LaToyla Ishia Cooper v. Virginia Beach Department of Social Services ( 2005 )


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  •                                 COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Bumgardner, Kelsey and Senior Judge Hodges
    LATOYLA ISHIA COOPER
    MEMORANDUM OPINION*
    v.      Record No. 2693-04-1                                          PER CURIAM
    MARCH 15, 2005
    VIRGINIA BEACH DEPARTMENT
    OF SOCIAL SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
    A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge
    (Adrianne L. Bennett, on brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
    on brief.
    (Leslie L. Lilley; Nianza E. Wallace II, Associate City Attorney, on
    brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
    (Lorraine Baysek, Guardian ad litem for the infant child, on brief).
    Guardian ad litem submitting on brief.
    LaToyla Ishia Cooper appeals from the trial court’s decision terminating her residual
    parental rights to her minor child, pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(C)(2). Cooper contends the trial
    court erred in finding that she had been unwilling or unable within a reasonable time to substantially
    remedy the conditions which led to the placement of her child in foster care. We affirm the decision
    of the trial court.
    BACKGROUND
    We view the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party below and grant
    to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Logan v. Fairfax County Dep’t of
    Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    , 128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 462 (1991). So viewed, the evidence
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    proved that the child was born on June 2, 2002. On June 14, 2002, Cooper was visiting
    DeShawnda Gooding, a friend, and Gooding’s mother. Gooding and her mother had a physical
    altercation, and Cooper left Gooding’s apartment with her child. Cooper placed the child in a
    stroller that was made for an older child, and Cooper’s child fell through a leg opening of the
    stroller down a flight of stairs. The child sustained a skull fracture from the fall and was later
    taken to the hospital. The Department of Social Services (DSS) found that the child’s injury may
    have been the result of an accident, but took custody of the child on June 17, 2002 due to the lack
    of parenting skills, the condition of the home, and the apparent low functioning of Cooper.
    In July 2002, April Clark, the child’s foster care worker, developed a care plan for the
    child. The plan required that Cooper attend an approved parenting class, obtain stable housing,1
    obtain stable employment, attend a nutrition and safety program for parents, maintain contact
    with DSS, obtain a mental health assessment, and attend any necessary mental health therapy.
    Clark testified appellant completed the parenting class. Clark testified since Cooper did not have
    a birth certificate, she had a difficult time finding employment. Clark obtained a birth certificate
    for Cooper, but Cooper lost it. At some point, Cooper worked at a fast food restaurant for a short
    period of time. One month prior to the termination hearing, Cooper obtained a job at another fast
    food restaurant. Clark testified Cooper never attended the nutrition and safety program. Clark
    testified DSS provided bus tokens to Cooper for transportation for mental health services, but
    Cooper never completed the mental health assessment and never attended any mental health
    therapy. Clark testified Cooper’s housing situation was sporadic and unstable and she did not
    always know where Cooper was living. At one point, Cooper moved to North Carolina with her
    1
    The parental rights of Cooper’s mother had been terminated when Cooper was a minor,
    but in June 2002 Cooper was living with her mother. Paulette Moore, an investigator with Child
    Protective Services, testified the residence was not an appropriate place for the child to live due
    to a ventilation problem. The care plan required Cooper to obtain stable housing independent of
    her mother.
    -2-
    mother and a home study found that the home was not appropriate for the child. DSS made a
    decision to allow Cooper more than one year to meet the goals of the care plan since she was in
    foster care as a minor and she expressed a desire to fulfill the requirements of the care plan.
    Rebecca Mani, a social worker for the Department of Human Services, testified that on
    March 18, 2004, Cooper came to her office and asked for an appointment because the DSS sent
    her. Cooper told Mani that she had been on a variety of medications for bipolar disorder when
    she was a minor. Mani testified she obtained a psychological history and scheduled a second
    appointment with Cooper, however, Cooper did not keep the appointment. Cooper also failed to
    appear for a scheduled psychiatric evaluation.
    Judy MacDonald, an employee with the juvenile court psychiatric program, testified she
    was appointed as an advocate for the child in June 2002. MacDonald testified that the child was
    “doing wonderfully” and was “a little ahead of the curve as far as intellect and
    developmentally.”2 MacDonald testified she had spoken to Cooper several times on the phone
    and saw her during three visitations at DSS. MacDonald testified she had not spoken to Cooper
    in five months because Cooper had moved and had left several phone numbers, but she was not
    able to talk to Cooper and Cooper never returned her calls. MacDonald testified she sent two
    letters to Cooper, but she never received a reply from Cooper.
    Sue Skeleton, a social worker, supervised Cooper’s visits with the child. Skeleton
    testified Cooper would become frustrated and anxious when the child was fussy. Skeleton
    explained that during one visit, she saw Cooper grab a stuffed animal and rip off a tag, and she
    also saw Cooper throw a large paper clip into a toy area where young children played.
    2
    The child was initially placed with one foster family for five months and had been with
    the second foster family for the eighteen months prior to the termination hearing.
    -3-
    Cooper testified she leased an apartment three days prior to the termination hearing.
    Although there was no furniture in the apartment, she planned on obtaining some in a few days.
    Cooper testified she was employed at a fast food restaurant for approximately one month and had
    worked for a short time at another fast food restaurant. Cooper testified her mother could watch
    the child while she worked and an aunt had recently moved to the Eastern Shore and she might
    be able to help watch the child.
    ANALYSIS
    Cooper argues she substantially remedied the conditions that led to the placement of her
    child in foster care because she completed the parenting class, she completed a mental health
    assessment, she was employed and had obtained housing independent of her mother.
    Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) requires proof, by clear and convincing evidence that (a) the
    termination is in the best interests of the child, (b) “reasonable and appropriate” services have
    been offered to help the parent “remedy substantially the conditions which led to or required
    continuation of the child’s foster care placement,” and, (c) despite those services, the parent has
    failed, “without good cause,” to remedy those conditions “within a reasonable amount of time
    not to exceed twelve months from the date the child was placed in foster care.” Because
    “‘[r]easonable and appropriate’ efforts can only be judged with reference to the circumstances of
    a particular case,” Ferguson v. Stafford Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    14 Va. App. 333
    , 338, 
    417 S.E.2d 1
    , 4 (1992), we have held that the trial judge “must determine what constitutes reasonable and
    appropriate efforts given the facts before the court.” Id. at 338-39, 417 S.E.2d at 4 (citation
    omitted). “The trial court’s judgment, ‘when based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be
    disturbed on appeal, unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.’” Logan, 13
    Va. App. at 128, 409 S.E.2d at 463 (citation omitted).
    -4-
    In this case, clear and convincing evidence proved Cooper failed to remedy the
    conditions that led to the placement of the child into foster care. Although Cooper completed a
    parenting class and an initial mental health assessment, she failed to complete a nutrition and
    safety program, she failed to attend a second mental health appointment, and she failed to appear
    for a scheduled psychiatric evaluation. Cooper was required to obtain stable housing
    independent of her mother, but she leased an apartment only three days prior to the termination
    hearing and there was no furniture in the apartment. Cooper was required to obtain stable
    employment, but the evidence proved she worked at one job for approximately one month prior
    to the termination hearing and had another job for a short period of time. Cooper was required to
    maintain contact with DSS, but the evidence proved that Cooper moved frequently and failed to
    return phone calls and respond to letters. Despite completing the parenting class, Cooper
    demonstrated inappropriate parenting behaviors at supervised visitations. Cooper told a mental
    health professional that she was on medication for bipolar disorder when she was a minor, but
    Cooper failed to address her mental health issues as required by the care plan. The child had
    been in foster care for almost two years when the trial court held the termination hearing, and
    was “doing wonderfully.” “It is clearly not in the best interests of a child to spend a lengthy
    period of time waiting to find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming his [or
    her] responsibilities.” Kaywood v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 
    10 Va. App. 535
    , 540, 
    394 S.E.2d 492
    ,
    495 (1990).
    The record supports the trial court’s finding that DSS presented clear and convincing
    evidence satisfying the statutory requirements of Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) and establishing that the
    termination of appellant’s residual parental rights was in the child’s best interest.
    Affirmed.
    -5-