Charles Walter Clay, Jr. v. Commonwealth of VA ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Annunziata and Frank
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
CHARLES WALTER CLAY, JR.
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0619-99-2 JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
SEPTEMBER 5, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF CHESTERFIELD COUNTY
Herbert C. Gill, Jr., Judge
Steven D. Benjamin (Betty Layne DesPortes;
Benjamin & DesPortes, P.C., on briefs), for
appellant.
Shelly R. James, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
Charles Walter Clay, Jr., (appellant) was convicted by a jury
of reckless driving in violation of Code § 46.2-862 and evading
and eluding in violation of Code § 46.2-817. On appeal, he
contends the trial court erred in denying his motions to dismiss
the charges based on former jeopardy and violation of Code
§ 19.2-274. For the reasons that follow, we affirm the
convictions.
I. BACKGROUND
On June 21, 1998, Virginia State Trooper John Wright
noticed a red car in Richmond traveling southbound on Interstate
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
95. The red car was traveling 83 miles per hour in a posted 55
miles-per-hour zone. When the trooper activated his blue light
and siren, the red car pulled over to the side of the road. As
the trooper approached the red car, the driver sped off. The
trooper returned to his police unit and pursued the red car into
Chesterfield County. The red car reached a speed of 110 miles
per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone. Though the trooper had
his blue lights flashing, appellant refused to stop and was
getting further ahead of the patrol car.
Appellant passed several other vehicles during the chase,
including a car and a truck that he "split . . . up the middle"
by driving down the center line of the road between the two
vehicles. The driver of the overtaken car, Leonard Price,
identified appellant as the driver of the red car. Trooper
Wright eventually lost sight of appellant's vehicle. Appellant
was later arrested at his mother's home.
On June 21, 1998, the trooper charged appellant in
Chesterfield with reckless driving due to excessive speed in
violation of Code § 46.2-862 and attempting to elude a police
officer in violation of Code § 46.2-817. Approximately four
days later, the trooper charged appellant in Richmond with the
same two offenses.
After both jurisdictions' general district courts found
appellant guilty of all the offenses, appellant appealed to the
circuit courts in Chesterfield County and Richmond.
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The Richmond appeal was heard first. One week prior to the
Chesterfield trial, appellant pled guilty in Richmond circuit
court to evading and eluding in violation of Code § 46.2-817 and
reckless driving in violation of Code § 46.2-852. No evidence
was presented at the Richmond trial on appellant's pleas of
guilty.
On the day of the appeal in Chesterfield County Circuit
Court, appellant moved to dismiss the Chesterfield charges based
on double jeopardy and a violation of Code § 19.2-294 because of
the Richmond convictions.
In Chesterfield circuit court, appellant did not produce a
copy of the conviction orders from Richmond, representing to the
trial court that the orders had not yet been entered. Appellant
proffered that the Richmond and Chesterfield charges arose out
of the same incident.
In Chesterfield circuit court, the Commonwealth contended
appellant's double jeopardy defense and the defense based on
Code § 19.2-294 were waived because no written motion was made
at least seven days prior to trial, as required by Rule 3A:9.
The Commonwealth further argued that the Richmond and
Chesterfield violations were two different events. Finally, the
Commonwealth argued appellant did not present any evidence of
the facts of the Richmond convictions to support a former
jeopardy argument.
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The trial court ruled that appellant was not procedurally
barred in his double jeopardy and Code § 19.2-294 arguments and
heard evidence on the underlying facts. The trial court then
denied appellant's motion, finding that there was no double
jeopardy or violation of Code § 19.2-294 because the Richmond
and Chesterfield incidents were not the same event or events.
However, the trial court made no finding of "good cause."
The trial court found appellant guilty of evading and
eluding and reckless driving.
II. ANALYSIS
To argue a violation of double jeopardy protections or Code
§ 19.2-294, a defendant must present his plea in writing seven
days prior to the trial date. See Rule 3A:9(b)-(c). See also
Cooper v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 642, 644, 414 S.E.2d 435,
436 (1992) (citations omitted). If Rule 3A:9 is not followed, a
defendant is deemed to have waived these concerns. See Freeman
v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 126, 127-28, 414 S.E.2d 871, 872
(1992). However, "for good cause shown," a circuit court can
allow an oral motion prior to trial. See Rule 3A:9(b)(3).
In this case, appellant did not file a written motion seven
days prior to the trial date pursuant to Rule 3A:9(c). The
Commonwealth objected on this ground and others. Appellant,
instead of offering "good cause" for his non-compliance with
Rule 3A:9, argued that double jeopardy is a "jurisdictional"
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issue that can be raised at any time, even for the first time on
appeal.
The Commonwealth contends the trial court erred in allowing
appellant to argue double jeopardy and a violation of Code
§ 19.2-294 because double jeopardy, just like other defenses,
must be timely asserted. Therefore, the Commonwealth contends,
because appellant waived these defenses, this Court should not
consider appellant's argument on appeal. We agree.
Double jeopardy and a violation of Code § 19.2-294 both are
"defects in the institution of the prosecution or in the written
charge upon which the accused is to be tried . . . ." Rule
3A:9(b)(1). 1 The requirements of Rule 3A:9(b)(1) are mandatory
unless "good cause" is shown. See Rule 3A:9(b)-(d).
The Double Jeopardy Clause insures that an accused is not
"subject for the same offense to be twice put in jeopardy of
life or limb." U.S. Const. amend. V. "This constitutional
guarantee is applicable to the States through the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment." Illinois v. Vitale, 447
U.S. 410, 415 (1980) (citing Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784(1969)).
1
The requirement under Rule 3A:9(b)(2) is permissive. See
Simmons v. Commonwealth, 6 Va. App. 445, 450, 371 S.E.2d 7, 9
(1988). While Rule 3A:9(b)(1) pertains to defects in the
institution of the prosecution or in the written charge upon
which the accused is to be tried, Rule 3A:9(b)(2) pertains to
"any defense or objection that is capable of determination
without the trial of the general issue."
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Although the language of Code § 19.2-294 does not state
that it provides a defense of former jeopardy, "it amounts to
such a defense in purpose and desired effect." Epps v.
Commonwealth, 216 Va. 150, 155, 216 S.E.2d 64, 68 (1975)
(citation omitted). Like the bar of former jeopardy under the
Fifth Amendment, Code § 19.2-294 prevents the Commonwealth from
"subjecting an accused to the hazards of vexatious, multiple
prosecutions." Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892, 899, 421
S.E.2d 455, 460 (1992) (en banc).
Appellant concedes in his reply brief that Rule 3A:9
applies. However, he argues the trial court made a finding that
"good cause" was shown and the record supports such finding.
However, we note that the trial court never explicitly made a
finding of "good cause."
Appellant offers his inability to obtain a certified copy
of the Richmond conviction orders because of the holiday season
and inclement weather as "good cause." In his reply brief,
appellant, for the first time, argues that until he was
convicted in Richmond circuit court a week earlier, there was no
basis for a double jeopardy motion. However, appellant never
made this argument to the trial court. His argument before the
trial court was an explanation of the reason he could not
produce certified copies of the Richmond conviction orders.
When the Commonwealth argued appellant had not given timely
written notice, appellant did not argue he had not had
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sufficient time to comply. His argument was that double
jeopardy, being a constitutional issue, could be raised at any
time.
In ruling that appellant had not waived his defenses, the
trial court stated:
Normally, if it goes to the institution of
prosecution, it must be filed seven days
ahead of time. You have argued and, I
think, most persuasively that, if it's
double jeopardy in this jurisdiction, of
course, that may be raised under the rule
309 [sic]. 2
Assuming, without deciding, the trial court implicitly
found "good cause" under Rule 3A:9(d), the record does not
support that finding. As discussed above, appellant gave no
reason for his non-compliance with Rule 3A:9. He only offered
an explanation of the reason he could not produce a certified
copy of the Richmond conviction orders. When addressing the
Commonwealth's argument that a motion was not timely filed,
appellant only argued that he could raise a double jeopardy
defense at any time, even for the first time on appeal.
Since appellant did not comply with the notice provisions
of Rule 3A:9 and did not show "good cause," he has waived the
double jeopardy and Code § 19.2-294 defenses. We, therefore, do
2
This reference to Rule 309 is an obvious error in the
record because there is no Rule 309. In context, the argument
dealt with Rule 3A:9. We, therefore, assume Rule 3A:9 is being
referred to by the trial court.
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not address the merits of his argument and affirm the judgment
of the trial court.
Affirmed.
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Elder, J., dissenting.
I believe the majority erroneously revisits the trial
court's implicit finding of good cause for the late filing by
Charles Walter Clay, Jr., (appellant) of his motions to dismiss.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent. For the reasons that follow,
I would reach the merits of the double jeopardy claim, affirming
appellant's conviction for reckless driving pursuant to Code
§ 46.2-862 and reversing the conviction for evading and eluding
police pursuant to Code § 46.1-817 because it constituted double
jeopardy.
Rule 3A:9 requires that a defendant asserting a violation
of double jeopardy or Code § 19.2-294 must file a written motion
to dismiss on those grounds at least seven days before trial.
Failure to comply with these requirements ordinarily results in
a waiver of the right to make such a challenge, see Freeman v.
Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 126, 127, 414 S.E.2d 871, 872 (1992),
but the trial court may grant relief from such waiver "[f]or
good cause shown," Rule 3A:9(b)(3), (d). Here, as the majority
acknowledges, the Commonwealth specifically contended that
appellant's double jeopardy and Code § 19.2-294 challenges were
waived because appellant made his motion on the day of trial
rather than at least seven days prior to trial. The trial court
ruled, however, that appellant was not procedurally barred from
raising these challenges, and it heard evidence on the
underlying facts. Implicit in this approach is that the trial
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court ruled against the Commonwealth and found "good cause" for
appellant's failure timely to file a written motion to dismiss.
Although the majority concludes the record does not support
a finding of "good cause," we are not at liberty to revisit this
issue on appeal. In considering the constitutional and
statutory issues, the trial court implicitly rejected the
Commonwealth's argument that good cause did not exist, and the
Commonwealth was not entitled to appeal that ruling. Revisiting
and reversing that implicit ruling on appeal would amount to
allowing the Commonwealth to appeal an issue which is not
constitutionally or statutorily appealable. See Va. Const. art.
VI, § 1; Code § 19.2-398; cf. Driscoll v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 449, 452, 417 S.E.2d 312, 313 (1992) (citing Hart v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 283, 290, 269 S.E.2d 806, 810 (1980), for
proposition that affirmance of trial court ruling based on
right-result-wrong-reason rationale is not permitted where
affirmance serves as "a subterfuge for a constitutionally
prohibited cross-appeal"). Therefore, I would reach the merits
of the appeal without examining the correctness of the trial
court's implicit good cause ruling. See Manning v.
Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 352, 356 & n.2, 344 S.E.2d 197, 199 &
n.2 (1986) (noting that Commonwealth could not contest court's
ruling on admissibility of particular evidence, "right or wrong"
and that Court of Appeals would "express no opinion on this
issue").
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In reaching the merits of the appeal, I would affirm
appellant's conviction in Chesterfield County for reckless
driving and reverse and dismiss his Chesterfield conviction for
eluding on the ground that it constituted double jeopardy. The
Double Jeopardy Clause of the United States Constitution
"'protects against [(1)] a second prosecution for the same
offense after acquittal[, (2)] . . . a second prosecution for
the same offense after conviction[, and (3)] . . . multiple
punishments for the same offense.'" Illinois v. Vitale, 447
U.S. 410, 415 (1980) (quoting North Carolina v. Pearce, 395 U.S.
711, 717 (1969)); see Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App.
729, 739-40, 467 S.E.2d 306, 311 (1996) (holding that double
jeopardy provisions of United States Constitution are
co-extensive with those of Virginia Constitution). Code
§ 19.2-264, upon which appellant also relies, provides similar
protections: "If the same act be a violation of two or more
statutes, . . . conviction under one of such statutes . . .
shall be a bar to prosecution or proceeding under the other or
others." 3 "[T]he analysis for what constitutes the same act or
3
The ways in which Code § 19.2-294 differs from double
jeopardy protections, see, e.g., Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va.
App. 892, 894, 421 S.E.2d 455, 457 (1992) (en banc) (noting that
statute does not bar multiple convictions for same act when
obtained in a single trial whereas double jeopardy may preclude
such convictions even if obtained in a single trial); Blythe v.
Commonwealth, 222 Va. 722, 725, 284 S.E.2d 796, 797 (1981)
(holding that statute applies only to statutory offenses and not
common law crimes), are not relevant in appellant's case.
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transaction is the same" for double jeopardy and Code
§ 19.2-294. Henry v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 141, 146 n.2,
462 S.E.2d 578, 581 n.2 (1995). "The test of whether there are
separate acts sustaining several offenses 'is whether the same
evidence is required to sustain them.'" Treu v. Commonwealth,
12 Va. App. 996, 997, 406 S.E.2d 676, 677 (1991) (quoting Estes
v. Commonwealth, 212 Va. 23, 24, 181 S.E.2d 622, 624 (1971)).
This requires a determination of "whether the acts are the same
in terms of time, situs, victim, and the nature of the act
itself." Hall v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 892, 898, 421 S.E.2d
455, 459 (1992) (en banc). "Two crimes, even though similar
because committed by the same criminal agent during a continuing
course of action . . . , are not committed by the same act if
not simultaneously committed." Henry, 21 Va. App. at 146, 462
S.E.2d at 581.
The burden of establishing the identity of the offenses is
on the accused. See Low v. Commonwealth, 11 Va. App. 48, 50,
396 S.E.2d 383, 384 (1990). An accused ordinarily may meet this
burden by offering a transcript of the prior proceedings into
evidence, but the burden may be met in other ways, such as
through a concession by the Commonwealth as to the identity of
the offenses. See id.
At issue here are two sets of convictions for violation of
the same or similar statutes. Assuming without deciding that
Code § 19.2-294 may be applied, despite the fact that at least
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some of the challenged convictions were rendered under identical
statutes rather than "two or more statutes," the determinative
issue for both the constitutional and statutory claims is
whether the acts supporting the convictions are the same. This
analysis, therefore, requires a careful review of the evidence
presented. The Commonwealth's implicit proffer 4 at the hearing
on the motion to dismiss and the testimony given by State
Trooper John Wright at trial, after which appellant renewed his
motion to dismiss, provide a complete recitation of the events
on which both the Richmond and Chesterfield convictions were
based.
At the hearing on the double jeopardy motion, the
Commonwealth's attorney said that the trooper who took out the
Richmond and Chesterfield warrants was present and argued that
the two sets of warrants "essentially [were based on] two
different events." He continued:
What happened is that . . . the defendant
was driving in the City, was stopped by the
trooper and came to a complete and total
stop on the side of the road, and we would
say that ended the first event. The trooper
walks up to him. At that point, he then
4
Although the Commonwealth's attorney rejected the proffer
of defense counsel, the Commonwealth made its own proffer as to
why the two sets of charges were "essentially two different
events." Although the Commonwealth contends on appeal that the
record may not clearly establish all relevant events which
supported the Richmond and Chesterfield County charges, I would
hold that the Commonwealth's proffer in arguing that the charges
arose from two different events, coupled with Trooper Wright's
trial testimony, provide a sufficient record from which to
analyze appellant's double jeopardy claim.
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takes off, and at that point there, then,
begins a second event of reckless driving
and attempting to elude.
* * * * * * *
[W]hen the defendant starts from ground
zero and takes off and gets going at 100
[or] so miles an hour, that's the attempt to
elude. And, when he almost drives other
citizens off the road, that's the reckless
driving.
Trooper Wright's trial testimony confirmed and expanded
upon the Commonwealth's pretrial proffer. Shortly before
6:00 p.m. on June 21, 1998, Wright observed a red Chevrolet
speeding in the southbound lanes of Interstate 95 in the City of
Richmond. After pacing the vehicle at 83 miles per hour in a 55
miles-per-hour zone, Wright caught up with the vehicle and
activated his blue lights and siren. "When the blue lights and
siren came on," the vehicle pulled to the side of the road, and
Trooper Wright followed. After calling in the license number,
Wright exited his vehicle and walked toward the red car, but it
sped off before he reached it. Trooper Wright ran back to his
car and began to pursue the Chevrolet at high speed with his
lights still flashing. After the Chevrolet veered off onto
Chippenham Parkway into Chesterfield County, Trooper Wright
paced it at 110 miles per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone.
During the chase, appellant drove down the center line of the
road, narrowly missing at least one car as he passed it.
Although Trooper Wright never got a good look at the driver of
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the fleeing Chevrolet, the driver of the car the Chevrolet
narrowly missed identified appellant as the driver of the
Chevrolet. Wright was unable to keep pace with appellant's car,
but using the license plate number, he subsequently arrested
appellant at his home.
The record established that appellant was convicted in the
Richmond General District Court on November 18, 1998, on
warrants obtained by Trooper Wright for (1) "driv[ing] a vehicle
on the highway recklessly or at a speed or in a manner so as to
endanger the life, limb, or property of any person" on June 21,
1998, in violation of Code § 46.2-852 and (2) "willfully
fail[ing] to bring his motor vehicle to a stop after having
received an audible or visible signal from a law-enforcement
officer to do so" on June 21, 1998, in violation of Code
§ 46.2-817. The record does not establish definitively whether
appellant appealed these convictions and, if so, whether the
outcome on appeal resulted in his conviction or acquittal.
However, because the double jeopardy clause bars subsequent
prosecution after a conviction or acquittal, see Vitale, 447
U.S. at 415 (citing Pearce, 395 U.S. at 717), the ultimate
outcome of the charge is not crucial as long as the evidence
establishes the second prosecution is for the same offense.
As to appellant's two reckless driving convictions, both
based on excessive speed, the evidence establishes that
appellant committed two separate offenses during two separate
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acts of driving such that the reckless driving conviction
rendered in Chesterfield did not constitute double jeopardy.
Per Trooper Wright's testimony, appellant drove 83 miles per
hour in a 55 miles-per-hour zone before Wright activated his
lights and siren and pulled appellant over to the side of the
road. As per the Commonwealth's attorney's proffer, this
constituted "the first event" and provided the basis for
appellant's reckless driving conviction in Richmond. After
appellant came to a complete stop on the side of the road and
then drove away as Trooper Wright approached on foot, appellant
obtained a speed of 110 miles per hour in a 55 miles-per-hour
zone. This constituted a "second event" of reckless driving and
supported appellant's conviction for reckless driving in
Chesterfield County. 5
As to appellant's two convictions for attempting to elude a
police officer, however, the evidence establishes only a single
act of eluding which continued from Richmond into Chesterfield
County. The Commonwealth's attorney proffered that "the first
event" ended when appellant's vehicle came to a complete stop on
the side of the road. Viewed along with Trooper Wright's
5
Although the Commonwealth's attorney argued during the
motion hearing that the Chesterfield reckless driving conviction
was based on "[appellant's] almost driv[ing] other citizens off
the road," the warrant on which appellant was arrested and
convicted was based on excessive speed, and the instructions
given the jury permitted a conviction for reckless driving based
only on excessive speed.
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testimony, the events to that point establish only that
appellant drove recklessly by exceeding the speed limit and that
he pulled over immediately when Wright activated his lights and
siren. Thus, although appellant may have formulated a plan to
stop and then speed away from Trooper Wright before he actually
pulled over in response to the lights, appellant's effort to
elude was one continuous act regardless of when it began, and it
began no later than when appellant "start[ed] from ground zero
and [accelerated to] 100 . . . miles an hour." This is
precisely the same act the Commonwealth's attorney proffered in
support of appellant's second conviction for eluding. Because
nothing separated the acts supporting the convictions in terms
of time, situs, victim or nature, they were one in the same for
purposes of double jeopardy
On appeal, the Commonwealth contends that appellant's
initial flight from the side of the road constituted one act and
his failure to stop a second act. However, the only reasonable
inference from the evidence is that appellant acted on a single
impulse with an ongoing intent to elude. Compare Carter v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 118, 127-29, 428 S.E.2d 34, 41-42
(1993) (holding that rape generally is not a continuous offense
and that one who repeated the crime by penetrating the victim,
allowing her to visit bathroom, penetrating her again, stopping
for several minutes, and penetrating her a third time was
properly convicted of three counts of rape because evidence
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established that each of the "repenetrations was clearly . . .
occasioned by separate acts" (citation omitted)), with Campbell
v. Commonwealth, 201 Va. 507, 510-11, 112 S.E.2d 155, 157-58
(1960) (holding that where accused hit victim multiple times
with revolver, causing him to fall into chair, said "I ought to
kill him," and then shot him within thirty to sixty seconds of
when he fell into chair, accused was engaged in fight involving
but one impulse and could be convicted for one count of common
assault rather than two for striking victim and then shooting
him). Because the Chesterfield conviction for eluding was based
on the same act as the Richmond conviction, it constituted
double jeopardy. 6 Therefore, I would hold the trial court erred
in denying appellant's motion to dismiss the Chesterfield
eluding charge, and I would reverse and dismiss this conviction.
Appellant contends on brief that, because his Richmond
eluding conviction was based on the single act of driving from
Richmond into Chesterfield, this conviction also barred his
Chesterfield reckless driving conviction because it resulted
6
The Commonwealth does not contend that appellant committed
two violations of the same statute simply by crossing the
jurisdictional boundary between Richmond and Chesterfield
County, and I do not believe such a distinction, standing alone,
is dispositive. Cf. Padgett v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 758, 761,
263 S.E.2d 388, 389-90 (1980) (holding under Code § 19.2-264.1,
which provides that accused may not be convicted for driving
while intoxicated and reckless driving "growing out of the same
act or acts," that the difference in venue does not "alter[] the
singular nature of the act or acts out of which the charges
arose").
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from the same act of driving. Assuming without deciding
appellant properly preserved this argument for appeal, I would
hold that it lacks merit. We held in Lash v. County of Henrico,
14 Va. App. 926, 421 S.E.2d 851 (1992) (en banc) (applying Code
§ 19.2-264), that a conviction for eluding a police officer did
not preclude a conviction for reckless driving which arose out
of the same "'continuous, uninterrupted course of operation of a
motor vehicle.'" Id. at 930-31, 421 S.E.2d at 853-54 (quoting
Padgett v. Commonwealth, 220 Va. 758, 761, 263 S.E.2d 388,
389-90 (1980)). We reasoned that "[t]he manner in which the
defendant drove away from the officer and the manner in which he
drove through the red traffic signal and through the supermarket
parking lot were acts upon which the charge of reckless driving
could have been based" whereas "[t]he defendant's failure to
stop in response to the police officer's flashing light and
siren after he drove away and before he reached the supermarket
intersection was a separate and distinct act upon which the
[eluding offense] was based." Id. at 930-31, 421 S.E.2d at
853-54. Similarly here, although the Chesterfield reckless
driving conviction was based on speeding which occurred in the
course of appellant's flight from the officer, it began after
appellant initiated his flight and constituted a distinct act
for purposes of double jeopardy and Code § 19.2-264 analysis.
For these reasons, I would reach the merits of appellant's
appeal and affirm his Chesterfield conviction for reckless
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driving but reverse and dismiss his Chesterfield conviction for
eluding a police officer because it constituted double jeopardy.
Therefore, I respectfully dissent.
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