Sa'ad El-Amin v. Carloyn Gautier-Adams ( 1997 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Annunziata and Overton
SA'AD EL-AMIN
MEMORANDUM OPINION *
v. Record No. 1583-96-2 PER CURIAM
JUNE 10, 1997
CAROLYN GAUTIER-ADAMS
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
James B. Wilkinson, Judge
(Sa'ad El-Amin, pro se, on brief).
No brief for appellee.
Sa'ad El-Amin (father) appeals the decision of the circuit
court calculating the amount of child support due to Carolyn
Gautier-Adams (mother) and deciding other issues. Father
contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion by not
recalculating support as of September 10, 1992, the date father
filed his original petition to reduce child support; (2) violated
his right to due process by finding him in contempt in the
absence of service of a rule to show cause; (3) erred in holding
him in contempt for his failure to pay mother the amount awarded
as equitable distribution; and (4) abused its discretion by
vacating, then reinstating, its August 18, 1995 order. Upon
reviewing the record and father's opening brief, we conclude that
this appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm
the decision of the trial court. Rule 5A:27.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
Child Support
Under Code § 20-108, the trial court may modify child
support "with respect to any period during which there is a
pending petition for modification, but only from the date that
notice of such petition has been given . . . ." Contrary to
father's contention, the court is not required to retroactively
modify child support to the date notice of the petition was
given. "Whether to make modification of a support order
effective during a period when a petition is pending is entirely
within the discretion of the trial court." O'Brien v. Rose, 14
Va. App. 960, 965, 420 S.E.2d 246, 249 (1992). We find no abuse
of discretion in the court's decision to modify child support as
of April 30, 1993 rather than September 10, 1992.
Due Process
The record reflects that mother served several notices on
father, which were accompanied by Petitions for Rule to Show
Cause, raising the issues that were addressed at the May 28, 1996
hearing. We find that the notices sufficiently detailed the
allegations which formed the basis of the contempt finding
against father. Moreover, the transcript clearly reflects
father's understanding of the issues raised before the court.
See Steinberg v. Steinberg, 21 Va. App. 42, 46-47, 461 S.E.2d
421, 423 (1995). Therefore, we find no deprivation of father's
rights to due process.
2
Equitable Distribution
Under Code § 18.2-456, a court may find a party in contempt
of court for "[d]isobedience or resistance . . . to any lawful
process, judgment, decree or order of the court." "The power to
punish for contempt is inherent in, and as ancient as, courts
themselves. It is essential to the proper administration of the
law, to enable courts to enforce their orders, judgments and
decrees." Carter v. Commonwealth, 2 Va. App. 392, 395, 345
S.E.2d 5, 7 (1986).
The transcript of the May 28, 1996 hearing and the order
entered pursuant to that hearing demonstrate that the court found
father in contempt on several grounds, including his failure to
pay spousal and child support. In its order, the court found
that he failed to provide mother with title to a car as
previously ordered, failed to pay the equitable distribution
award on which he owed $224,532.37, and failed to pay spousal and
child support in the total amount of $82,820.51.
On appeal, father argues that the court could not find him
in contempt on the outstanding equitable distribution award
because that was a money judgment. The record demonstrates that
the court's finding of contempt was grounded on more than the
equitable distribution award. Unquestionably, the court had
authority to find father guilty of criminal contempt for
nonpayment of support and failing to comply with the other
previously entered court orders. See, e.g., Steinberg, 21 Va.
3App. at 46-47, 461 S.E.2d at 423. Therefore, father has not
demonstrated reversible error.
Vacated Order
Husband contends that the trial court abused its discretion
by initially vacating, then reinstating, its order of August 18,
1995. When the court entered its order dated October 13, 1995,
that order provided that "[t]he Court hereby vacates its order of
August 18, 1995 entered herein, and it shall be held in the
balance, said order to be reinstated in the event that the
agreement is terminated." The evidence presented at the May 28,
1996 hearing established that father had failed to honor the
terms of the agreement. The court therefore reinstated the
original order of August 18, 1995. We find no abuse of
discretion in the court's reinstatement of the order which was
conditioned on the parties' implementation of their agreement.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
4