Mary E. Jackson v. Richmond DSS ( 1999 )


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  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Coleman and Bray
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    MARY E. JACKSON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 0226-99-2                 JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    DECEMBER 28, 1999
    RICHMOND DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SERVICES
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF RICHMOND
    Randall G. Johnson, Judge
    (Robert W. Carll, on brief), for appellant.
    Appellant submitting on brief.
    Alexandra Silva, Assistant City Attorney;
    Robin M. Morgan, Guardian ad litem for the
    minor child (Office of the City Attorney, on
    brief), for appellee.
    Mary Jackson appeals from a decision terminating her parental
    rights of her daughter, Ruth Jackson.    The issue on appeal is
    whether the evidence is sufficient to meet the clear and
    convincing standard required for termination of parental rights
    under Code § 16.1-283(C).   We find that the evidence is sufficient
    and affirm the trial court's ruling terminating Mary Jackson's
    residual parental rights.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    BACKGROUND
    In January 1995, approximately a week after her birth, Ruth
    Jackson was removed from her parents' custody due to concerns
    raised by hospital personnel.    Several days later, Ruth Jackson
    was placed back in the custody of her parents, with legal custody
    remaining with the Richmond Department of Social Services (DSS)
    until March 1995.    In July 1995, Ruth was again removed from her
    parents' custody because of allegations that she was abused and
    neglected.    At that time, Ruth's father, Harold Jackson, was
    hospitalized for a gunshot wound received during a drive-by
    shooting.    Mary Jackson had been hospitalized several times for
    mental health problems, and she did not have a permanent
    residence.   The juvenile court returned Ruth to her parents'
    custody, but ordered stabilization services to prevent future
    removals from the home.
    In the ensuing months, Mary Jackson was repeatedly
    hospitalized for psychiatric problems and she was still unable to
    maintain a permanent residence.    During this period, Harold and
    Mary Jackson would occasionally live together at friends' homes or
    hotels.   DSS encouraged and assisted Mary Jackson in moving to
    Norfolk, where her mother could assist her with caring for Ruth.
    Mary Jackson, however, stayed in Norfolk for only six days before
    returning to Richmond.
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    On April 24, 1996, Ruth was again removed from her mother's
    custody based on allegations that Mary Jackson was unable to care
    for Ruth.   In May 1996, Janet Kramer, Ruth's foster care worker,
    counseled Mary Jackson on various things she should do in order to
    regain custody of her daughter.   Kramer recommended that Mary
    Jackson establish a stable residence, obtain full-time employment,
    and obtain a psychological evaluation.   While living in Virginia,
    the Jacksons lived at twelve different locations.   Despite being
    advised to move to Richmond where services could be provided and
    where the Jacksons would have access to the Richmond Mental Health
    facility, Harold Jackson indicated that he preferred to live in
    Chesterfield County.    In June 1997, the couple moved to
    Pennsylvania.   Mary Jackson did not avail herself of the referral
    by DSS to assist the Jacksons in obtaining housing, employment, or
    a psychological evaluation.
    When Ruth was placed in foster care in April 1996, she was
    dirty, had head lice, and was withdrawn.   She has been diagnosed
    with having Attention Deficit Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD).      Ruth
    is a very active child, and she is more difficult to care for than
    the average child.    She attends a special needs school and is
    enrolled in an early childhood development program.
    From April 1996 until June 1998, Mary Jackson had supervised
    visits with Ruth.    Until Mary Jackson moved to Pennsylvania in
    June 1997, she visited Ruth at least once per month; after Mary
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    Jackson moved, she visited Ruth once in September 1997, once in
    October 1997, once in February 1998, and once in May 1998.     During
    the visits, Ruth did not appear to bond with her mother.   She
    would cry when Mary Jackson tried to hold her and seemed to be
    fearful of Mary Jackson.   The Jacksons would frequently telephone
    Ruth at her foster parents' home to check on her and to talk with
    her.
    Howard Rosen, Ph.D., a licensed psychologist, conducted a
    psychological evaluation of Mary Jackson on April 9, 1998.     He
    diagnosed her with schizophrenia, dependent personality disorder,
    and a history of alcohol abuse.   Dr. Rosen stated that Mary
    Jackson was deficient in identifying critical issues of children's
    feelings and presenting adequate solutions to problems.
    Dr. Rosen also stated that, although she exhibited some "good"
    parenting skills while in a controlled environment with support,
    her parenting skills deteriorated rapidly when the child became
    "fussy."   Dr. Rosen predicted that if she were to care for Ruth,
    who had ADHD, Mary Jackson's schizophrenia would "escalate."     He
    concluded that without substantial community supports, Mary
    Jackson is incapable of safely or adequately parenting a child.
    ANALYSIS
    "When addressing matters concerning a child, including the
    termination of a parent's residual parental rights, the paramount
    consideration of a trial court is the child's best interests."
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    Logan v. Fairfax County Dep't of Human Dev., 
    13 Va. App. 123
    , 128,
    
    409 S.E.2d 460
    , 463 (1991).   Where the trial court hears the
    evidence ore tenus, its decision is entitled to great weight and
    will not be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without
    evidence to support it.   See Lowe v. Department of Pub. Welfare,
    
    231 Va. 277
    , 282, 
    343 S.E.2d 70
    , 73 (1986).
    Code § 16.1-283(C)(2) provides that the parental rights of a
    child placed in foster care may be terminated if the court finds
    by clear and convincing evidence that it is in the best interests
    of the child and that:
    [t]he parent . . . , without good cause,
    [has] been unwilling or unable within a
    reasonable period not to exceed twelve
    months from the date the child was placed in
    foster care to remedy substantially the
    conditions which led to or required
    continuation of the child's foster care
    placement, notwithstanding the reasonable
    and appropriate efforts of social, medical,
    mental health or other rehabilitative
    agencies to such end. Proof that the parent
    . . . without good cause, [has] failed or
    been unable to make substantial progress
    towards elimination of the conditions which
    led to or required continuation of the
    child's foster care placement in accordance
    with [the parent's] obligations under and
    within the time limits or goals set forth in
    a foster care plan filed with the court
    . . . shall constitute prima facie evidence
    of this condition.
    "'[T]he rights of parents may not be lightly severed but are
    to be respected if at all consonant with the best interests of
    the child.'"   Ward v. Faw, 
    219 Va. 1120
    , 1124, 
    253 S.E.2d 658
    ,
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    661 (1979) (quoting Malpass v. Morgan, 
    213 Va. 393
    , 400, 
    192 S.E.2d 794
    , 799 (1972)).   The termination of parental rights is a
    grave, drastic, and irreversible action.   When a court orders
    termination of parental rights, the ties between the parent and
    child are severed forever and the parent becomes "'a legal
    stranger to the child.'"   Lowe, 231 Va. at 280, 
    343 S.E.2d at 72
    (quoting Shank v. Department of Soc. Servs., 
    217 Va. 506
    , 509, 
    230 S.E.2d 454
    , 457 (1976)).
    The trial court found that Mary Jackson has severe mental
    health problems, including schizophrenia and dependent personality
    disorder.   The trial court further found that she failed to follow
    through with treatment plans and that even assuming she did comply
    with the mental health care providers' treatment plans, she is
    unable to adequately provide for Ruth's well-being.
    Despite the social services provided, Mary Jackson did not
    follow through with the recommendations of the social worker.    By
    her own admission, she suffers from schizophrenia and has been
    hospitalized more than twenty times.   She has been unable to
    consistently follow through with recommendations and treatment
    plans provided by mental health care providers.   In 1996, at the
    request of mental health personnel at one of the treatment
    facilities, Mary Jackson was placed in an adult home, but she fled
    from the home twice, stating that she needed her "freedom."     Her
    mental health problems contribute to her inability to successfully
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    parent Ruth, and it is unlikely that the problems will abate in
    the future given her inability to maintain a treatment program.
    Further, she failed to present any evidence that her mental health
    condition is improving.
    The record indicates that Ruth Jackson is doing well in
    foster care where she has been since April 1996.    She is being
    treated for ADHD and is attending a special needs school.    Ruth's
    foster parents actively seek community services to assist her.
    She is receiving medical treatment for mood liability,
    distractibility, and impulsiveness.
    Ruth was in foster care for nearly four years, while Mary
    Jackson was unable or unwilling to cooperate with the agencies
    seeking to assist her.    She has not demonstrated that she is
    willing or able to remedy within twelve months the conditions that
    led to Ruth being placed in foster care or shown good cause for
    her failure or inability to do so.     "It is clearly not in the best
    interests of a child to spend a lengthy period of time waiting to
    find out when, or even if, a parent will be capable of resuming
    his responsibilities."    Kaywood v. Halifax County Dep't of Soc.
    Servs., 
    10 Va. App. 535
    , 540, 
    394 S.E.2d 492
    , 495 (1990).
    The trial court's finding that the termination of Mary
    Jackson's residual parental rights was in Ruth Jackson's best
    interest and the court's finding that DSS presented clear and
    convincing evidence to meet the requirement of Code
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    § 16.1-283(C)(2) was supported by the record.   Accordingly, we
    affirm the decision.
    Affirmed.
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