Mary Cassell Scott v. Frederic W. Scott, Jr. ( 1996 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bray and Fitzpatrick
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
MARY CASSELL SCOTT
v. Record No. 1587-95-2 MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
FREDERIC W. SCOTT, JR. APRIL 16, 1996
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE
F. Ward Harkrader, Jr., Judge
John K. Taggart, III (Patricia D. McGraw;
Tremblay & Smith, LLP, on briefs), for
appellant.
Ronald R. Tweel (Thomas J. Michie; Michie,
Hamlett, Lowry, Rasmussen & Tweel, P.C., on
brief), for appellee.
Incidental to divorce proceedings between Mary Cassell Scott
(wife) and Frederic W. Scott, Jr. (husband), the trial court
ruled that a disputed prenuptial agreement required equal
division of certain tangible personalty purchased with funds
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inherited by wife following the marriage. On appeal, wife
disputes this construction of the agreement. Finding no error,
we affirm the order of the trial court.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and we
recite only those facts necessary to a disposition of this
*
Pursuant to Code § 17-116.010 this opinion is not
designated for publication.
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The validity of this agreement is not an issue on appeal.
appeal.
Prenuptial agreements, like property settlement agreements,
are subject to the "same rules of interpretation applicable to
contracts generally." See Tiffany v. Tiffany, 1 Va. App. 11, 15,
332 S.E.2d 796, 799 (1985). On appeal, "the meaning and effect
of [a] contract is a question of law which can readily be
ascertained by this court," Fry v. Schwarting, 4 Va. App. 173,
180, 355 S.E.2d 342, 346 (1987), and "we are not bound by the
trial court's conclusions . . . ." Smith v. Smith, 3 Va. App.
510, 513, 351 S.E.2d 593, 595 (1986).
When the terms of a disputed provision are
clear and definite, it is axiomatic that they are to be
applied according to their ordinary meaning. Where
there is no ambiguity in the terms of a contract, we
must construe it as written, and . . . not . . . search
for the meaning . . . beyond the pertinent instrument
itself.
Id. at 514, 351 S.E.2d at 595-96 (citations omitted); see also
Frey v. Frey, 14 Va. App. 270, 275, 416 S.E.2d 40, 43 (1992).
"'[A]mbiguity exists when language admits of being understood in
more than one way or refers to two or more things at the same
time.'" Smith, 3 Va. App. at 513, 351 S.E.2d at 595 (citations
omitted). However, "[c]ontracts are not rendered ambiguous
merely because the parties disagree as to the meaning of the
language employed by them in expressing their agreement." Wilson
v. Holyfield, 227 Va. 184, 187, 313 S.E.2d 396, 398 (1984);
Smith, 3 Va. App. at 513-14, 351 S.E.2d at 595.
Here, article 1(a) of the agreement provides that
in the event of . . . legal separation or
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divorce:
(a) All house furniture and furnishings and
articles of household use or ornament
acquired after marriage (other than by
inheritance) shall be divided equally between
the parties with regard to . . . their
current appraised value . . . unless
otherwise agreed in writing at the time of
the purchase of a particular item.
Wife contends that the exclusion, "other than by inheritance,"
contemplated household articles whether inherited or acquired
with inherited funds. In support of her contention, wife urges
the Court to consider other provisions of the agreement which (1)
directed the disposition upon death of her interest in that
personalty described in article 1(a), (2) established the rights
of each party in the premarital separate property of the other,
and (3) acknowledged wife's "limited assets" and "expect[ed]
. . . inheritance."
However, we find the language of 1(a) unambiguous and the
court's construction consistent with the remainder of the
agreement. The provisions relied upon by wife simply resolved
certain property rights should wife predecease husband, declared
the rights of each party in their respective separate property
(expressly excepting such property "otherwise specifically
provided herein"), and recognized an expectancy of inheritance by
wife, all issues apart from those interests addressed by article
1(a) and not in conflict with its clear import.
We, therefore, find that the trial court correctly
ascertained and applied "the plain meaning of the words" of the
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agreement to equally divide the subject household effects,
exclusive only of those articles inherited by either party.
Accordingly, the order is affirmed.
Affirmed.
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