Hector Maya, Jr. v. Susan E. Maya ( 1996 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Willis, Annunziata and Overton
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    HECTOR MAYA, JR.
    v.             Record No. 0429-95-4        MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    SUSAN E. MAYA                                 JANUARY 11, 1996
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF LOUDOUN COUNTY
    James H. Chamblin, Judge
    Cheryl K. Brunner (Bradley T. White; Brunner &
    White, on briefs), for appellant.
    Cindy Leigh Decker (Walter C. Jacob, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from the trial court's denial of his motion to
    reduce child support, Hector Maya, Jr. contends the trial court
    erred in finding him voluntarily underemployed and in imputing
    income to him.      We find no error and affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    Mr. and Ms. Maya were divorced on December 8, 1993.      Ms.
    Maya was awarded sole legal and physical custody of their minor
    son.       Mr. Maya was ordered to pay $425 per month child support
    and to maintain health insurance on their son.
    At the time of the divorce decree, Mr. Maya earned $21,700 a
    year as an accounts billing clerk with ICO Kaiser International.
    Ms. Maya worked for Vrendenburg, earning $20,000.      On March 1,
    1994, Mr. Maya was laid off from Kaiser due to company
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    downsizing.   On March 28, 1994, he was arrested and charged with
    forgery.   On May 28, 1994, he was convicted and sentenced to
    three years probation.   In June 1994, he began working as a
    waiter, earning $2.13 per hour.
    On August 2, 1994, Ms. Maya petitioned for a rule to show
    cause, alleging that Mr. Maya had failed to pay child support
    from March 1994, until August 1994, and that he had not provided
    health insurance for their son.   On August 31, 1994, Mr. Maya was
    found in contempt of the December 8, 1993 decree.   He was ordered
    to keep his child support current and to pay an additional $74.82
    a month to Ms. Maya for their son's health insurance.
    On October 31, 1994, Ms. Maya filed a second petition for a
    rule to show cause, alleging that Mr. Maya had failed to comply
    with either the December 8, 1993 decree or the August 31, 1994
    order.    Mr. Maya failed to appear and a capias was issued for his
    arrest.    A condition of his bail bond required that he post
    $4,316.36 to be held for Ms. Maya's benefit.   After his arrest,
    he posted the required bond.
    On November 18, 1994, Mr. Maya moved to reduce his support
    obligation because of a material change in circumstances.    He
    alleged that he had been laid off from his job in March 1994, had
    been arrested and incarcerated from March 27 to May 26, 1994, had
    been convicted of forgery, and was employed as a waiter at
    greatly reduced earnings.   On December 28, 1994, Ms. Maya filed a
    third petition for a rule to show cause.   After a hearing, the
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    trial court issued a letter opinion denying Mr. Maya's motion to
    reduce child support.   The court found a material change in the
    parties' financial circumstances, that Mr. Maya's income had
    greatly decreased and Ms. Maya's income had increased by $5,000.
    However, it also found that Mr. Maya was voluntarily
    underemployed.   It found that Mr. Maya's forgery conviction was
    due to his own wrongdoing, and that his inability to obtain a job
    with the same earning capacity as his former job was partially
    due to that conviction and partially due to his failure to make a
    diligent search for new employment.    Based on those findings, the
    trial court found that Mr. Maya's decreased earning capacity was
    due to his own voluntary act or neglect.
    "When invoking the divorce court's continuing jurisdiction
    under Code § 20-108, following entry of a final decree of
    divorce, a party seeking a change in court-ordered child support
    has the burden to prove by a preponderance of the evidence a
    material change in circumstances justifying modification of the
    support requirement."   Antonelli v. Antonelli, 
    242 Va. 152
    , 154,
    
    409 S.E.2d 117
    , 118-19 (1991) (citation omitted).    "A material
    change in circumstances, standing alone, does not provide a basis
    for the trial court to modify its support decree."    Yohay v.
    Ryan, 
    4 Va. App. 559
    , 566, 
    359 S.E.2d 320
    , 324 (1987).     The party
    "seeking a reduction in support payments must also make a full
    and clear disclosure about his ability to pay, and he must show
    his claimed lack of ability to pay is not due to his own
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    voluntary act or because of his neglect."     Antonelli at 154, 409
    S.E.2d at 119.
    Mr. Maya first contends that the trial court erred in
    finding him voluntarily underemployed.    He argues that he works
    fifty hours a week to earn money to meet his child support
    obligation, but is unable to do so because of his low wages, not
    because of neglect.   He argues that his inability to obtain a
    more lucrative job results not from his conviction, but from a
    bad job market.
    We find no error in the trial court's finding that Mr. Maya
    is voluntarily underemployed.   He did not prove that his reduced
    earning capacity was not due to his own voluntary act or neglect.
    Id.   Although he was laid off through no fault of his own, his
    forgery conviction is the result of his own wrongdoing and
    greatly diminishes his chances of obtaining a position of trust.
    Mr. Maya testified that he had not looked for a higher paying
    job since he began working as a waiter in June 1994, and offered
    no evidence of a bad job market.
    Mr. Maya next contends that the trial court erred in
    imputing income to him pursuant to Code § 20-108.1(B)(3).      He
    first argues that because § 20-108.2 establishes a presumptive
    guideline amount for child support, Ms. Maya has the burden of
    establishing why a deviation from that amount is appropriate.
    The statute imposes no such burden.     "Where a parent is
    'voluntarily unemployed or voluntarily underemployed' a trial
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    court may impute income based on evidence of recent past
    earnings."    Brody v. Brody, 
    16 Va. App. 647
    , 651, 
    432 S.E.2d 20
    ,
    22 (1993) (citation omitted).
    Mr. Maya next argues that income should not be imputed to
    him because he is barred by legal impossibility from pursuing his
    former employment.    See L.C.S. v. A.C.S., 
    19 Va. App. 709
    , 719,
    
    453 S.E.2d 580
    , 585 (1995).    Mr. Maya argues that the terms and
    conditions of his probation bar him from working in accounts
    payable and from handling checks.       However, the record supports
    the trial court's finding that Mr. Maya has made no reasonable
    effort to secure employment utilizing his professional
    capabilities and producing an income comparable to what he earned
    before his conviction.
    Third, Mr. Maya argues that imputing income to him violates
    the double jeopardy clause of the Fifth Amendment by imposing
    multiple punishments for his forgery offense.       See U.S. v.
    Halper, 
    490 U.S. 435
     (1989).    We reject this argument.     Mr.
    Maya's child support obligation is not a civil sanction, but is a
    civil liability based on his responsibility as a parent.
    The trial court found Mr. Maya voluntarily underemployed not
    because he was laid off from Kaiser, but because he has not
    sought a better paying job since the time of his conviction.
    "[A] parent may not 'purposefully choose to pursue a low paying
    career which operates to the detriment of [the parent's]
    children.'"    Hur v. Va. Dep't of Social Services, 
    13 Va. App. 54
    ,
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    60, 
    409 S.E.2d 454
    , 458 (1991) (citations omitted).   Mr. Maya
    presented no evidence of his career plans or that he was seeking
    employment with a greater earning capacity.
    Because the court found Mr. Maya voluntarily underemployed,
    it acted properly in imputing income to him.   The trial court
    first computed the presumptive guideline amount of support using
    Mr. Maya's present monthly earnings and then computed it using
    his former monthly earnings.   The amount of support actually
    awarded, $425, is between those two figures.   See Barnhill v.
    Brooks, 
    15 Va. App. 696
    , 702, 
    427 S.E.2d 209
    , 213-14 (1993).
    Although Mr. Maya showed a material change in circumstances
    justifying a review of the previous award, we find no abuse of
    discretion in the trial court's holding that Mr. Maya failed to
    meet his burden of proving that the material change in
    circumstances warranted a reduction in his child support
    obligation.
    We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
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