Melvin Alexander Moore v. Commonwealth ( 1996 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Senior Judge Cole
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    MELVIN ALEXANDER MOORE
    v.       Record No. 1595-94-2                   MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE MARVIN F. COLE
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF APPOMATTOX COUNTY
    Kenneth M. Covington, Judge
    Andrew M. Sacks (Sacks, Sacks & Imprevento,
    on brief), for appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Melvin Alexander Moore, appellant, was convicted of
    statutory rape of a six-year old girl in violation of Code
    § 18.2-61(A)(iii).      On appeal, appellant argues that the trial
    court erred in allowing a mental health therapist "to testify as
    an expert witness on the credibility of the [victim] and on the
    probability of the incident occurring based on certain
    hypothetical questions tracking the [victim]'s symptoms."          For
    the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial
    judge.
    I.
    The victim was fifteen years old at the time of the trial.
    She testified that when she was six years old she had a sexual
    encounter with appellant, who had been dating the victim's
    *
    Pursuant to Code       §   17-116.010   this   opinion   is    not
    designated for publication.
    mother.   The victim testified that appellant "held his penis with
    one of his hands and he rubbed it on the inside of my
    vagina . . . ."    The next day the victim told her babysitter
    "that [appellant] had made love to [her]."   She was upset and
    cried as she disclosed the incident to the babysitter.    She then
    told her mother about the incident, but her mother did not
    believe her and did not take her to a doctor.
    The victim testified that after the incident, when appellant
    visited her home, she hid under the bed, in the closet, or behind
    other furniture.   The victim became upset at television shows
    that depicted rape or sexual molestation.    She often cried about
    the incident and, at one time, took an overdose of aspirin.
    In September, 1993, about nine years after the incident, the
    victim saw appellant at a laundromat.   She became upset and left
    the building, although she had not seen appellant since 1984.
    The victim testified that she cried, wished she was dead, and
    asked herself why the incident had to happen to her.    Her mother
    took her to the hospital, where she was referred to the
    Appomattox Counseling Center.
    The victim began seeing Carol DePew, a mental health
    therapist.   She met with DePew for a total of eleven sessions.
    DePew has an undergraduate degree in psychology and a masters
    degree in mental health counseling.   She has "a National
    Counseling Certification which is a five year renewable license
    to be continued with 100 continued education hours of which [she]
    2
    ha[d] earned 50."   She has attended professional seminars on such
    topics as working with sexual abuse survivors.   DePew testified
    she has "done extensive professional reading of books and
    journals on topics relevant to working with adolescents and
    families and [has] five years of professional experience in
    therapy primarily working with children and families."    DePew
    stated that one-third to one-half of her caseload involves
    children who have been sexually abused.
    DePew was qualified as an expert witness over appellant's
    objection.   Appellant argued to the trial court that DePew's
    testimony was inadmissible because it would address the ultimate
    issue in the case -- the credibility of the victim.   However, the
    trial court ruled that DePew could testify, stating:
    [T]he Court would not allow the witness to
    give an opinion as to the ultimate fact in
    issue. That is in her opinion whether or not
    this child on the occasion was sexually
    abused or not. That is an issue for the jury
    to draw from all the evidence. However, I
    assume what the Commonwealth is about to do
    is to relate certain behavioral happenings
    and characteristics and ask the witness
    whether that type of behavior is consistent
    with a child who has been sexually abused. I
    don't think the response to that, assuming it
    would be an affirmative one based upon the
    facts that the Commonwealth would give, would
    go to invading the province of the jury in
    deciding the ultimate issue. I think it
    would be probative here. We have something
    that happened some nine years ago.
    Basically, the case comes down to the
    testimony of the young lady at this juncture
    as would be opposed by testimony of the
    defendant if he testifies. But, basically,
    it's coming down to the testimony of what the
    young lady has to say. This could be helpful
    to the jury in deciding whether or not she is
    3
    telling the truth. Something that the jury
    could consider other than their observation
    of her manner and demeanor and responses here
    today.
    At the trial, DePew testified in response to hypothetical
    questions.    She listed the following as "pretty common" symptoms
    of sexual abuse victims:    crying; expressing painful or negative
    emotions in inappropriate fashions; becoming upset in a manner
    that is not rational or reasonable to others, such as when seeing
    something on television reminiscent of the event; safety seeking
    behavior such as hiding; overdose or suicide attempts; and panic
    attacks upon seeing the perpetrator.    She testified that one of
    the strongest indicators of sexual abuse was when the victim
    remembered the exact event even though it occurred many years
    ago.
    Appellant testified and denied any sexual activity with the
    victim.
    II.
    "The admissibility of evidence is within the broad
    discretion of the trial court, and a ruling will not be disturbed
    on appeal in the absence of an abuse of discretion."     Blain v.
    Commonwealth, 
    7 Va. App. 10
    , 16, 
    371 S.E.2d 838
    , 842 (1988)
    (citation omitted).
    Relying on Davison v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 496
    , 
    445 S.E.2d 683
     (1994), appellant argues that DePew's testimony
    impermissibly bolstered the credibility of the victim and offered
    conclusions as to the ultimate issue in the case.    However,
    4
    DePew's testimony differed from the testimony offered by the
    expert witness in Davison.    In Davison, the expert witness, a
    therapist, testified concerning the "phenomenon of recanting" to
    explain why the victim, a child, would relate prior inconsistent
    statements that contradicted both the victim's trial testimony
    and the victim's original version of a sexual assault.      Id. at
    498-99, 445 S.E.2d at 684-85.    We held that the trial court erred
    in admitting the therapist's testimony because she offered an
    opinion as to why the victim's testimony at trial should be
    believed and why the victim's prior inconsistent statement should
    be disbelieved.   Id. at 503-04, 445 S.E.2d at 687.
    The testimony of DePew is more analogous to the expert
    witness testimony offered in Taylor v. Commonwealth, 
    21 Va. App.
    ___, ___ S.E.2d ___ (1996).   In Taylor, a licensed clinical
    social worker testified that she "'found [the victim] to be
    suffering from posttraumatic stress disorder,' explained how she
    reached her diagnosis from the symptoms that the victim related,
    and testified that posttraumatic stress disorder may afflict
    'anyone who has had a traumatic event outside of normal human
    experience that would be markedly distressing to almost anyone.'"
    Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.    The expert witness also
    identified criteria necessary to diagnose posttraumatic stress
    disorder, applied the criteria to the victim, and expressed her
    professional opinion that "the victim demonstrated the requisite
    number of criteria to support a diagnosis of posttraumatic stress
    5
    disorder."   Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.
    This Court rejected Taylor's assertion that the expert
    witness' testimony "constituted a comment on the victim's
    credibility." Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___.    We held:
    [E]vidence of an emotional or psychological
    injury such as posttraumatic stress disorder,
    like medical evidence of physical injury, is
    relevant as circumstantial evidence of the
    occurrence of a traumatizing event. In this
    case, [the expert witness'] testimony
    corroborated the fact that the victim had
    suffered a traumatizing event, as evidenced
    by her mental condition, and constituted
    neither the expression of an opinion on the
    victim's credibility, nor an opinion as to
    which version of events should be accepted by
    the jury.
    Id. at ___, ___ S.E.2d at ___. 1
    An expert in a criminal case "may give an
    opinion based [only] upon his own knowledge
    of facts disclosed in his testimony or . . .
    upon facts in evidence assumed in a
    hypothetical question," but the witness may
    not express an opinion as to the ultimate
    issue to be determined by the trier of fact.
    Price, 18 Va. App. at 764, 446 S.E.2d at 645 (citations omitted).
    In this case, DePew responded only to hypothetical questions
    concerning the symptoms related to sexual abuse.   She also
    testified that victims "could easily have a panic attack" when
    they encountered their offender, even years after a traumatizing
    1
    See also Price v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 760
    , 765, 
    446 S.E.2d 642
    , 645 (1994) (holding that an expert witness' testimony
    concerning battered child syndrome "'is not an opinion regarding
    the culpability of any particular defendant. . . . [It] merely
    tends to show that the child was intentionally, rather than
    accidentally, injured.'" (citation omitted)).
    6
    incident.   DePew did not enumerate any details of the incident
    that the victim may have related to her in therapy sessions.
    Further, DePew did not testify that she believed the victim was
    telling the truth, or that, in her opinion, appellant committed
    the charged offense.   DePew merely responded to hypothetical
    questions that certain behavior was consistent with that of a
    sexually abused child.   Therefore, DePew's testimony corroborated
    the fact that the victim had been sexually abused and
    "constituted neither the expression of an opinion on the victim's
    credibility, nor an opinion as to which version of events should
    be accepted by the jury."   See Taylor, 
    21 Va. App.
    at ___, ___
    S.E.2d at ___.   Thus, the trial court did not abuse its
    discretion in admitting the evidence.
    Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
    7
    BENTON, J., dissenting.
    In Davison v. Commonwealth, 
    18 Va. App. 496
    , 
    445 S.E.2d 683
    (1994), we held as follows:
    In proffering [the therapist] as an expert,
    it was the prosecutor's intent to bolster the
    truth of [the victim's] testimony at trial.
    It is well settled that an expert may not
    "express an opinion as to the veracity of any
    witness." The prosecutor's question to [the
    therapist] specifically concerned the
    testimony of a "particular . . . witness"
    and, thus, was clearly "intended to elicit an
    opinion" of veracity. Such evidence is a
    comment on an ultimate fact within the
    province of the jury and must be excluded by
    the trial court.
    Id. at 504, 445 S.E.2d at 688 (citations omitted).    See also
    Coppola v. Commonwealth, 
    220 Va. 243
    , 252, 
    257 S.E.2d 797
    , 803
    (1979), cert. denied, 
    444 U.S. 1103
     (1980).    Because the
    therapist's testimony was admitted in this case only to bolster
    the complainant's credibility by discussing truthfulness
    criteria, I would hold that Davison controls this case and
    reverse the conviction.
    In her testimony, the complainant said that Moore had sexual
    intercourse with her nine years earlier when she was six years of
    age.   Because the complainant was under the age of thirteen when
    the incident was alleged to have occurred, the Commonwealth had
    to prove only that Moore had sexual intercourse with the
    complainant, who was not his spouse, to establish a violation of
    Code § 18.2-61(A)(iii).   To support her claim, the Commonwealth
    introduced testimony by the complainant's mother and babysitter
    8
    describing the complainant's behavior during the years following
    the incident.   However, only the complainant testified that
    sexual intercourse actually occurred and that Moore was the
    perpetrator.    Moore testified and denied that he ever had sexual
    intercourse or other sexual contact with the complainant.
    Consequently, this case turned solely on the credibility of the
    complainant and Moore.
    During the Commonwealth's case-in-chief, the prosecutor
    asked to have the therapist qualified as an expert witness.
    Defense counsel objected and stated that "the matters that are in
    controversy in this case are well within the knowledge and
    experience of all of these jurors."      Defense counsel argued that
    the only purpose of the therapist's testimony was to prove that
    the victim testified truthfully.       In admitting the testimony the
    trial judge ruled as follows:
    We have something that happened some nine
    years ago. Basically, the case comes down to
    the testimony of the [complainant] at this
    juncture as would be opposed by testimony of
    the defendant if he testifies. But,
    basically, it's coming down to the testimony
    of what the [complainant] has to say. [The
    therapist's testimony] could be helpful to
    the jury in deciding whether or not [the
    complainant] is telling the truth. Something
    that the jury could consider other than their
    observation of her manner and demeanor and
    responses here today.
    The trial judge's reason for admitting the therapist's testimony
    is precisely the reason that it should not have been admitted.
    The prosecutor used the therapist's testimony to validate
    9
    the truthfulness of the complainant's testimony.    By commenting
    upon the various behaviors that the child was said to have
    exhibited over a nine year period, the therapist sought to convey
    by a professional explanation that a rape must have occurred and
    that the complainant obviously testified truthfully.    The
    therapist's testimony was used in this manner to impermissibly
    vouch for the credibility of the complainant.    "Permitting a
    person in the role of an expert to suggest that because the
    complainant exhibits some of the symptoms of rape trauma . . . ,
    the complainant was therefore raped, unfairly prejudices the
    [accused] by creating an aura of special reliability and
    trustworthiness."     State v. Salana, 
    324 N.W.2d 227
    , 230 (Minn.
    1982).
    The therapist's testimony clearly was systematically
    structured to bolster the complainant's testimony.    (See
    Appendix).    The prosecutor's strategy is obvious in the following
    question and response:
    Q. Let's go a little further. If this child
    related to you that I told my mother and I
    told my babysitter and they didn't believe
    me, is that consistent with this type of
    case, sexual abuse case?
    A. Yes. Often adults who are charged with
    caretaking of young children feel so much
    shame and guilt and denial that a child has
    been violated while in their care that it is
    very difficult for them to accept.
    At its core, this testimony affirms the therapist's belief in the
    complainant's truthfulness.    In addition, the testimony asserts
    10
    that the complainant is credible even when she appears otherwise
    to others.    By asserting as a characteristic of "sexual abuse
    case[s]" the disbelief of others when hearing a complaint, the
    therapist gave an expert opinion that truth should be inferred
    from the disbelief of the others.       The illogic is patent.   I find
    no basis to allow an expert to comment on the validity of the
    complainant's charge and the complainant's truthfulness in the
    guise of explaining why the complainant would be disbelieved by
    others.
    If there could be any doubt as to the thrust and purpose of
    this testimony, the Commonwealth's strategy is again revealed in
    the following exchange:
    Q. Okay. Again, hypothetically, this
    incident occurred when this child was six
    years old and some nine years later, is it
    consistent that the child remember the exact
    or close to the exact events of what occurred
    to the child when she was six years old?
    A.   Yes.
    Q.   That wouldn't be unusual?
    A.   That's one of the strongest indicators.
    This testimony manifestly and openly asserted that the child
    truthfully and accurately testified concerning an event that was
    alleged to have occurred nine years earlier when the child was
    six.   Simply put, the therapist was permitted to give an "expert"
    evaluation of the complainant's truthfulness.
    When expert testimony is intended to prove a witness'
    credibility, the role of the fact finder is invaded.        Davison, at
    11
    504, 445 S.E.2d at 688.   Expert testimony will be allowed to aid
    jurors only when the jurors must consider matters that are not
    within their common knowledge.   See Callahan v. Commonwealth, 
    8 Va. App. 135
    , 138, 
    379 S.E.2d 476
    , 478 (1989).
    Where a jury is confronted with evidence of
    an alleged child victim's behaviors, paired
    with expert testimony concerning similar
    syndrome behaviors, the invited inference -
    that the child was sexually abused because he
    or she fits the syndrome profile - will be as
    potentially misleading and equally as
    unreliable as expert testimony applying the
    syndrome to the facts of the case and stating
    outright the conclusion that a given child
    was abused. The danger of the jury
    misapplying syndrome evidence thus remains
    the same whether an expert expresses an
    explicit opinion that abuse has occurred or
    merely allows the jury to draw the final
    conclusion of abuse.
    Seward v. State, 
    652 N.E.2d 490
    , 499 (Ind. 1995).
    The therapist's affirmation of the complainant's testimony
    proved to be a critical part of the Commonwealth's case.
    However, the therapist's testimony "was only a thinly veiled way
    of stating that [the victim] was telling the truth."     United
    States v. Whitted, 
    11 F.3d 782
    , 787 (8th Cir. 1993).    An expert
    witness may not give a judgment on the truthfulness of a witness
    "under the guise of a scientific diagnosis."   Id.     See also
    Wescott v. Crinklaw, 
    68 F.3d 1073
    , 1077 (8th Cir. 1995).
    Moreover, when the conflicting testimony of witnesses is an
    ultimate issue in fact, an expert may not comment upon the
    credibility of one of the witnesses.   See Davison, at 504, 445
    S.E.2d at 688.   The sole purpose of the therapist's testimony was
    12
    to comment on the complainant's credibility and to prove she
    truthfully testified when she said that she was the victim of a
    sexual assault almost a decade ago.
    13
    APPENDIX
    In pertinent part, the therapist testified as follows:
    Q. Hypothetical question. The young lady
    comes to you and tells you she has been,
    since she was six years been upset, crying
    for no reason at all, telling her mother and
    her best friend or babysitter who is like a
    mother to her that she had been raped at
    another time earlier than this, she watches
    television shows dealing with child
    molestation and she becomes upset and cries,
    is this consistent with a child who has been
    sexually abused?
    A.   Yes.
    Q.   Can you explain why?
    A. There are certain symptoms that are like
    symptoms of any illness or disease that are
    customary for sexual abuse or sexual violence
    survivors. Those can include inappropriate
    expressions of emotions, especially painful
    or negative emotions like excessive crying or
    crying at inappropriate times.
    *        *        *
    There are certain symptoms of survivoring
    sexual abuse or sexual violence that are
    pretty common and those can include
    expressing negative or painful emotions in
    inappropriate fashions. Crying or becoming
    upset in a manner that doesn't seem
    reasonable or rational to adults or other
    people. Witnessing media exposure through
    books or movies or television or videos
    that's reminisce of the event that may have
    occurred in the young person's life.
    Witnessing that can fracture their
    psychological defenses and cause the painful
    emotions to emerge and sometimes those
    emotions are split off and attributed to
    other things, maybe upset about school or
    grades.
    Q. Let's go a little further. If this child
    related to you that I told my mother and I
    told my babysitter and they didn't believe
    14
    me, is that consistent with this type of
    case, sexual abuse case?
    A. Yes. Often adults who are charged with
    caretaking of young children feel so much
    shame and guilt and denial that a child has
    been violated while in their care that it is
    very difficult for them to accept.
    Q. Now, if the child further told you that
    subsequent to this rape episode when this man
    would come back to the home of her parent,
    her mother, the child would hide in closets
    or under tables or under beds, is that
    consistent with a child that has been abused?
    A. Yes. It's really interesting in sexually
    abused children, male and female children.
    It's natural for a child to maybe hide and
    play but children who have been physically
    violated it's called safety seeking behaviors
    and they go to excessive lengths and they
    often hide in the bottom of closets or behind
    furniture. They hide much more than a
    regular child would for regular reasons of
    play and they do this because they need to go
    somewhere where they feel physically and
    psychologically safe.
    Q. This same child four or five years after
    the original incident took an overdose of
    medication from the home, is that consistent
    behavior for a child who has been sexually
    abused?
    A. Yes. Often children themselves, their
    mind protects the trauma victim by
    surrounding the event with denial or
    splitting the event off from the mind and a
    child can experience so much emotional pain
    that they don't really know how to cope with
    it and an overdose or suicide attempts are
    quite common.
    Q. Okay. Now, the child, say, eight years
    later came in contact with this person, they
    are in the same room together, is it
    consistent that this child would become
    hysterical, have trouble breathing, shaking,
    screaming, relating back to that incident, is
    that consistent?
    15
    A. Yes. The child could easily have a panic
    attack or an episode where the way that their
    mind disassociates or splits off the emotion
    content of the trauma, those two things can
    become connected. Seeing the perpetrator, or
    the offender, again could cause the person to
    feel like the same event is happening and the
    fear and trauma can emerge. The subconscious
    mind has no concept of time like we do. So
    we might be able to say a car wreck happened
    ten years ago, maybe there was a lot of
    crashing or loud glass breaking and if you
    were to hear those noises again it may appear
    that that event was happening all over again.
    That's because the subconscious memory has
    been triggered and it seems like it's
    happening at the same moment again.
    Q. That kind of leads me to my next
    question. Back to the hypothetical again,
    first. It's been related that this child who
    is seven or eight years old may have
    masturbated with her fingers. Is that
    consistent with a child that's been sexually
    abused?
    A. Yes. Children don't develop healthy
    sexuality until the onset of hormonal
    development in adolescence. So provocative
    or sexualized behavior in young children is
    almost always a sign that they have been
    sexually violated in some way. It's natural
    for the body to enjoy the feeling of arousal
    but not in a sexualized fashion like that.
    Q. Okay. Again, hypothetically, this
    incident occurred when this child was six
    years old and some nine years later, is it
    consistent that the child remember the exact
    or close to the exact events of what occurred
    to the child when she was six years old?
    A.   Yes.
    Q.   That wouldn't be unusual?
    A.   That's one of the strongest indicators.
    16