Timothy Rome Baker, Jr. v. Fredericksburg DSS ( 2000 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Coleman and Lemons ∗
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    TIMOTHY ROME BAKER, JR.
    MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗∗ BY
    v.   Record No. 1089-99-2                  JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS
    MARCH 21, 2000
    FREDERICKSBURG DEPARTMENT
    OF SOCIAL SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF FREDERICKSBURG
    John W. Scott, Jr., Judge
    (Donald R. Skinker, on brief), for appellant.
    Appellant submitting on brief.
    Joseph A. Vance, IV (Timothy W. Barbrow;
    Joseph A. Vance, IV & Associates, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Timothy Rome Baker, Jr. appeals the decision of the circuit
    court terminating his parental rights to his three children,
    Antonio Lewis, Shakela Lewis and Ervin Lewis.       On appeal, Baker
    contends that the Fredericksburg Department of Social Services
    (DSS) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
    Baker is not reasonably likely to correct or eliminate the
    ∗
    Justice Lemons prepared and the Court adopted the opinion
    in this case prior to his investiture as a Justice of the
    Supreme Court of Virginia.
    ∗∗
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    conditions that resulted in the abuse of his children so as to
    allow their safe return to him.   Finding no error, we affirm.
    I.   BACKGROUND
    Three children were born to Baker and Teresa Lewis:
    Antonio in 1989, Shakela in 1991 and Ervin in 1993.   The
    evidence revealed that Baker was serving jail time for
    possession of cocaine with intent to distribute on February 21,
    1996 when DSS intervened because of concerns that the youngest
    child had been sexually abused.   Further investigation revealed
    that the youngest child was "demonstrating very sexualized
    behavior with other children" in his Head Start program, and a
    medical examination indicated that he had been sexually abused.
    The medical examination showed that the second child had been
    sexually abused vaginally and anally.   The oldest child was
    characterized as being aggressive, "fail[ing] to comply in the
    classroom" and as "a very angry young man."   He was also
    described as having "sexualized behaviors" such as "sexual talk"
    and "knowledge."
    To prevent removal, Lewis was offered various services,
    including homebuilder services, child protective services, a
    referral to individual counseling, medication management and a
    parenting skills class.   Since Lewis could not assure the
    children's safety in her home, however, DSS removed the children
    from her custody on October 24, 1996 and placed them into three
    separate foster homes.
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    In December of 1996, DSS designed a foster care plan for
    Lewis and the children.    The plan called for her to obtain
    full-time employment, attend the Fresh Start program, complete
    parenting classes, undergo individual counseling and a
    psychological evaluation, make her home safe by removing other
    adults from the home, secure independent housing and learn how
    to provide necessary medications as directed.    The goal of the
    plan was for the children to be returned home.
    Baker was released from prison in February of 1997, secured
    part-time employment with a landscaping company and moved into a
    residence with Lewis.    Although the service plan referred only
    to Lewis, Baker appeared in the juvenile court on September 11,
    1997, and indicated that he had no objection to the foster care
    plan.    In the meantime, Baker had supervised and unsupervised
    visitation rights with his children.
    In February of 1998, the goal of the foster care plan was
    changed to adoption based on the parents' failure to establish
    appropriate housing over the previous one and a half years,
    Lewis' inability to protect the children from future abuse,
    Baker's failure to complete any item listed in the initial
    service plan, the parents' failure to address the issues leading
    to the removal of their children, Lewis' inability to set limits
    and interact with her children during visits and Baker's
    infrequent visits since his release from jail.
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    In April of 1998, Baker attended two classes on the
    traumatic effects of sexual abuse on children and one counseling
    session with a mental health therapist.   Baker attended eight of
    the nine weekly basic parenting classes between August 25, 1998
    and October 20, 1998.   Georgette Cromartie, the teacher of the
    basic parenting classes, testified that Baker's score on a
    parenting skills test improved from forty-two percent prior to
    the class to seventy percent after completion of the class.     She
    also noted, however, that any score less than eighty percent was
    not a passing grade and was cause for concern.   During the nine
    weeks of classes, Cromartie told her students that anyone not
    scoring an eighty percent on the post-test needed to retake the
    class, and she testified that the client was responsible for
    making the arrangements for taking the class again.    When Baker
    received his score, Cromartie told him that she was not finished
    working with him.   Baker did not retake the class.
    Mental health therapist Florence Duke provided counseling
    to Baker and Lewis but testified that Baker did not undergo any
    of the evaluations required under the foster care plans.   Baker
    told her that he could not afford to comply with the
    requirements.   Dr. Susan Rosebro, the counselor who conducted a
    parent competency evaluation of Lewis, testified, however, that
    funding was provided for that evaluation and that Baker failed
    to contact her.   Furthermore, Baker did not attend the Fresh
    Start program as required by DSS's service plan.
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    DSS had concerns about Baker's ability to provide care and
    protection of his children.   Mary Elizabeth McGhee, the
    children's counselor since November of 1996, testified that she
    would be concerned for their welfare if they were in an
    environment of inadequate supervision or structure and that the
    children were making progress in their current living
    situations.   Cromartie testified that the children needed a safe
    and stable environment, and she expressed concern that Baker and
    Lewis resided with "someone that they didn't know the name of."
    The children's high level of needs further required that their
    care provider have a high level of parenting skills and a highly
    structured environment, neither of which, in DSS's opinion,
    Baker could provide.
    At the February 3, 1999 hearing, Baker was employed full
    time with health and dental benefits for the children, but there
    was no evidence that stable housing was obtained.    Baker and
    Lewis were evicted in September 1998 for nonpayment of rent.     At
    the time of the hearing, the couple was renting a bedroom in a
    house from a woman and her adult godson.
    II.   SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE
    Pursuant to Code § 16.1-283(B)(2), the parental rights of
    parents of abused children may be terminated if the court finds
    by clear and convincing evidence that, inter alia, it is not
    reasonably likely that the conditions which resulted in the
    neglect or abuse can be substantially corrected or eliminated so
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    as to allow the children's safe return to their parents within a
    reasonable period of time.    Proof that "[t]he parent or parents,
    without good cause, have not responded to or followed through
    with appropriate, available and reasonable rehabilitative
    efforts on the part of social, medical, mental health or other
    rehabilitative agencies designed to reduce, eliminate or prevent
    the neglect or abuse" is prima facie evidence of the conditions
    set out in Code § 16.1-283(B)(2).    Code § 16.1-283(B)(2)(c).
    "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
    termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the
    paramount consideration of a trial court is the child's best
    interests."   Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    , 128, 
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 463 (1991).    "In matters of a
    child's welfare, trial courts are vested with broad discretion
    in making the decisions necessary to guard and to foster a
    child's best interests."     Farley v. Farley, 
    9 Va. App. 326
    , 328,
    
    387 S.E.2d 794
    , 795 (1990).    In making its determination, the
    trial court must remember that
    the termination of the legal relationship
    between parent and child is a grave
    proceeding. A court order terminating
    parental rights renders the parent "a legal
    stranger to the child" and severs "all
    parental rights." Shank v. Dept. of Social
    Services, 
    217 Va. 506
    , 509, 
    230 S.E.2d 454
    ,
    457 (1976). [The Supreme Court of
    Virginia's] prior decisions clearly indicate
    a respect for the natural bond between
    children and their natural parents. The
    preservation of the family, and in
    particular the parent-child relationship, is
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    an important goal for not only the parents
    but also the government itself. While it
    may be occasionally necessary to sever the
    legal relationship between parent and child,
    those circumstances are rare. Statutes
    terminating the legal relationship between
    parent and child should be interpreted
    consistently with the governmental objective
    of preserving, when possible, the
    parent-child relationship.
    Weaver v. Roanoke Dept. of Human Res., 
    220 Va. 921
    , 926, 
    265 S.E.2d 692
    , 695 (1980).
    On appeal, we presume that the trial court "thoroughly
    weighed all the evidence, considered the statutory requirements,
    and made its determination based on the child's best interests."
    Farley, 9 Va. App. at 329, 
    387 S.E.2d at 796
    .    We view the
    decision in the light most favorable to DSS as the party
    prevailing below, and its evidence is afforded all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.    See Logan, 13 Va. App.
    at 128, 
    409 S.E.2d at 463
    .   The trial court's judgment, "'when
    based on evidence heard ore tenus, will not be disturbed on
    appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to support it.'"
    
    Id.
     (citation omitted).
    This record clearly demonstrates that the children had
    special needs because of their history of abuse and required a
    greater amount of supervision.    According to the testimony of
    the children's counselor, to meet the needs of all three
    children, Baker and Lewis would have to maintain a highly
    structured and supervised environment, support and cooperate
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    with the children's counselors and teachers, support the
    children socially, firmly set limits with respect to the
    children's behavior, support the children in the area of sexual
    development and become involved in school activities.    The goal
    of DSS's initial foster care plan was to return the children to
    their parents.    Among other requirements, the parents were to
    take a parenting skills class, make their home safe for the
    children by removing other adults from the home, attend
    individual counseling, and obtain full-time employment and
    independent housing.
    Although Baker was released from prison in February of
    1997, when the foster care plan's goal changed to adoption in
    February of 1998, he had not yet complied with any of the plan's
    requirements.    While Baker eventually took a sufficient number
    of parenting skills classes, the evidence revealed that he
    failed to achieve a passing score on the post-test and did not
    retake the class when it was made clear to him that he should.
    Baker did not undergo any of the evaluations required under the
    foster care plans because he claimed that he could not afford
    them.    Dr. Rosebro, however, testified that funding was
    available.    Neither parent completed the Fresh Start program as
    prescribed by the service plan.
    The record also demonstrates that Baker and Lewis were
    unable to provide both the necessary support and structured
    environment their children need.    The parents failed to address
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    the issues that led to the removal of their children.    With
    respect to Lewis, Dr. Rosebro questioned her ability to protect
    her children from future abuse.    Furthermore, Baker visited his
    children "on a very limited basis" since his release from
    prison.   Finally, although Baker was employed full time when the
    hearing occurred, there was no evidence that the parents had
    obtained stable housing.    Baker and Lewis had been evicted in
    September of 1998 for nonpayment of rent from a home where they
    resided with people whom they did not know.    By the February
    hearing, Lewis testified that she and Baker rented a bedroom in
    the house of an older woman and her adult godson.   Baker and
    Lewis did not know the godson.
    Based upon all of the information available to DSS, it was
    concerned that the children would not be protected any better on
    February 11, 1998 than they had been in October of 1996.    The
    children were reported to have made "remarkable" progress in the
    foster care system and advancements had been made in the areas
    of behavioral modification and sexual behavior and that
    heightened parenting skills were necessary to maintain this
    progress.   It was further reported that the children continue to
    be "high needs" children.   The children's counselor testified
    that the children's behavioral problems have improved with
    counseling and that their social skills are improving.
    It is noteworthy that Baker does not attack the findings
    that the children were neglected and abused.   Nor does he deny
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    that such neglect and abuse "present[s] a serious and
    substantial threat to [their] li[v]e[s], health or development."
    Code § 16.1-283(B)(1).   Baker only argues that the proof fails
    to show that it is not reasonably likely that the condition that
    resulted in the neglect and abuse was not substantially
    corrected or eliminated so as to allow their safe return to his
    custody.   The evidence clearly and convincingly demonstrates
    otherwise.
    Finding no error, the order of the trial court terminating
    Baker's parental rights is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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