Paul Allen Friedline v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judge Benton and
Senior Judge Duff
Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
PAUL ALLEN FRIEDLINE
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0113-99-4 JUDGE CHARLES H. DUFF
APRIL 4, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF PRINCE WILLIAM COUNTY
Herman A. Whisenant, Jr., Judge
John E. Gullette for appellant.
Marla Graff Decker, Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Paul Allen Friedline (appellant) appeals from his
convictions in the Circuit Court of Prince William County for
carjacking, robbery, and using a firearm in the commission of
those two crimes. Appellant contends the trial court erred when
it admitted evidence pertaining to a burglary and larceny that
occurred the same night and in the same locality as the crimes for
which appellant was convicted. Finding no error, we affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Background
Appellant was charged in connection with the March 8, 1998
carjacking of Cindy Loring, and the robbery of Michael Boyer.
During its case-in-chief, the Commonwealth presented evidence
tending to prove appellant's involvement in the March 8, 1998
burglary of Dorothy and Scott Register's residence. The trial
court overruled appellant's objection to this evidence.
Dorothy Register testified that she left her residence on
the afternoon of March 6, 1998, and when she returned on March
9, 1998, she discovered that her house had been burglarized.
The perpetrators stole, among other items, seven long guns
(rifles and shotguns), two handguns, a holster, a box of
ammunition, and some cigars. There was mud all over the
interior of the house, and muddy footprints led from the back of
the house to the Registers' back fence. There was mud on the
fence bordering the Registers' neighbor's property, and Scott
Register found a pager approximately one foot from the fence. A
trail of muddy footprints on the sidewalk in front of the
neighbor's house led to a house under construction where some of
the Register's stolen property was subsequently recovered.
Mrs. Register testified that the only light she left on
when she left the house on March 6 was in the kitchen. Kevin
Hansen testified that he was on the Register's property at
10:00 a.m. on March 8 and saw no evidence of a burglary, but
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between 8:00 and 10:00 that evening, he saw a dim light coming
from one of the Register's upstairs windows.
Cindy Loring testified that on the night of March 8, 1998,
she had stopped her vehicle at a stop sign when two men wearing
"white sheets or something" 1 over their heads ran up to her car.
One of the men, who was armed with a handgun, broke Loring's
driver's side window with the gun and began to hit Loring.
Before pulling Loring from the car and fleeing in the vehicle,
one of the men stuck a hot object on the back of Loring's neck,
leaving a circular-shaped burn.
Jean Hassan and Michael Boyer testified that around
11:00 p.m. on March 8, 1998, they were robbed by two men armed
with handguns, each of whom was wearing "a hood or mask" over
his head. The robbers took Boyer's wallet, which contained
sixty dollars.
Peggy Dixon recalled an incident where appellant and Brian
Calvin came to her house between midnight and 1:00 a.m. She
stated that it was raining that night and the two men were
covered with mud. After Dixon's son refused the men's request
for a ride, Calvin made a telephone call from Dixon's house.
Cheryl Richards testified that Calvin called her sometime
after 11:00 p.m. on March 8, 1998, and asked her for a ride.
1
Officer Landu testified that Loring reported that the
culprits had "white pillowcases or sheets or something white
over their faces."
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She drove to an agreed location where appellant and Calvin
entered the car. Richards testified that the two men were muddy
and that they told her to "get them out of there." She drove
them to Washington, D.C., where the two men purchased marijuana.
On the way to Washington, appellant handed a wallet to Calvin,
who threw it out of the car. The men also discarded their muddy
shoes.
Upon returning from Washington, appellant and Calvin
directed Richards to drive them to a house under construction,
which appellant and Calvin then entered and exited several
times. Richards testified that appellant and Calvin argued
about the fact that something they were looking for was not
there. She noted that appellant was carrying a bag that was
similar in appearance to a pillowcase.
Richards later dropped off appellant and Calvin at Eric
Stokes' residence. Upon cleaning the interior of her vehicle,
Richards discovered a holster and a box of ammunition under her
car seats. 2 Calvin subsequently called Richards and told her
that he had left something "hot" in her car.
Stokes testified that when appellant and Calvin arrived at
his house, they were wet and muddy. Calvin related to Stokes
how he and appellant had carjacked a woman, and described how he
had broken the woman's car window with his gun. Calvin also
2
Richards testified that she disposed of these items.
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told Stokes about subsequently robbing a couple. 3 Stokes
indicated that Calvin and appellant told him about stealing guns
and an ammunition box from a house that night.
Shortly after midnight on March 9, 1998, and approximately
one hour after responding to the Loring carjacking scene,
Officer Landu discovered some of the Registers' stolen property
at the house under construction. Landu testified that it had
been raining all night and that the property around the house
under construction was extremely muddy. The Registers' two
handguns, the holster, the ammunition box, and the cigars were
not among the items recovered.
Detective McClellan testified that the Register house was
approximately two blocks from the house under construction where
the Registers' property was recovered. The house under
construction was approximately one mile from where Loring was
carjacked. McClellan stated that Loring's car was recovered a
few minutes' drive from the place the carjacking occurred and
that the Hassan/Boyer robbery scene was approximately four
hundred yards from where the police found Loring's car. During
the course of his investigation, McClellan attempted to have
Richards identify the house under construction where she drove
appellant and Calvin that night. Although she was unable to
3
Appellant did not object to this testimony. See Lilly v.
Virginia, 527 U.S. 116 (1999).
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identify the exact house, Richards led McClellan to the street
where Landu found the Registers' stolen property in a house.
Dontae Carter was incarcerated with appellant when
appellant was served with the carjacking and robbery
indictments. Appellant told Carter about a carjacking he had
committed, about going back to a house to recover some guns that
turned out not to be there, and going to "Eric's" house.
Appellant also related that his accomplice had lost a pager.
Analysis
Evidence of other crimes or bad acts is
inadmissible if it is offered merely to show
that the defendant is likely to have
committed the crime charged. However, such
evidence is admissible if it tends to prove
any element of the offense charged, even
though it also tends to show that the
defendant is guilty of another crime.
Goins v. Commonwealth, 251 Va. 442, 462, 470 S.E.2d 114, 127
(1996) (citations omitted).
Other crimes evidence "is permissible in cases where the
motive, intent or knowledge of the accused is involved, or where
the evidence is connected with or leads up to the offense for
which the accused is on trial." Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth,
211 Va. 269, 272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970).
Where a course of criminal conduct is
continuous and interwoven, consisting of a
series of related crimes, the perpetrator
has no right to have the evidence
"sanitized" so as to deny the jury knowledge
of all but the immediate crime for which he
is on trial. The fact-finder is entitled to
all of the relevant and connected facts,
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including those which followed the
commission of the crime on trial, as well as
those which preceded it; even though they
may show the defendant guilty of other
offenses.
Scott v. Commonwealth, 228 Va. 519, 526-27, 323 S.E.2d 572, 577
(1984); see Rodriguez v. Commonwealth, 249 Va. 203, 206, 454
S.E.2d 725, 727 (1995) (evidence of prior crimes admissible
where they "constitute a part of the general scheme of which the
crime charged is a part").
"In addressing the admissibility of other crimes evidence
the court must balance the probative value of the evidence of
the other offenses and determine whether it exceeds the
prejudice to the accused. The court's weighing of these factors
is reviewable only for clear abuse of discretion." Pavlick v.
Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 219, 226, 497 S.E.2d 920, 923-24
(1998) (en banc). "'[T]he test for admission of evidence of
other crimes is met when there is "a causal relation or logical
and natural connection between the two acts, or they . . . form
parts of one transaction."'" Bullock v. Commonwealth, 27 Va.
App. 255, 261, 498 S.E.2d 433, 436 (1998) (quoting Guill v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 140, 495 S.E.2d 489 492 (1998)).
In Bullock, the defendant was charged with a November 21,
1996 robbery, during which the victim was shot. A witness for
the Commonwealth testified that on December 31, 1996, he
committed a robbery using a sawed-off shotgun that he borrowed
from the defendant. See id. at 259, 498 S.E.2d at 434-35. The
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witness further testified that he purchased this shotgun from
the defendant on January 6, 1997. The Commonwealth presented
evidence that police recovered the shotgun after it was thrown
from a car occupied by the witness and the defendant. The
victim testified that the shotgun looked identical to the weapon
employed against him by the defendant during the November 21,
1996 robbery. See id. at 259, 498 S.E.2d at 435.
We held that the probative value of this evidence
outweighed any prejudice suffered by the defendant. See id. at
263, 498 S.E.2d at 436-37. The challenged evidence tended to
prove that the defendant, who presented alibi evidence, was the
perpetrator of the robbery and malicious wounding for which he
was charged. See id. at 262-63, 498 S.E.2d at 436-37.
In Kirkpatrick, the defendant was charged with aiding and
abetting the May 20, 1968 robbery of a hotel clerk. See
Kirkpatrick, 211 Va. at 269-70, 176 S.E.2d at 803. The robber
had committed the crime using a sawed-off shotgun. The robber
was subsequently apprehended, with the shotgun, in the
defendant's hotel room, but the defendant denied any knowledge
of the robber. See id. at 270-72, 176 S.E.2d at 804-05. Over
the defendant's objection, the Commonwealth presented evidence
tending to prove that the defendant stole the shotgun from his
former employer on the afternoon of May 19, 1968. See id. at
271, 176 S.E.2d at 804.
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The Supreme Court upheld the admission of this evidence,
holding that the evidence was
"so intimately connected and blended with
the main facts adduced in evidence, that
they cannot be departed from with propriety;
and there is no reason why the criminality
of such intimate and connected
circumstances, should exclude them, more
than other facts apparently innocent." It
is impossible from a fair reading of the
evidence in this case to disassociate
Kirkpatrick from the theft of the gun that
was used in the robbery.
Id. at 276, 176 S.E.2d at 807-08 (citation omitted).
The evidence regarding the Register burglary and larceny
tended to prove appellant's involvement in a series of crimes,
all of which occurred within a span of a few hours on the night
of March 8, 1998, and in close physical proximity to one
another. There was evidence from which the jury could infer
that handguns stolen from the Register household were
subsequently employed in the carjacking and the robbery and that
the circular-shaped burn wound inflicted on Loring was caused by
a lit cigar stolen from the Registers' house. Additionally, the
robbery and carjacking victims indicated that the perpetrators
had been wearing sheets or pillowcases over their heads, and
Richards testified how she saw appellant carrying a
pillowcase-like bag that night.
The evidence tending to link these crimes was particularly
relevant because none of the victims was able to identify either
of the perpetrators. Appellant did not have the right to
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exclude this evidence merely because it tended to prove that he
was involved in a crime for which he was not being tried.
Accordingly, we hold that the trial court did not err in
concluding that the burglary evidence was probative, and did not
abuse its discretion when it admitted this evidence because its
probative value outweighed its prejudicial effect. 4
Moreover, even if we assume that the trial court erred by
admitting this evidence, any such error was harmless. "In
Virginia, non-constitutional error is harmless '[w]hen it
plainly appears from the record and the evidence given at the
trial that the parties have had a fair trial on the merits and
substantial justice has been reached.'" Lavinder v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1003, 1005, 407 S.E.2d 910, 911 (1991)
(en banc) (citation omitted). The testimony of Stokes and
Carter, coupled with the other non-burglary evidence, was
sufficient to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant and
Calvin perpetrated the carjacking and the robbery.
4
Appellant contends on appeal that, in addition to his
general objection, the scope of the burglary evidence presented,
such as the Registers' daughter's reaction to the break-in, and
the photographs of the Register home, exceeded that necessary to
prove the carjacking and the robbery. Other than posing his
general objection to the burglary evidence, appellant did not
object to the relevancy of the evidence cited to in his brief.
Accordingly, he did not preserve this issue for appeal. See
Rule 5A:18.
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For the reasons stated above, the judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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Benton, J., dissenting.
Paul Allen Friedline was tried by a jury for the following
offenses which occurred on March 8, 1998: carjacking, robbery,
use of a firearm in the carjacking and use of a firearm in the
robbery. Although the trial judge allowed the Commonwealth to
prove facts concerning a burglary, that evidence was not
relevant to any issue at trial, was unduly prejudicial, and
should have been ruled inadmissible.
The evidence proved that on the night of March 8, 1998, in
Dale City, two men wearing white material over their heads
approached Cindy Loring while she sat in her automobile with a
friend. Loring testified that it was "raining pretty hard."
One of the men had a gun and broke a window of her automobile.
After hitting Loring, the two men pulled Loring and her friend
out of the automobile and drove away in Loring's automobile.
Loring did not see the faces of the men and could not identify
them.
At eleven o'clock that same night, Jean Hassan and her
friend, Michael Boyer, were sitting in her automobile when two
men ran to her automobile. Each man had a handgun and was
wearing a white hood over his head. The men took Hassan's car
keys and Boyer's wallet and ran away. Neither Hassan nor Boyer
could identify the robbers.
After 11:00 p.m., Cheryl Richards responded to a telephone
call from Brian Calvin and drove to Dale City to meet Calvin and
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Friedline. When they entered her car, they were "muddy" and
told her to "get them out of there." Friedline had a white bag
that was "puffed up." As she drove them to Washington, D.C.,
Friedline gave Calvin several items, including a wallet. Calvin
threw them out the car window. Friedline and Calvin also
discarded their muddy shoes out the window.
Later, Richards drove Friedline and Calvin back to Dale
City and followed their direction to a house under construction.
Both men entered the unfinished house and returned to the car.
They argued because they could not find something for which they
were searching. Richards then drove them to Eric Stokes'
residence.
Stokes testified that both men were wet and muddy when they
arrived at his residence and that it was raining. Stokes
testified without objection that Calvin told him about several
events that occurred that night. Calvin said he and Friedline
pulled a girl out of the car and took her car. They then drove
near Charles Street and robbed another woman and a man at
gunpoint.
An inmate who was confined in jail testified that he met
Friedline in jail after the robberies. According to him,
Friedline showed him the indictments charging the carjacking and
two armed robberies. He testified that Friedline admitted
committing those crimes and described to him how "he went upon a
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car . . . [,] got the girl out of the car . . . [and] they took
the car."
Over objection, the Commonwealth was permitted to prove
facts concerning a burglary that occurred sometime between
4:00 p.m., Friday, March 6, 1998, and the night of Sunday, March
8, 1998. The prosecutor proffered that the evidence of this
burglary proved a "common scheme and plan," "opportunity to
commit the crime," "intent," and "identity." The trial judge
ruled that the burglary evidence was admissible and that "[t]he
weight to be given it will be for the [jury]."
The evidence concerning the burglary proved that on March
8, an hour after Loring's automobile was taken, the officer
investigating that crime received a report from a resident of
Dale City that "suspicious persons [were] in front of his
house." The officer went to investigate. He testified as
follows:
I had taken a prior burglary report earlier
that day. We were informed by a citizen
that there was -- That whole area is under
construction. There were some houses that
were under construction at the time in that
area and local juvenile young adults had
been hanging out in the houses and possibly
that were involved with these burglaries.
The officer went into some of the houses that were under
construction and testified that the area was very muddy. He
found in one of the unfinished houses a large bag full of guns
and other items that he concluded were stolen. He seized the
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bag and its contents and recorded them as "found property." The
police did not then know to whom the property belonged.
On Monday, March 9, 1998, at 4:00 p.m., Dorothy Register
telephoned the police to report that a burglary had occurred at
her residence. Register left home at 4:00 p.m. on Friday, March
6, and discovered, when she returned on Monday, March 9, that
someone had broken into her home. The burglar had tracked mud
throughout the residence and had taken property, including
several rifles and handguns. Thus, the evidence proved that a
burglary occurred at the Registers' residence after 4:00 p.m.,
March 6, and before the police found the Registers' property
late Sunday night, March 8. The Registers' residence is near
the houses that were being constructed.
The trial judge erred in permitting the Commonwealth to
prove facts concerning the burglary because "[e]vidence that
shows or tends to show a defendant has committed a prior crime
generally is inadmissible to prove the crime charged." Guill v.
Commonwealth, 255 Va. 134, 138, 495 S.E.2d 489, 491 (1998).
"This is because such evidence confuses one offense with the
other, unfairly surprises the defendant with a charge he is
unprepared to meet, and, by showing that the [defendant] has a
criminal propensity, tends to reverse his presumption of
innocence of the crime on trial." Lewis v. Commonwealth, 225
Va. 497, 502, 303 S.E.2d 890, 893 (1983). Evidence of other
crimes may be admitted as an exception to the general rule only
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when it is "relevant to an issue or element in the . . . case."
Sutphin v. Commonwealth, 1 Va. App. 241, 245, 337 S.E.2d 897,
899 (1985) (citing Kirkpatrick v. Commonwealth, 211 Va. 269,
272, 176 S.E.2d 802, 805 (1970)). "Among other exceptions,
evidence of other crimes . . . is allowed if relevant to show
the perpetrator's identity when some aspects of the prior crime
are so distinctive or idiosyncratic that the fact finder
reasonably could infer that the same person committed both
crimes." Guill, 255 Va. at 138-39, 495 S.E.2d at 491.
The only contested issue at Friedline's trial was the
identity of the men who robbed Loring, Hassan, and Boyer.
Indeed, on appeal the Commonwealth notes in its brief that
"identity obviously was an issue . . . [and] it was the only
real issue in the case." The Commonwealth contends, however,
the evidence concerning the burglary was relevant to prove
identity and proved "the defendant's role as the criminal agent,
by connecting him to the weapons which in turn facilitated the
carjacking and robbery."
To support an exception to the rule barring evidence of
other crimes, it is not sufficient to assert, as does the
Commonwealth, that identity is an issue and then offer evidence
of other crimes without proving a logical nexus between identity
and the other crimes. To be admissible as evidence of identity,
the prior crime does not have to be a "signature" crime,
however, it must show "'a singular strong resemblance to the
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pattern of the offense charged.'" Spencer v. Commonwealth, 240
Va. 78, 90, 393 S.E.2d 609, 616 (1990) (quoting United States v.
Shackleford, 738 F.2d 776, 783 (7th Cir. 1984)). The
Commonwealth did not proffer and the evidence did not establish
a similarity or pattern between the carjacking and robbery for
which Friedline was tried and the burglary of the Registers'
residence. The Commonwealth is asking this Court to assume a
connection between the crimes based on "sheer speculation,
unsupported by the evidence." Tucker v. Life Ins. Co. of Va.,
228 Va. 55, 62, 321 S.E.2d 78, 82-83 (1984). No evidence
proved, however, that anything about the burglary and the crimes
for which Friedline was tried was "'sufficiently idiosyncratic
to admit an inference of pattern for purposes of proof,' [and]
thus tend[ed] to establish the probability of a common
perpetrator." Spencer, 240 Va. at 90, 393 S.E.2d at 616(citation omitted).
Moreover, even assuming Friedline placed the Registers'
property in the unfinished house or discovered the property in
the unfinished house after the burglary, those facts do not tend
to prove Friedline's identity as one of the persons who robbed
Loring, Hassan, and Boyer. No evidence remotely proved that the
guns used in the Loring, Hassan, and Boyer robberies were so
distinctive that they could only have come from the Registers'
residence. The guns the robbers used were neither described by
the victims nor recovered by the police. The Commonwealth's
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theory is based on a speculative assumption that only the person
who committed the burglary of the Registers' residence had
possession of handguns.
This country is awash with handguns. It is a rank
speculation to assume that an armed robber must have committed a
burglary where a gun was taken merely because the robbery
occurred near in time and location to the burglary. "Like any
other element of a crime, [identity] must be proved as a matter
of fact and may not be the subject of surmise and speculation."
Guill, 255 Va. at 139, 495 S.E.2d at 492 (citation omitted).
To be admissible under the identity exception, prior crimes
evidence must also meet "the further requirement that the
legitimate probative value of the evidence must exceed the
incidental prejudice caused to the defendant." Id. Friedline
contends the evidence lacked any probative value and served only
the highly prejudicial purpose of suggesting that he "was likely
to commit the crime charged in the indictment." Kirkpatrick,
211 Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805. I agree. Although
Friedline's identity was at issue in the case, the evidence of
the burglary at the Registers' residence was not probative of
the identity of the men who robbed Loring of her automobile and
Hassan and Boyer of their property. Indeed, no physical
evidence proved Friedline was ever in the residence and no one
testified that he was seen in the residence. Significantly,
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Friedline has never been tried for or convicted of committing
the burglary.
The same weekend as the Registers' home was burglarized,
the police received a report of another burglary in the vicinity
of the unfinished houses where the Registers' stolen property
was recovered. The Commonwealth does not contend Friedline was
involved in the other burglary. The officer who found the
Registers' property testified that a citizen told him some
"local juvenile young adults had been hanging out in the houses
[under construction] and possibly . . . were involved in the
burglaries." The officer also testified that the area around
the unfinished houses was muddy. Thus, the Commonwealth
presented evidence from which the trier of fact could only
speculate about who committed the burglary. Although
Friedline's friend said that Friedline was wet and muddy when he
entered her car, the evidence failed to prove that the mud in
the Registers' house came from Friedline. The evidence proved
that it was "raining pretty hard" on at least one day that
weekend and that the Registers' home is near the muddy
construction site where the juveniles, who were suspected of
burglaries, were seen. Therefore, from this evidence, the trier
of fact could only conclude that anyone walking around in the
area could have tracked mud into the Registers' home.
The Commonwealth also argues that Friedline "was intimately
connected with . . . a criminal rampage" and "the offenses were
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part-and-parcel to 'a course of criminal conduct' which was
'continuous and interwoven.'" In this case, however, evidence
of prior crimes is neither "connected with [nor] leads up to the
offense for which the accused is on trial." Kirkpatrick, 211
Va. at 272, 176 S.E.2d at 805. Not only is there no evidence of
a "criminal rampage," the cases upon which the majority opinion
relies to support the theory that the burglary was evidence of a
rampage are distinguishable from the present case.
In Bullock v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 255, 498 S.E.2d 433(1998), the evidence proved that after Bullock robbed and shot
the victim using a sawed-off shotgun, he sold the same shotgun
to a friend who testified to that effect at Bullock's trial.
See id. at 259, 498 S.E.2d at 434-35. Further, the Commonwealth
proved that police recovered the same shotgun after Bullock and
his friend threw it from a vehicle which they occupied. See id.
at 259, 498 S.E.2d at 435. Unlike Bullock, no evidence in this
record proved the guns stolen from the Registers' home were used
in the robbery or the carjacking. In addition, no evidence
proved that Friedline was ever in possession of the Registers'
guns.
In Kirkpatrick, the evidence proved that a robbery was
committed using a sawed-off shotgun and that the robber was
apprehended in Kirkpatrick's hotel room with the same shotgun in
his possession. See 211 Va. at 270, 176 S.E.2d at 803. The
Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed the trial judge's decision to
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allow the admission of evidence that Kirkpatrick had previously
stolen the shotgun from his former employer. See id. at 276,
176 S.E.2d at 807-08. Thus, unlike in Kirkpatrick, no evidence
in this record connected the weapons used in the carjackings or
the robberies with the guns stolen from the Registers.
To be admissible, a prior crime must be "'so intimately
connected and blended with the main facts adduced in evidence,
that they cannot be departed from with propriety.'" Id. The
majority opinion holds that "[t]here was evidence from which the
jury could infer that handguns stolen from the Register
household were subsequently employed in the carjacking and the
robbery and that the circular-shaped burn wound inflicted on
Loring was caused by a lit cigar stolen from the Registers. I
disagree. As previously stated, to support such an inference,
it is not enough to prove merely that guns were stolen from the
Registers and that guns were used in the carjacking and robbery.
The guns used in the carjacking and robberies were neither
identified nor recovered by the police.
Likewise, evidence that cigars were stolen from the
Registers certainly does not support an inference that when
Loring was burned by an unidentified circular object during a
pouring rain, a cigar from the Registers' home caused the burn.
Contrary to the majority opinion's suggestion, no evidence in
this record tends to prove that the burn wound Loring suffered
was caused by a cigar. Moreover, the further suggestion that,
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therefore, the cigar was taken from the Registers' residence is
a speculative inference drawn on a speculative inference.
The trier of fact could only speculate whether Loring was
burned by a cigarette, a cigar, or some other object carried by
one of the robbers during the heavy rainstorm that night.
Likewise, the trier of fact could only speculate about the
origin of the white pillowcase-like bag that Friedline had when
he was in Richards' automobile. No evidence remotely tends to
prove it came from the Registers' residence.
Proof of the burglary only served to suggest by innuendo
that Friedline committed the burglary and, thus, had a
propensity to commit crimes. That evidence had no bearing on
the charged robbery and was unduly prejudicial. Therefore, I
would reverse the convictions and remand for a new trial.
I dissent.
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