Eric Lin Harris v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Elder and Bray
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
ERIC LIN HARRIS
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 0909-99-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
MARCH 7, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF HAMPTON
Christopher W. Hutton, Judge
(David B. Olson; Cope, Olson & Yoffy, on
brief), for appellant. Appellant submitting
on brief.
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Stephen R.
McCullough, Assistant Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee. Appellee submitting on
brief.
Eric Lin Harris (appellant) was convicted in a bench trial
of possession with intent to distribute cocaine, in violation of
Code § 18.2-248, and possession of a firearm while in possession
of cocaine, in violation of Code § 18.2-308.4. The sole issue
raised on appeal is whether the Commonwealth sufficiently
established that the evidence was received by "an authorized
agent" of the Division of Forensic Science within the meaning of
Code § 19.2-187.01. For the following reasons, we affirm.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the prevailing party
below, granting to that evidence all reasonable inferences
fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v. Commonwealth, 26 Va.
App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997). So viewed, the
evidence established that on September 21, 1998, appellant was
stopped by Officer J. Wideman (Wideman) on several traffic
violations. In a search incident to his arrest, Wideman found a
firearm and 12.963 grams of suspected cocaine on appellant's
person. After seizing the evidence from appellant, Wideman
placed a tag on it, wrote appellant's name on the tag and
assigned case number "9812788" to it. Wideman wrote this same
information inside the bag containing the evidence and sealed
the bag. Appellant was charged with possession with intent to
distribute cocaine and possession of a firearm while in
possession of cocaine.
At trial, the Commonwealth presented the testimony of
Ronnie Staton (Staton), a property and evidence representative
for the Hampton Police Department, to establish the chain of
custody of the contraband seized during appellant's arrest.
Staton testified that after receiving the evidence from Wideman,
he marked and packaged the suspected bag of cocaine and on
September 24, 1998, he transported it to the forensic laboratory
for analysis. Staton took the cocaine and "tagged it in Norfolk
under [forensic lab number] T989734." He also testified that he
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kept the item in his personal possession until the time he
"deposited it at the lab" and that no other person had access to
this evidence. The certificate of analysis, which confirmed
that the evidence was cocaine, reflected the same case number
"98-12788" assigned by Wideman and the same forensic lab number
"T98-9734" assigned by Staton. No evidence of tampering was
presented.
On appeal, appellant argues that the Commonwealth failed to
prove that the contraband seized by Wideman and held by Staton
was ever received by an "authorized agent" of the laboratory as
required by Code § 19.2-187.01. That section provides in part:
A report of analysis duly attested by the
person performing such analysis or
examination in any laboratory . . . shall be
prima facie evidence in a criminal . . .
proceeding as to the custody of the material
described therein from the time such
material is received by an authorized agent
of such laboratory until such material is
released subsequent to such analysis or
examination. Any such certificate of
analysis purporting to be signed by any such
person shall be admissible as evidence in
such hearing or trial without any proof of
the seal or signature or of the official
character of the person whose name is signed
to it. The signature of the person who
received the material for the laboratory on
the request for laboratory examination form
shall be deemed prima facie evidence that
the person receiving the material was an
authorized agent and that such receipt
constitutes proper receipt by the laboratory
for purposes of this section.
Code § 19.2-187.01 (emphasis added). This section "relieves the
Commonwealth of having to present testimony regarding the chain
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of custody of an analyzed or examined substance, provided
certain safeguards are met." Dunn v. Commonwealth, 20 Va. App.
217, 220, 456 S.E.2d 135, 136 (1995).
Assuming, without deciding, that the Commonwealth was
required to prove that the evidence was received by an
"authorized agent" within the meaning of Code § 19.2-187.01, we
conclude that any error was harmless. Indeed, we have
previously held that "Code § 19.2-187.01 does not 'specifically
require' the Commonwealth to identify the recipient only through
a 'request for laboratory examination form.' The agency
relationship may be established by other evidence." Harshaw v.
Commonwealth, 16 Va. App. 69, 72, 427 S.E.2d 733, 736 (1993).
In the instant case, Officer Wideman noted his name, a case
number unique to the case, and appellant's name on the sealed
envelope containing the seized contraband. Staton testified
that he marked his name and the date on the envelope containing
the drugs and that no other person had access to the evidence
between the time he received the evidence and when he deposited
it to the laboratory. Additionally, the certificate of analysis
bears the same unique case number as that affixed by Wideman and
the same unique lab number as that assigned by Staton.
Because the Commonwealth established that the evidence
submitted was the same evidence as that tested by the laboratory
and that it had not been altered, substituted or contaminated
prior to testing, any lack of proof regarding the identity of
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the "authorized agent" at the laboratory who received the
evidence was harmless. See Code § 19.2-187 (by presenting a
duly attested certificate of analysis, the Commonwealth
establishes its prima facie evidence of chain of custody); Crews
v. Commonwealth, 18 Va. App. 115, 120, 442 S.E.2d 407, 409
(1994) (no break in the chain of custody where evidence was
mailed in a sealed envelope to the forensic laboratory);
Harshaw, 16 Va. App. at 72, 427 S.E.2d at 736 (no break in chain
of custody where the arresting officer hand-delivered the
evidence to an individual at the laboratory who assigned the
case numbers); see also Dunn, 20 Va. App. at 222-23, 456 S.E.2d
at 137-38 (no break in the chain of custody where the evidence
was transferred between laboratories). For the foregoing
reasons, appellant's convictions are affirmed.
Affirmed.
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