Rontel Taylor, s/k/a Rontal Taylor v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2010 )


Menu:
  •                                  COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, McClanahan and Haley
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    RONTEL TAYLOR, S/K/A
    RONTAL TAYLOR
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.     Record No. 0697-09-2                              JUDGE ELIZABETH A. McCLANAHAN
    APRIL 20, 2010
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HOPEWELL
    James F. D’Alton, Jr., Judge
    David C. Fratarcangelo (Eliades & Eliades, on brief), for appellant.
    Josephine F. Whalen, Assistant Attorney General II (William C.
    Mims, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.
    Rontel Taylor was convicted, in a bench trial, of shooting into an occupied dwelling and
    conspiracy to shoot into an occupied dwelling, in violation of Code § 18.2-279 and Code
    § 18.2-22. Taylor argues on appeal that the evidence was insufficient to support his convictions
    based on his credibility challenge to one of the Commonwealth’s witnesses. Rejecting this
    argument, we affirm the convictions.
    When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “the judgment of the trial
    court sitting without a jury is entitled to the same weight as a jury verdict.” Saunders v.
    Commonwealth, 
    242 Va. 107
    , 113, 
    406 S.E.2d 39
    , 42 (1991) (citation and internal quotation
    marks omitted). Under this standard, this Court does not “ask itself whether it believes that the
    evidence at the trial established guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Jackson v. Virginia, 
    443 U.S. 307
    , 318-19 (1979) (emphasis in original; citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    Instead, we ask only “‘whether, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the
    prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
    beyond a reasonable doubt.’” Maxwell v. Commonwealth, 
    275 Va. 437
    , 442, 
    657 S.E.2d 499
    ,
    502 (2008) (quoting Jackson, 
    443 U.S. at 319
    ) (emphasis in original). See also McMillan v.
    Commonwealth, 
    277 Va. 11
    , 19, 
    671 S.E.2d 396
    , 399 (2009); Jones v. Commonwealth, 
    277 Va. 171
    , 182-83, 
    670 S.E.2d 727
    , 734 (2009); Clanton v. Commonwealth, 
    53 Va. App. 561
    , 566, 
    673 S.E.2d 904
    , 906-07 (2009) (en banc).
    The Commonwealth’s key witness, Travis Morse, testified that he was one of Taylor’s
    confederates in the shooting. According to Morse, on the day of the shooting, Taylor had with
    him the “whole day” a shotgun, which was Taylor’s gun. Morse explained that he, Taylor, and
    two other friends were riding together in a car and that one of the two friends shot into Calvin
    Jones’ house. Then later in the evening, the four of them drove back to Jones’ house, knowing
    that “[s]omebody was going to shoot in the house [for the second time].” This time, as they
    drove by the house, “Rontel Taylor shot in the house,” using his shotgun. Morse indicated that
    the reason Taylor shot into Jones’ house was to retaliate for Jones’ actions in response to the first
    shooting.
    In challenging the sufficiency of the evidence, Taylor argues that Morse’s testimony was
    not credible because Morse was a convicted felon and certain details of his testimony at trial
    were inconsistent with his prior testimony. We reject this argument. It is well established that
    “[t]he credibility of the witnesses and the weight accorded the evidence are matters solely for the
    fact finder who has the opportunity to see and hear that evidence as it is presented.” Sandoval v.
    Commonwealth, 
    20 Va. App. 133
    , 138, 
    455 S.E.2d 730
    , 732 (1995). Under this standard, “[t]he
    conclusions of the fact finder on issues of witness credibility may only be disturbed on appeal if
    this Court finds that [the witness’] . . . testimony was inherently incredible, or so contrary to
    -2-
    human experience as to render it unworthy of belief.” Moyer v. Commonwealth, 
    33 Va. App. 8
    ,
    28, 
    531 S.E.2d 580
    , 590 (2000) (en banc) (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
    Morse’s testimony was neither inherently incredible nor contrary to human experience, and thus
    the trial court, as fact finder, did not err in crediting it.
    For these reasons, we affirm Taylor’s convictions.
    Affirmed.
    -3-