Jermel Rodney Davis, etc v. Commonwealth ( 1995 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present:   Chief Judge Moon, Senior Judges Duff and Hodges
    JERMEL RODNEY DAVIS, a/k/a
    RODNEY JERMEL DAVIS
    v.   Record No. 1599-94-3              MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    CHIEF JUDGE NORMAN K. MOON
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA                   AUGUST 15, 1995
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
    Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge
    Elizabeth P. Murtagh, Assistant Public
    Defender (Office of the Public Defender, on
    brief), for appellant.
    Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
    (James S. Gilmore, III, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Jermel Rodney Davis appeals his bench trial convictions of
    attempted murder and use of a firearm in the commission of
    attempted murder arguing that the evidence was insufficient to
    support his convictions.    We hold that the testimony that Davis
    discharged a firearm in the direction of Jones was sufficient to
    prove the specific intent required for his conviction of
    attempted willful, deliberate, and premeditated murder.
    Therefore, we affirm the convictions.
    During the early morning hours of February 20, 1994, Davis
    patronized an establishment by the name of "The Underground" on
    Memorial Avenue in Lynchburg.   At closing, security officers,
    while clearing the parking lot adjacent to the club, heard Davis
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
    designated for publication.
    "ranting and raving" about "going on a mission," and "being tired
    of people messing with him."   The officers heard Davis say, "I'm
    the mother fucking man, fuck security, fuck the police."
    Hearing these statements, one officer followed Davis across
    the parking lot.   As he did so, the officer noticed something
    shiny in Davis's hand and yelled to his supervisor that Davis had
    a gun.   At that time, Craig Jones, another uniformed security
    officer, pulled up and got out of his car.     Jones approached
    Davis and told him to drop his weapon and place his hands on top
    of his head.   Davis did not comply and started walking backwards,
    away from Jones.   Again, Jones told Davis to drop his weapon and
    place his hands on top of his head.      This time, Davis pointed the
    gun at Jones and fired a shot.    Jones ducked behind his car and
    heard Davis fire three more shots before he stood and returned a
    single shot which struck Davis in the leg.     Davis fell to the
    ground but immediately stood and fled on foot.     The officers were
    unable to stop Davis who disappeared behind an adjacent business.
    In characterizing the intent required for a conviction
    of attempted murder, the Supreme Court has said:
    To commit murder one need not intend to
    take life; but to be guilty of an attempt to murder, he
    must so intend.   It is not sufficient that his act, had
    it been fatal, would have been murder.
    Merritt v. Commonwealth, 
    164 Va. 653
    , 662, 
    180 S.E. 395
    , 399
    (1935).
    The Commonwealth "must prove beyond a reasonable doubt
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    both the act and the mental state. Sufficient proof of
    one element, but not the other, will result in
    reversal." . . . Intent or mental state is subjective,
    but it may, and usually must, be proven objectively
    from the circumstances.
    Harrell v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 1
    , 7, 
    396 S.E.2d 680
    , 682
    (1990)(other citations omitted).
    The circumstances from which intent may be proven include
    such things as a person's statements or conduct, and "[a]
    person's conduct may be measured by its natural and probable
    consequences.   The finder of fact may infer that a person intends
    the natural and probable consequences of his acts."   Campbell v.
    Commonwealth, 
    12 Va. App. 476
    , 484, 
    405 S.E.2d 1
    , 4 (1991).     "The
    inferences to be drawn from proven facts, so long as they are
    reasonable, are within the province of the trier of fact."
    Johnson v. Commonwealth, 
    209 Va. 291
    , 295, 
    163 S.E.2d 570
    , 574
    (1968).   Moreover, the Supreme Court has stated that the intent
    to kill may be inferred from the mere drawing of a gun.     Martin
    v. Commonwealth, 
    242 Va. 1
    , 7, 
    406 S.E.2d 15
    , 18 (1991).
    Applying the above principles, we hold that the testimony
    about Davis's statements and conduct outside the club could be
    inferred to establish his hostile state of mind towards the
    security personnel at the time he aimed and discharged a gun in
    the direction of Jones.   This evidence coupled with the evidence
    that Davis drew his gun and fired in the direction of Jones was
    sufficient to support a finding that Davis intended to kill
    Jones.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 1599943

Filed Date: 8/15/1995

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 4/17/2021