Jose Alberto Navarette-Ramos v. Commonwealth ( 2004 )


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  •                                 COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Bumgardner and Kelsey
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    JOSE ALBERTO NAVARETTE-RAMOS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
    v.      Record No. 2152-03-4                                    JUDGE JAMES W. BENTON, JR.
    NOVEMBER 16, 2004
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
    LeRoy F. Millette, Jr., Judge
    William A. Boge for appellant.
    Donald E. Jeffrey, III, Assistant Attorney General (Jerry W. Kilgore,
    Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    The trial judge convicted Jose Alberto Navarette-Ramos of the felony of recruiting a
    juvenile to participate in or become a member of a criminal street gang in violation of Code
    § 18.2-46.3. Navarette-Ramos contends the evidence was insufficient to prove the gang has as one
    of its primary objectives the commission of a predicate criminal act, which he argues is an element
    of the statutory definition of criminal street gang. He argues, therefore, that the evidence failed to
    prove beyond a reasonable doubt an essential element of Code § 18.2-46.3. We affirm the
    conviction.
    I.
    The evidence proved that a juvenile girl went with her boyfriend and his friend to “meet . . .
    the other people from the [boyfriend’s] gang, his friends.” They went to a bedroom in the apartment
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    where Jose Alberto Navarette-Ramos resided. Navarette-Ramos was present with three other men
    and two women, some of whom were juveniles. Another man later came into the room.
    As some of the people in the room drank beer and others smoked marijuana, several of the
    men spoke to the juvenile girl about the gang, which they identified as MS-13. They asked if she
    was a member of a gang and if she wanted to join their gang. While explaining the gang to her, they
    asked her about her home environment and asked whether she had problems at home. When she
    said her mother would require her to work after she turned eighteen, the men told the juvenile girl
    she could live with them if she had no place to live. They promised to “give . . . food, a roof where
    to live and . . . take care of [her], but [said she had to] be part of the gang for [them] to help. . . .”
    During an occasion when the men left the room, the juvenile girl asked the two teenage girls if they
    wanted to be members of the gang. They said “no because this is too dangerous to be in.”
    After the men returned, the juvenile girl decided to join the gang, indicating she had
    problems at home. One of the men explained that to join the gang she had to either submit to a
    physical beating by the gang members or have sexual intercourse with multiple gang members.
    Two hours after she entered the apartment, the juvenile girl decided to have sexual intercourse with
    five of the men. Navarette-Ramos, the last man who had sexual intercourse with her, said
    “Welcome to . . . the gang. You’re part of us now.” The juvenile girl remained in the apartment
    until early the next morning, when she left because she was experiencing pain.
    One of the females in the apartment was sixteen years old. She testified that earlier in
    evening, before these events occurred, Navarette-Ramos told her that he and the other members of
    the gang would be recruiting a person into the gang that evening. She named the gang, and she
    described the gang signs, the gang colors, and various gang activities which she had observed. She
    identified all of the people who were in the apartment with the juvenile girl that evening. She also
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    testified that she and the other female were told to leave the room while the juvenile girl remained
    with the six men and that she was told “why that was happening.”
    The teenager further testified that she dated a member of the gang who was in the room
    during these events. Although she often “hung out” with the gang, she was not a member because
    she “had not been beaten-in nor sexed-in.” She also testified she was present when her boyfriend
    put a gang tattoo on Navarette-Ramos. On one other occasion, she was present when
    Navarette-Ramos entered a house and yelled at her and others to get on the floor because
    Navarette-Ramos, her boyfriend, and another man had just shot at members of another gang.
    A police officer testified as an expert “concerning gangs in general and . . . MS-13 in
    particular.” He identified numerous crimes that members of this gang had been convicted of in the
    region. Those crimes included “homicide . . . , malicious woundings, weapons violations, shooting
    a gun on school property, armed robberies, simple assaults . . . [and] traffic tickets DUI’s.” He
    testified that the gang has units in other cities and distributes drugs nationally. He also testified that
    the gang has been certified as being a criminal gang in many jurisdictions and is “a criminal
    enterprise.” He further testified that although some members of the gang joined for reasons other
    than to participate in criminal activities, all of the gang members support the criminal activity of the
    gang.
    In addition, the evidence contains records of criminal convictions for gang participation for
    three of the men who were in the apartment with the juvenile girl. The evidence also contained
    evidence of other criminal offenses committed by two of the men who were in the apartment and
    criminal convictions of another man who was associated with the gang.
    Navarette-Ramos testified and denied being a member of a gang. He also denied that these
    events occurred in his apartment, and he denied knowing the juvenile girl and the other teenager
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    who testified about events in the apartment. He testified that he was intoxicated when someone put
    a tattoo of a gang symbol on him without his consent.
    The trial judge convicted Navarette-Ramos of recruiting a juvenile to become a member of a
    street gang in violation of Code § 18.2-46.3, but acquitted him of the charge of violating Code
    § 18.2-46.2 (requiring proof the accused actively participated in a criminal street gang and
    knowingly and willfully participated in a predicate act committed for the benefit of or in association
    with a street gang).
    II.
    The offense for which the trial judge convicted Navarette-Ramos provides, in pertinent part,
    as follows:
    Any person age 18 years or older who solicits, invites, recruits,
    encourages or otherwise causes or attempts to cause a juvenile to
    actively participate in or become a member of what he knows to be
    a criminal street gang is guilty of a Class 6 felony.
    Code § 18.2-46.3(A). Navarette-Ramos contends the trial judge erred in convicting him because
    “[t]he Commonwealth’s evidence, from the record, utterly failed to prove beyond a reasonable
    doubt, that one of the primary objectives or activities of MS-13 is the commission of a predicate
    criminal act, as defined by . . . Code § 18.2-46.1.”1
    1
    Code § 18.2-46.1 contains the following definitions:
    “Act of violence” means those felony offenses described in
    subsection A of § 19.2-297.1.
    “Criminal street gang” means any ongoing organization,
    association, or group of three or more persons, whether formal or
    informal, (i) which has as one of its primary objectives or activities
    the commission of one or more criminal activities (ii) which has an
    identifiable name or identifying sign or symbol, and (iii) whose
    members individually or collectively have engaged in the
    commission of, attempt to commit, conspiracy to commit, or
    solicitation of two or more predicate criminal acts, at least one of
    -4-
    The record discloses, however, that the issue Navarette-Ramos raises on this appeal was
    never raised at trial. At the conclusion of the Commonwealth’s evidence, Navarette-Ramos
    made a motion to strike the evidence, arguing that the Commonwealth failed to establish a prima
    facie case for gang participation because no evidence proved “prior criminal activity.” In
    addition, the attorney for a co-defendant made extensive arguments, which Navarette-Ramos
    adopted, that the evidence failed to prove the co-defendant engaged in “predicate criminal acts,”
    that the evidence failed to prove the co-defendant knew the females were juveniles, and that the
    evidence did not prove an “act of violence” necessary to establish a “predicate criminal act,” as
    defined by Code § 18.2-46.1. The trial judge denied these motions to strike.
    At the conclusion of all the evidence, the attorneys made these same arguments: the
    evidence did not prove (1) predicate criminal acts, (2) acts of violence necessary to establish
    predicate criminal acts, (3) knowledge that the teenager was a juvenile, and (4) the accused was
    “an active participant in . . . or associate of this gang.” Navarette-Ramos adopted these
    arguments and further argued (1) that he was not present in the apartment, (2) that he has no
    prior criminal record, (3) that he is not associated with the group, and (4) that he was not
    involved in any activity described as a “predicate act.” The trial judge denied these motions.
    ________________________
    which is an act of violence, provided such acts were not part of a
    common act or transaction.
    “Predicate criminal act” means (i) an act of violence; (ii) any
    violation of §§ 18.2-46.3, 18.2-51, 18.2-51.1, 18.2-52, 18.2-53,
    18.2-55, 18.2-57, 18.2-57.2, 18.2-121, 18.2-127, 18.2-128,
    18.2-137, 18.2-138, 18.2-146, 18.2-147, subsection H, H 1 or H 2
    of § 18.2-248, §§ 18.2-248.01, 18.2-255, or § 18.2-255.2; (iii) a
    second or subsequent felony violation of subsection C of
    § 18.2-248 or of § 18.2-248.1; or (iv) any violation of a local
    ordinance adopted pursuant to § 15.2-1812.2.
    -5-
    On brief, Navarette-Ramos now argues as follows:
    [I]n order for the trial court to have properly convicted [him], it
    had to find that the Commonwealth proved beyond a reasonable
    doubt that MS-13 has, as one of its primary objectives or activities,
    the commission of a predicate criminal act. The Commonwealth’s
    evidence, from the record, utterly failed to prove, beyond a
    reasonable doubt, that one of the primary objectives or activities of
    MS-13 is the commission of a predicate criminal act, as defined by
    Virginia Code § 18.2-46.1. (emphasis added).
    Because Navarette-Ramos did not raise at trial the issue he now presents on appeal, we
    are barred from considering it by Rule 5A:18.
    No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for
    reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds
    therefor at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or
    to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice.
    Id. This rule of appellate procedure precludes Navarette-Ramos from raising on appeal an issue
    that he did not raise at trial. Correll v. Commonwealth, 
    42 Va. App. 311
    , 324, 
    591 S.E.2d 712
    ,
    719 (2004).
    We also hold that because the argument Navarette-Ramos now presents is based upon a
    misreading of the statute, the record does not establish either the good cause or the ends of
    justice exception. Initially, we note that Navarette-Ramos correctly asserts that Code § 18.2-46.3
    requires the Commonwealth to prove he recruited a person to “become a member of . . . a
    criminal street gang,” and that, to satisfy the definition of “criminal street gang,” the
    Commonwealth had to prove the “organization, association, or group of three or more persons
    . . . has as one of its primary objectives or activities the commission of one or more criminal
    activities.” Code § 18.2-46.1. We disagree with his further assertion that one of the primary
    objectives or activities must be, as he argues, “the commission of a predicate criminal act, as
    defined by . . . Code § 18.2-46.1.” The definition of criminal street gang does not limit the
    “primary objectives or activities” to predicate criminal acts. Rather, the proof must establish that
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    one of the primary objectives or activities of the group is “the commission of one or more
    criminal activities.” Id.
    Simply put, the “criminal activities” referenced in part (i) of the definition of “criminal
    street gang” are not narrowed or limited by the definition of “predicate criminal act.”
    Furthermore, the evidence was sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the group had
    as a primary activity the commission of criminal activities.
    For these reasons, we affirm the conviction.
    Affirmed.
    -7-
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 2152034

Filed Date: 11/16/2004

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014