Troy Dyon Tarpley v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Frank and Senior Judge Hodges
    Argued at Salem, Virginia
    TROY DYON TARPLEY
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 2890-98-3                      JUDGE ROBERT P. FRANK
    APRIL 25, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF MARTINSVILLE
    Charles M. Stone, Judge
    S. Jane Chittom, Appellate Counsel (Elwood
    Earl Sanders, Jr., Appellate Defender; Public
    Defender Commission, on briefs), for
    appellant.
    Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Troy Dyon Tarpley (appellant) appeals his conviction for
    grand larceny after a bench trial on December 9, 1998.       On appeal,
    he contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the
    conviction.   We disagree and affirm the judgment of the trial
    court.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Appellant was a passenger in a car driven and owned by
    William Bruce.   There were two other passengers in the car, Mike
    and Jose.   Bruce drove the car to an area known as Koehler Hill in
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    the Rivermont Apartment complex.      Appellant and Mike exited the
    car.    There was a group of ten to fifteen people assembled in the
    area.    An unknown member of the group approached Bruce's car,
    reached into the car, and was "fussing" with Jose.      Bruce exited
    the car to try to move the group away from the vehicle.      Bruce was
    attacked and knocked unconscious.      Robert Smith, a resident of
    Rivermont Apartments, witnessed the fight and testified that
    appellant was involved in the fight in which Bruce was attacked.
    After Bruce was attacked, Jose attempted to drive Bruce's car away
    from the crowd and appellant was a passenger in the car.      Jose
    drove the car onto a curb, and then appellant took over as the
    driver of the vehicle.    Appellant drove the car away from the
    scene of the fight, turned around, and drove the car at a high
    rate of speed towards the exit to the apartment complex.
    Appellant testified that he took the car because he was afraid and
    he wanted to get help.    Appellant did not stop at his own
    apartment, his mother's apartment, or any other residents'
    apartments to seek help.    Appellant crashed into some trees as he
    exited the complex.
    II.    ANALYSIS
    Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
    support his conviction of grand larceny.       We find the evidence
    sufficient and affirm the judgment of the trial court.
    "When an appeal challenges the sufficiency of the evidence,
    the evidence is viewed in the light most favorable to the
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    Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable inferences deducible
    therefrom.    A judgment will not be disturbed unless plainly wrong
    or unsupported by the evidence."    Ford v. Commonwealth, 
    28 Va. App. 249
    , 259, 
    503 S.E.2d 803
    , 807 (1998) (citations omitted).
    "[L]arceny is the taking and carrying
    away of the goods and chattels of another
    with intent to deprive the owner of the
    possession thereof permanently." Lund v.
    Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 688
    , 691, 
    232 S.E.2d 745
    , 748 (1977). Under Code § 18.2-95, grand
    larceny includes "larceny not from the person
    of another of goods and chattels of the value
    of $200 or more."
    Winston v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 746
    , 757, 
    497 S.E.2d 141
    , 147
    (1998).
    In determining intent [in a larceny
    case], "the factfinder may consider the
    conduct of the person involved and all the
    circumstances revealed by the evidence."
    Wynn v. Commonwealth, 
    5 Va. App. 283
    , 292,
    
    362 S.E.2d 193
    , 198 (1987). Indeed, "[t]he
    specific intent in the person's mind may, and
    often must, be inferred from that person's
    conduct and statements." Martin v.
    Commonwealth, 
    13 Va. App. 524
    , 527, 
    414 S.E.2d 401
    , 402 (1992) (citing Hargrave v.
    Commonwealth, 
    214 Va. 436
    , 437, 
    201 S.E.2d 597
    , 598 (1974)).
    Welch v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 518
    , 524, 
    425 S.E.2d 101
    ,
    105-06 (1992).
    In this case, there was credible evidence that appellant was
    involved in the fight in which Bruce was knocked unconscious.
    Once Bruce was unconscious, appellant drove Bruce's car away from
    the scene at a high rate of speed.       Appellant did not stop at any
    of the apartments to attempt to get help.      Instead, he drove for
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    the exit to the apartment complex.     Such evidence is sufficient to
    show intent to permanently deprive Bruce of his vehicle.
    Appellant asserts on brief that he took Bruce's car out of
    necessity.   In order to prove necessity, the defendant must show:
    "(1) a reasonable belief that the action was necessary to avoid an
    imminent threatened harm; (2) a lack of other adequate means to
    avoid the threatened harm; and (3) a direct causal relationship
    that may be reasonably anticipated between the action taken
    and the avoidance of the harm."    Buckley v. City of Falls Church,
    
    7 Va. App. 32
    , 33, 
    371 S.E.2d 827
    , 827-28 (1988).
    In this case, appellant presented evidence to the trial court
    that he took Bruce's car because he was frightened and wanted to
    escape from the group on Koehler Hill.     The trial judge rejected
    appellant's evidence and convicted him.    On appeal, we will not
    disturb the trial court's determination of the evidence.
    For these reasons, we find the evidence sufficient to support
    appellant's conviction for grand larceny and, therefore, affirm
    the judgment of the trial court.
    Affirmed.
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Document Info

Docket Number: 2890983

Filed Date: 4/25/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014