed.
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