Harvey E. Long v. Virginia Retirement System ( 1998 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Overton and Bumgardner
Argued at Salem, Virginia
HARVEY E. LONG
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1807-97-3 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
MAY 19, 1998
VIRGINIA RETIREMENT SYSTEM
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF MONTGOMERY COUNTY
Ray W. Grubbs, Judge
Raphael B. Hartley, III (Dorsey & Hartley, on
brief), for appellant.
Patricia H. Quillen, Assistant Attorney
General (Richard Cullen, Attorney General;
Michael K. Jackson, Senior Assistant Attorney
General, on brief), for appellee.
Harvey E. Long (Long) appeals an order of the trial court
which affirmed a decision by the Virginia Retirement System (VRS)
denying his claim for permanent disability retirement benefits.
Finding no error, we affirm the order.
The parties are conversant with the record and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to
disposition of the appeal.
In accordance with well established principles, we view the
evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below, the VRS in this instance. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 789 (1990).
After 24 years of employment in the Poultry Science
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Department at Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State
University, Long was transferred to the Animal Science
Department, with an attendant change in job responsibilities.
Following the transfer, Long became depressed and was diagnosed
with "major depression, melancholia" while hospitalized at the
Lewis-Gale Psychiatric Center from February 28 to March 9, 1992.
Upon release from the hospital, however, Long returned to his
employment and discontinued medication, despite persistent
depression and related difficulties.
During February 1994, Long resumed psychiatric treatment.
Although the professional care and treatment regimen improved
Long's "anxiety and sleeping patterns," he continued to suffer
depression and deficiencies in his job performance and retired in
February of 1995, applying for permanent disability benefits from
the VRS in March 1995.
Three psychiatrists evaluated Long incidental to his
disability claim. On May 9, 1995, Dr. Neil Dubner, Long's
treating psychiatrist, opined that Long was "permanently disabled
as a result of a chronic Major Depressive state" and was an
unsuitable candidate for "Electraconvulsive Therapy" (ECT).
However, Dr. Pamila Herrington, a resident in psychiatric
medicine at the University of Virginia, concluded that
[g]iven his partial response to pharmacologic
treatment, [Long] may continue to show
improvement with further medical management,
or ECT may be a further consideration. The
patient, however, is very vested in seeking
disability and may be resistant to pursuing
other treatment options.
- 2 -
At this time, there is no evidence that
the patient will be rendered permanently
disabled secondary to his mental illness.
Dr. Debra J. Hockett also evaluated Long and supported
Dr. Dubner, finding Long "permanently disabled" by "chronic
depression along with an early onset dementia" which precluded
ECT treatment.
After the VRS Medical Board had reviewed Long's claim
pursuant to Code § 51.1-124.23 and recommended denial of relief
on these occasions, the VRS designated attorney R. Louis
Harrison, Jr. to conduct an "informal fact-finding hearing" and
report his findings and recommendations to the VRS. In a written
decision, dated May 22, 1996, Harrison reviewed the record in
detail and determined "that Mr. Long is not likely to be
permanently disabled," a finding that the VRS adopted in its
"final case decision" on June 21, 1996. In affirming the VRS
action on appeal, the trial court ruled that "substantial
evidence" supported the ruling.
Upon judicial review of agency action in accordance with the
Administrative Process Act (APA), the court must examine the
entire record to "ascertain[] whether there was substantial
evidence . . . upon which the agency as the trier of the facts
could reasonably find them to be as it did." Code § 9-6.14:17.
"Cases subject to the standard of review outlined in Code
§ 9-6.14:17 cannot be considered a trial de novo since the
factual issues on appeal are controlled solely by the agency
- 3 -
record." School Bd. of County of York v. Nicely, 12 Va. App.
1051, 1062, 408 S.E.2d 545, 551 (1991). "Therefore, . . . the
circuit court's role in an appeal from an agency decision is
equivalent to an appellate court's role in an appeal from a trial
court." Id.
"The 'substantial evidence' standard, adopted by the General
Assembly, is designed to give great stability and finality to the
fact-findings of an administrative agency. The phrase
'substantial evidence' refers to 'such relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.'" Virginia Real Estate Comm'n v. Bias, 226 Va. 264,
269, 308 S.E.2d 123, 125 (1983) (citation omitted).
Here, although each of three psychiatrists agreed that Long
suffered major depression, opinions differed with respect to
appropriate treatment and the permanency of the illness.
Significantly, Dr. Herrington noted that all treatment options
had not been exhausted and that a finding of permanency was
premature. Guided by the "substantial evidence" standard of
review, we find that Dr. Herrington's opinion, when considered
with the entire record, constituted "relevant evidence as a
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a
conclusion." Thus, the court correctly affirmed the denial of
disability benefits to Long.
Accordingly, we affirm the decision of the trial court.
Affirmed.
- 4 -