Edmund Steven Hardman v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 2000 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Bumgardner
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    EDMUND STEVEN HARDMAN
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1878-99-3             JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    MAY 16, 2000
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF LYNCHBURG
    Mosby G. Perrow, III, Judge
    David E. Wright, Assistant Public Defender,
    for appellant.
    H. Elizabeth Shaffer, Assistant Attorney
    General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on
    brief), for appellee.
    After a bench trial, the trial court convicted Edmund
    Steven Hardman of possession with intent to distribute cocaine,
    possession with intent to distribute marijuana, and possession
    of a firearm while possessing a controlled substance in
    violation of Code §§ 18.2-248, -248.1, and -308.4.   The
    defendant contends the trial court erred in admitting statements
    he made to a police officer who had not informed him of his
    rights under Miranda v. Arizona, 
    384 U.S. 436
     (1966).      Assuming
    the trial court erred, we find the error harmless beyond a
    reasonable doubt.
    * Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
    § 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
    The evidence viewed in the light most favorable to the
    Commonwealth established that Officer H.W. Duff went to the
    defendant's apartment at 12:38 a.m. to investigate a traffic
    accident.   Two plainclothes officers accompanied Duff.     The
    defendant answered the door and let the officers enter when they
    acknowledged that they were inquiring "about the car."      The
    defendant's girlfriend, Christy Stevens, and one other person
    were present when the officers entered.
    Upon entering the living room, Duff noticed a partially
    smoked marijuana blunt.   The defendant admitted he had smoked it
    earlier that day, but when Duff asked to search the apartment,
    the defendant refused to give consent.      Duff went to get a
    search warrant, leaving the other officers at the apartment.
    They asked the occupants to remain in the living room because
    they were under investigation.    The officers did not draw
    weapons or handcuff the occupants.       When Duff returned around
    2:45 a.m. with the search warrant, three or four uniformed
    officers had already arrived to assist.
    As the officers began the search, the defendant said he
    needed to use the bathroom.    Duff insisted on accompanying him
    and remained within four feet of the defendant.      While still in
    the bathroom, Duff asked the defendant if he had anything in the
    apartment he wanted to tell the officer about.      The defendant
    replied, "[H]e had a .380 caliber semi-automatic pistol in the
    bedroom for his protection."   Duff asked the defendant if he had
    - 2 -
    any marijuana or cocaine, and the defendant replied that he had
    about a half ounce of marijuana in the bedroom.     The defendant
    admitted that he sold marijuana but denied selling cocaine.
    Assuming the trial court erred, we consider whether the
    error was harmless.    In order for an error to be harmless, "'the
    court must be able to declare a belief that the error was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'"      Dearing v. Commonwealth,
    
    259 Va. 117
    , 123, 
    524 S.E.2d 121
    , 124 (2000) (quoting Chapman v.
    California, 
    386 U.S. 18
    , 24 (1967)).      "'[A]n otherwise valid
    conviction should not be set aside if the reviewing court can
    confidently say, on the whole record, that the constitutional
    error was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.'"      
    Id. at 123
    , 
    524 S.E.2d at 125
     (citations omitted).      In determining whether the
    error was harmless, the court must consider several factors,
    including "the importance of the tainted evidence in the
    prosecution's case, whether the evidence was cumulative, the
    presence or absence of evidence corroborating or contradicting
    the tainted evidence on material points, and, of course, the
    overall strength of the prosecution's case."      Lilly v.
    Commonwealth, 
    258 Va. 548
    , 551, 
    523 S.E.2d 208
    , 209 (1999)
    (citations omitted).
    Applying these principles, we find the error in admitting
    the defendant's statements was harmless beyond a reasonable
    doubt.   The defendant consented to the officers entering his
    apartment and admitted he smoked marijuana earlier that day.
    - 3 -
    Duff obtained a warrant to search the apartment for contraband.
    When Duff questioned the defendant, officers were lawfully
    executing the warrant.    The defendant's statements pointed to
    evidence the officers would discover during the search and added
    little to a very strong case.
    The apartment contained two bedrooms, but only one was
    used.    In that bedroom, the officers found statements from a
    joint bank account that the defendant shared with Stevens.
    Under the bed, they recovered a .38 caliber semi-automatic
    handgun, and on the closet floor, they found the bullets.      The
    officers also found marijuana under the mattress.      The officers
    pried open two safes found in the bedroom when the defendant
    refused to furnish keys.    One safe contained marijuana and $522.
    Two wooden boxes contained bags of cocaine and $874.      In the
    kitchen, the officers found digital scales, razor blades and
    knives with cocaine residue, and plastic bags.      In the living
    room, they found a police scanner.       The defendant had $590 in
    his sock.    In total, the officers recovered 70 grams of
    marijuana, 28.4 grams of cocaine, and $1,986 cash.
    Christy Stevens testified that she lived in the apartment
    with the defendant but neither the drugs nor the scales belonged
    to her.    The gun did not belong to her though she had seen it
    before.    She did not have a key to the defendant's safe nor was
    she aware of its contents.    Stevens stated that the defendant
    used the wooden boxes, but she had never looked into them.
    - 4 -
    The police properly acquired all the physical evidence by
    execution of a valid search warrant and independently of any
    tainted evidence.   Along with Christy Stevens' testimony, it
    conclusively established the defendant's guilt beyond a
    reasonable doubt.   Indeed, the trial court found that the
    evidence without the defendant's statements still proved the
    offenses beyond a reasonable doubt.    The trial court stated:
    I think the circumstantial evidence is
    overwhelming. Even without [the defendant's]
    statement to Officer Duff, [the defendant] is
    tied to that bedroom through the papers found
    there. The quantity of cocaine is in excess
    of $3,000 of street value. And not just the
    quantity of cocaine and marijuana alone,
    you’ve got the scales and all of the other
    paraphernalia or accoutrements of the drug
    trade in the house, and I think the evidence
    is overwhelming.
    Any error in admitting the defendant's statements was
    harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.    Accordingly, we affirm the
    convictions.
    Affirmed.
    - 5 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 1878993

Filed Date: 5/16/2000

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014