Eugene Smith Thompson v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2010 )


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  •                                COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Petty, Alston and Senior Judge Willis
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    EUGENE SMITH THOMPSON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.     Record No. 1732-09-2                                    JUDGE JERE M.H. WILLIS, JR.
    JULY 6, 2010
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DINWIDDIE COUNTY
    Thomas V. Warren, Judge
    Linwood T. Wells, III, for appellant.
    John W. Blanton, Assistant Attorney General (Kenneth T.
    Cuccinelli, II, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from his conviction of operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of
    alcohol, a second or subsequent offense, in violation of Code § 18.2-266, Eugene Smith Thompson
    contends the trial court erred in finding the evidence sufficient to prove he drove or operated the
    vehicle in which the police found him. We affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    Background
    “On appeal, ‘we review the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
    granting to it all reasonable inferences fairly deducible therefrom.’” Archer v. Commonwealth,
    
    26 Va. App. 1
    , 11, 
    492 S.E.2d 826
    , 831 (1997) (quoting Martin v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 438
    , 443, 
    358 S.E.2d 415
    , 418 (1987)).
    Deputy Sheriff Nathaniel Charles, III, testified that around 10:00 p.m. on October 27,
    2008, “we had a call of a vehicle traveling west in eastbound lanes [of Route 460].” About
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    fifteen minutes after receiving the call, Charles arrived “[o]ne and a half miles west of Baltimore
    Road” and saw a “vehicle facing west and in the eastbound lane.” Thompson was seated behind
    the wheel. He appeared sluggish, and Charles detected a strong odor of alcohol. The vehicle’s
    engine was off, the keys were not in the ignition, and there was damage to the front of the
    vehicle. Charles saw beer cans and debris inside the vehicle. Thompson said he was all right.
    When asked how far off the roadway the vehicle was located, Charles stated, “[I]t was in the
    [grass] median probably maybe 30, 40 feet off of the highway.”
    Trooper Christopher Ryan Garrett arrived a short time later and took charge of the
    investigation. He stated Thompson’s vehicle was “sitting eastbound in the westbound lane” and
    Thompson was “behind the driver’s seat, no seat belt on, passed out.” Garrett testified that
    the car[’s] headlights [were] turned on. The ignition keys, we
    couldn’t find them. The engine was not on. Upon questioning
    Mr. Thompson he stated that he was leaving a buddy’s house
    traveling to the town of Crew[e]. He further stated that he had had
    17,000 beers to drink that evening and he had not had anything to
    drink since I came into contact with him.
    Thompson had a strong odor of alcohol about his person, stumbled, swayed, and
    exhibited slurred speech. Due to his condition, he was unable to perform any field sobriety tests.
    Asked about Thompson’s statements, Garrett said:
    He had stated again that he was traveling to meet up with friends in
    the town of Crew[e] coming from a buddy’s house. Observed I
    believe it was eight or nine beer bottles empty in the vehicle.
    Again the car was off of the roadway.
    The Commonwealth’s attorney asked if Thompson said anything about oncoming traffic,
    and Garrett responded, “He did say when I questioned him why he had pulled over he had
    admitted that he was scared. He saw lights coming from oncoming traffic.”
    Thompson’s sister, Mary Bullock, testified that she received a call from her brother’s
    fiancé, Sheila Coryea, around 8:00 p.m. asking her to drive to a local business and help her with
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    Thompson, who was intoxicated and uncooperative. She said she and Coryea succeeded in
    getting Thompson into his vehicle, which Coryea drove. Bullock followed Thompson’s car as
    Coryea tried to take him to a friend’s house. Bullock testified as follows:
    [W]e come to a stop sign. It was on 460. I saw the sign. It
    was going - - [Coryea] turned to the right . . . and then she went up
    the road about four miles I guess it was. Then she turned back to
    the left going to a secondary road. She went up that road I guess
    about a mile or so and then she turned around. And I could see
    commotion. I turned around, too. I saw commotion in the car
    before they got to the stop sign right there at back on 460 [sic].
    [Thompson] had opened up the door on the passenger side
    and it was like he was trying to get out. And then the door closed
    again and I noticed that [Coryea] was going to the left. And she
    went up like going towards west going up on 460. And it was in
    the wrong lane, and then I come across.
    According to Bullock, Coryea stopped the car where police later found it, ran over to Bullock’s
    car and said, “‘I can’t stand it no more . . . I have to get away.’” Coryea said the best thing was
    just to leave Thompson there, and she entered Bullock’s car. Bullock testified that she also told
    Coryea “the best thing is just to let him you know sleep it off where we can go find somebody.”
    They agreed and “went up the road about four or five miles . . . up toward it was 460 West.”
    They looked for a service station to call 911, but did not find one. Bullock said she then turned
    around, traveled east on Route 460, found a service station, pulled in, “and [Coryea] was going
    to go in.”
    And about that time I [(Bullock)] saw some lights going by and I
    said, Sheila, I said maybe that is the police that is going up there to
    check on him. So we went by and when we did we went straight
    by and then we saw. We turned around to the left. We were going
    [on] 460 and saw the police that was on the side of the road. And I
    said I’m exhausted and tired. I have to go to work in the morning
    before 7:00. I said the best thing is to call in the morning. I said
    you need to go home because you can’t talk to him, and I said if he
    sees you he is going to get really worse than what he is and he may
    start cursing and fighting and doing much worse than what he is. I
    was tired. I said it is time to go.
    -3-
    Bullock said she did not stop and speak with the police because she “knew” Thompson
    “would be in worse shape. I mean he might start cursing if he saw [Coryea] because he was
    already outrageous.”
    Coryea testified that Thompson was heavily intoxicated that evening and wanted to visit
    a friend’s house, so she agreed to drive him there. After she bought Thompson beer, he became
    unmanageable, so she called Bullock to help her. Coryea said she asked Bullock to “follow me,
    let’s just get him, you know, get him to his friend’s, leave him there, and take me back home.”
    While she was trying to find the friend’s house, Thompson became disruptive, causing Coryea to
    turn into and drive in the wrong lane of travel on Route 460. She pulled into the grassy median
    as soon as she realized her mistake. She “turned the car off, grabbed the keys, took [her] purse
    and headed across into the grass,” leaving Thompson alone in the passenger seat of his car. She
    got into Bullock’s car. Coryea claimed her cell phone “had died,” so they drove up and down
    Route 460 “looking for someplace to make a phone call.” Coryea said she had nothing to drink
    that night and she never let Thompson drive the car. When asked why she did not stop when she
    saw the police confront Thompson, Coryea replied, she “was scared” because she was driving
    the car. When pressed further, Coryea explained she was scared because “I could have hit
    someone” driving the wrong way. On redirect examination, Coryea added she did not stop
    because she was afraid she would get charged with driving in the wrong direction. When asked
    if she has ever told the authorities this account, Coryea said she has not because she “thought
    since [she] had the keys” and Thompson was a passenger, he “wouldn’t be charged.”
    Thompson testified and recalled being heavily intoxicated at the store with Coryea. The
    next thing he remembered was waking up in jail after his arrest. When asked if he recalled
    speaking with the officers, Thompson said, “It seems like I remember pieces of something, but
    no, sir, not exactly.”
    -4-
    After hearing evidence and argument, the trial court found the testimony of Bullock and
    Coryea incredible and determined that the circumstantial evidence proved Thompson had driven
    the car and was guilty of driving while under the influence of alcohol.
    Analysis
    Thompson challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to support his conviction. He
    asserts “it was never proved that he either drove or operated the vehicle.” He argues that the
    Commonwealth never established that he operated the vehicle and that he established through
    two “unimpeached witnesses” that someone else was driving.
    When faced with a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, we “‘presume the
    judgment of the trial court to be correct’ and reverse only if the trial court’s decision is ‘plainly
    wrong or without evidence’ to support it.” Kelly v. Commonwealth, 
    41 Va. App. 250
    , 257, 
    584 S.E.2d 444
    , 447 (2003) (en banc) (quoting Davis v. Commonwealth, 
    39 Va. App. 96
    , 99, 
    570 S.E.2d 875
    , 876-77 (2002)). A reviewing court does not “ask itself whether it believes that the
    evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318-19 (1979). We ask only whether “any rational trier of fact could have found the
    essential elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” Kelly, 41 Va. App. at 257, 584
    S.E.2d at 447. “‘This familiar standard gives full play to the responsibility of the trier of fact
    fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable
    inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’” Id. at 257-58, 584 S.E.2d at 447 (quoting
    Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319).
    Many of the cases upon which Thompson relies involve situations in which the defendant
    was deemed to be “operating” merely because he or she was present behind the wheel of a
    parked or stopped vehicle. See, e.g., Nicolls v. Commonwealth, 
    212 Va. 257
    , 
    184 S.E.2d 9
    (1971); Gallagher v. Commonwealth, 
    205 Va. 666
    , 
    139 S.E.2d 37
     (1964); Keesee v.
    -5-
    Commonwealth, 
    32 Va. App. 263
    , 
    527 S.E.2d 473
     (2000); Leake v. Commonwealth, 
    27 Va. App. 101
    , 
    497 S.E.2d 522
     (1998); Propst v. Commonwealth, 
    24 Va. App. 791
    , 
    485 S.E.2d 657
     (1997). Here, however, the trial court relied upon its finding that Thompson operated the
    vehicle before pulling it onto the median, rather than merely upon the fact that he was seated
    behind the wheel of the car with its lights on and no key in the ignition.
    In Lyons v. Petersburg, 
    221 Va. 10
    , 11, 
    266 S.E.2d 880
    , 880 (1980), an officer came
    upon an accident in which Lyons’ car had hit a parked vehicle. Lyons was seated in the driver’s
    seat. Id. He admitted drinking earlier but made no statements about the accident. Id. at 11-12,
    266 S.E.2d at 880-81. Although “there were no witnesses testifying that [Lyons] was actually
    seen driving his vehicle,” the Virginia Supreme Court explained that “[c]ircumstantial evidence
    is sufficient to convict if it excludes every reasonable hypothesis of innocence.” Id. at 12-13,
    266 S.E.2d at 881 (pointing out and citing several cases upholding convictions for operating a
    vehicle despite the absence of an eyewitness to such operation). Finding no reasonable,
    alternative explanation for Lyons’ presence in his own wrecked car late at night, the Court held
    that it could be properly “inferred that Mr. Lyons’ car was where it was at the time because he
    drove it there, and that the accident between his vehicle and the [parked car] occurred at a time
    when Lyons was in actual physical control of and operating his own vehicle.” Id. at 13, 266
    S.E.2d at 881.
    Here, the circumstantial evidence points ineluctably to the conclusion that Thompson
    operated the car. The police found him alone, heavily intoxicated, behind the wheel of his own
    car minutes after a report that the car was traveling in the wrong lane of traffic. The scene was
    deserted. No one else was around. Thompson admitted he was traveling to Crewe, and he
    further stated he pulled off the road because the lights from coming traffic frightened him.
    -6-
    Notwithstanding the foregoing evidence, Thompson contends the testimony from his two
    witnesses was neither impeached nor contradicted, that it rebutted and disproved the
    Commonwealth’s theory that he operated the car.
    While a jury, or a judge trying a case without a jury, are the judges
    of the weight of the testimony and the credibility of witnesses, they
    may not arbitrarily disregard uncontradicted evidence of
    unimpeached witnesses which is not inherently incredible and not
    inconsistent with the facts appearing in the record, even though
    such witnesses are interested in the outcome of the case.
    Hodge v. American Family Life Assurance Co., 
    213 Va. 30
    , 31, 
    189 S.E.2d 351
    , 353 (1972)
    (emphasis added).
    Thompson fails to acknowledge the trial court’s role, as fact finder, and the requirement
    that the witnesses’ testimony, although uncontradicted, also be credible. Bullock and Coryea
    were impeached by the showing of their bias and by the implausibility of their accounts. After
    hearing their testimony that they left Thompson in a severely drunken state unattended in the
    median of a highway, never advised anyone of this fact, and drove past the scene without giving
    information or assistance, and having considered their demeanor, the trial court found their
    testimony incredible.
    The evidence, taken as a whole, sufficiently supports the trial court’s finding that
    Thompson drove the car while under the influence of alcohol. Accordingly, we affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
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