Phillip Ashby Mitchell v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Annunziata
Argued at Chesapeake, Virginia
PHILLIP ASHBY MITCHELL
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 2313-98-1 CHIEF JUDGE JOHANNA L. FITZPATRICK
NOVEMBER 16, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF NEWPORT NEWS
Randolph T. West, Judge
Jeffrey C. Rountree for appellant.
Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney
General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
brief), for appellee.
Phillip Ashby Mitchell (appellant) was convicted on
March 13, 1998, of two counts of embezzlement and one count of
grand larceny by false pretenses. The trial court sentenced
appellant to three ten-year terms and suspended all of the time
imposed. At a subsequent revocation hearing, the trial court
revoked all of the suspended sentences but suspended nine years
of the ten years previously imposed on each count. On appeal,
appellant argues the trial court abused its discretion in
revoking part of his suspended sentences. Finding no error, we
affirm.
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
I.
Under familiar principles of appellate review, we examine
the evidence in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth,
the prevailing party below, granting to it all reasonable
inferences fairly deducible therefrom. See Juares v.
Commonwealth, 26 Va. App. 154, 156, 493 S.E.2d 677, 678 (1997).
So viewed, the evidence established that on March 13, 1998,
appellant pled guilty to two counts of embezzlement and one
count of grand larceny by false pretenses. On each count, the
trial court sentenced appellant to ten years imprisonment, all
of which was suspended. In addition to imposing one year of
supervised probation, the trial court ordered appellant to make
restitution in the amount of $5,000 to Charles and Kathleen
Johnson, $6,000 to Michael and Lori Stephenson, and $10,495 to
James B. Majka. Restitution was to be made by May 18, 1998.
On May 20, 1998, the Commonwealth filed a motion to revoke
appellant's suspended sentences because he had failed to make
restitution as required. Additionally, Douglas Weeks (Weeks),
appellant's probation officer, filed a Major Violation Report,
noting that appellant failed to obey the laws of the
Commonwealth by unlawfully displaying vehicles for sale without
a license. The report also charged that appellant "continued to
commit Fraud" in that he has "sold vehicles and has failed to
pay the owner's (sic) as stated in the contract."
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At appellant's May 26, 1998 revocation hearing, appellant
stipulated to the violations alleged in the probation officer's
report. Appellant's counsel gave the court restitution checks
for each of the victims in accordance with the court's prior
sentencing order. Additionally, appellant indicated that, upon
his release from jail, he had arranged to begin a job as a
salesman for a local radio station.
Although appellant stipulated to the violations alleged by
his probation officer, and the trial court could have revoked
appellant's suspended sentence at that time, the trial court
gave appellant another opportunity to pay off his outstanding
debts to parties that were not the subject of the instant
offenses. The revocation hearing was continued to July 7, 1998,
thus allowing appellant additional time to provide the court
with "a breakdown of everything that he agrees to that he has
defrauded people out of and what he intends to do about it, on
what schedule, etc." (i.e., to show that he was of "good
behavior").
On July 7, 1998, appellant presented the trial court a list
of outstanding debts owed to different victims. At that
hearing, the trial court learned that appellant never began the
job at the radio station and that he was now employed by
Terminix. Since the new position involved appellant going to
the homes of potential customers and recommending that certain
work be completed, the trial court was concerned that appellant
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might attempt to defraud customers to increase his commissions.
Accordingly, the trial court required appellant to return on
September 9, 1998 with a different job. Appellant was also
ordered to provide proof that substantial payment had been made
on his outstanding debts.
On September 9, 1998, appellant reported that he had gotten
a new job at Haynes Furniture. When asked whether he had made
any restitution payments to Sharon Richardson (Richardson) and
Marvin Whitmore (Whitmore), appellant presented the trial court
with copies of two cashier's check stubs as proof that payment
had been made to these parties. However, the stubs also
indicated that the checks were made out to "Mitchell Auto
Sales," appellant's business. Unclear as to whether appellant
actually paid the victims, the trial court stated, "I am tired
of playing with this. I have bent over backwards and I'm not
getting the results that I want. Every time it's something
different. Who did this money go to?" Appellant unequivocally
stated that both Richardson and Whitmore received the checks.
The court again continued the hearing to the next day to
verify whether the victims had been paid. At that hearing, Ms.
Richardson testified that she received no monies or check from
appellant. Appellant's probation officer, Mr. Weeks, confirmed
with the First Advantage Federal Credit Union that the two
cashier's checks, payable to "Mitchell Auto Sales or Sharon
Richardson" and "Mitchell Auto Sales or Marvin Whitmore," were
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cashed and deposited into appellant's business bank account.
The Commonwealth also introduced into evidence two handwritten
notes, in which appellant pleaded with the victims to "work with
[him]" regarding the restitution payments. 1
Appellant then testified, stating that he was sorry for
what he had done. He stated that he used the cashier's checks
to keep his house out of foreclosure, and appellant admitted
that he did not pay the victims, despite his prior testimony
that he had paid them. Appellant testified as follows:
Q. You were supposed to be in here
yesterday to give proof of payment of
restitution to Ms. Richardson and Mr.
Whitemore, correct?
A. Yes, sir.
1
The letter to Ms. Richardson, which was delivered to her
residence by appellant on September 8, 1998, stated the following:
I am doing everything with in (sic) my power
to get a loan so that I can pay your money.
This was supposed to have been mail[ed] one
day last week but I understand that it
wasn't until [S]unday. I am trying three
[d]ifferent [p]laces to borrow money. I
really want to pay you. I am trying hard to
get your money. Mr. Weeks will probably be
calling you to see if you received this.
Please work with me. Thank you.
The letter to Mr. Whitmore made a similar plea, stating the
following:
You will be receiving this [check] just as
soon as we get your last name spell (sic)
right. I have a [p]robation officer that
will be calling you by the name of Mr.
Weeks. He will be asking you if you
received this [check] yet. I wish you
wouldn't have to talk to him. . . . He is
trying to put me in jail.
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Q. And as part of that proof, you gave the
Judge those check stubs?
* * * * * * *
A. From what I understood, cashier's, yes.
Q. But the money didn't go to Ms.
Richardson or Mr. Whitmore?
A. That's why I went out there yesterday.
I was going to have proof this morning.
Q. That money did not go to them?
A. No, sir.
Q. You were lying to the Court?
A. Sir, I was going to try to straighten it
out yesterday.
Q. You were lying to the Court?
A. Not my intention, sir.
Ms. Richardson was called again to the stand to confirm that
appellant had not paid her any money.
At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial court revoked
appellant's suspended sentences. The trial judge stated:
Mr. Mitchell, this court, the
Commonwealth and everyone else has bent over
backwards trying to get this matter
straightened out so that you could stay out
of jail. . . . As I pointed out a moment
ago, from the day this Court found you
guilty of [the charges], I set the case down
for sentencing, you walked out of this court
and perpetrated the same identical offense,
knowing that you were coming back before
this Court for sentencing. . . . You have
done nothing but lie to this Court day in
and day out, every time you have been in
here, and I don't even think the truth is
within you. . . .
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There's nothing this Court can do for
you and I think it's time you started paying
society.
I'm granting the motion to revoke on
all three indictments. . . .
Although the trial court revoked the suspended sentences of ten
years on all three counts, the court re-suspended nine years on
each count for a period of ten years and imposed two years of
supervised probation or "until all debts and court costs have
been repaid, whichever is later."
II.
Pursuant to its authority under Code § 19.2-306, "[t]he
court may, for any cause deemed by it sufficient within the
probation period, . . . revoke the suspension of sentence."
Code § 19.2-306 (emphasis added). "A revocation . . . must be
based on reasonable cause but a court has broad discretion in
making such a determination." Resio v. Commonwealth, 29 Va.
App. 616, 621, 513 S.E.2d 892, 895 (1999) (quoting Patterson v.
Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 1046, 1048, 407 S.E.2d 43, 44 (1991)).
"To put the matter another way, the sufficiency of the evidence
to sustain . . . revocation is a matter within the sound
discretion of the trial court, . . . reversible only upon a
clear showing of an abuse of such discretion." Id. (quoting
Slayton v. Commonwealth, 185 Va. 357, 367, 38 S.E.2d 479, 484
(1946)); see also Holden v. Commonwealth, 27 Va. App. 38, 41,
497 S.E.2d 492, 493 (1998).
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The evidence clearly established that appellant violated
the conditions of his probation. Appellant (1) failed to make
timely restitution payments to the three victims defrauded in
the underlying convictions; (2) continued to fraudulently obtain
money from other individuals, thus violating a condition of his
suspended sentences that he obey the laws of the Commonwealth;
and (3) lied to the court. See Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va.
App. 570, 574, 405 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1991) ("Deceit,
untruthfulness and deception . . . are always grounds for
revoking a suspended sentence."). Accordingly, we conclude that
the trial court did not abuse its discretion in revoking
appellant's suspended sentences. 2 The judgment of the trial
court is affirmed.
Affirmed.
2
Appellant also argues that the trial court did not have the
authority to order restitution in any cases not pending before the
court and, therefore, the failure to pay Richardson or Whitmore
was an improper factor to consider in revoking his suspended
sentences. However, appellant did not raise this issue before the
trial court and his claim is barred on appeal. See Rule 5A:18;
Connelly v. Commonwealth, 14 Va. App. 888, 891, 420 S.E.2d 244,
246 (1992) ("A matter not in dispute before the trial court will
not be considered for the first time on appeal."); Martin v.
Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 524, 530, 414 S.E.2d 401, 404 (1992)
("The primary function of Rule 5A:18 is to alert the trial judge
to possible error so that the judge may consider the issue
intelligently and take any corrective actions necessary to avoid
unnecessary appeals, reversals and mistrials.").
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