Charles Francis Carter v. Arlington Co. Fire Dpt ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Elder, Bumgardner and Lemons
CHARLES FRANCIS CARTER
MEMORANDUM OPINION ∗
v. Record No. 2394-98-4 PER CURIAM
APRIL 20, 1999
ARLINGTON COUNTY FIRE DEPARTMENT
FROM THE VIRGINIA WORKERS' COMPENSATION COMMISSION
(Charles Francis Carter, pro se, on briefs).
(Lisa A. Cay; Siciliano, Ellis, Dyer &
Boccarosse, on brief), for appellee.
Charles Francis Carter ("claimant") contends that the
Workers' Compensation Commission ("commission") erred in finding
that (1) he was not entitled to reimbursement for the cost of
air conditioning repairs to any vehicles other than his 1989
Plymouth Voyager; (2) he was not entitled to reimbursement for
interest and other out-of-pocket costs; (3) his request for
reimbursement for home air conditioning expenses was barred by
the doctrine of res judicata; and (4) he was not entitled to
reimbursement for certain mileage expenses. 1 Upon reviewing the
∗
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
this opinion is not designated for publication.
1
Claimant presented arguments and evidence in his thirty-five
page brief which were either not before the commission or are
irrelevant to the issues on appeal. We will only address those
issues decided by the commission in its September 11, 1998 review
opinion, and timely appealed by claimant.
record and the briefs of the parties, we conclude that this
appeal is without merit. Accordingly, we summarily affirm the
commission's decision. See Rule 5A:27.
On appeal, we view the evidence in the light most favorable
to the prevailing party below. See R.G. Moore Bldg. Corp. v.
Mullins, 10 Va. App. 211, 212, 390 S.E.2d 788, 788 (1990).
Unless we can say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence
sustained his burden of proof, the commission's findings are
binding and conclusive upon us. See Tomko v. Michael's
Plastering Co., 210 Va. 697, 699, 173 S.E.2d 833, 835 (1970).
I.
In denying claimant's request for reimbursement for the
cost of air conditioning repairs to vehicles other than his 1989
Plymouth Voyager, the commission found as follows:
Deputy Commissioner Bruner, in his
Opinion issued January 5, 1996, approved
such repairs only on a Plymouth van, which
the billing record shows to be a 1989
Plymouth Voyager. In these proceedings,
[claimant] asserted that Deputy Commissioner
Bruner's Opinion authorized repairs of all
his Plymouth vehicles, which is a
misinterpretation of that Opinion, as well
as of the Opinions issued on review and on
appeal. . . . We agree with Deputy
Commissioner Cummins that such additional
repair costs are not the reasonable and
necessary responsibility of the employer.
This instant claim demonstrates the
absurdity of the claimant's argument.
Although he demanded air conditioning
repairs on four vehicles, [claimant]
admitted at the hearing that he had expenses
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attributable only to three, but that he
might make a later claim for the fourth
vehicle. The award of medical benefits
deemed necessary by the Commission must be
balanced against a reasonableness standard
that compels the employer to pay for such
benefits. We agree with the Deputy
Commissioner that the employer should be
liable only for the cost of air conditioning
repairs to the claimant's 1989 Plymouth
Voyager, and also that the employer should
be allowed to determine the necessity and
reasonableness of future repairs before such
costs are incurred.
The commission further held that employer was liable to
reimburse claimant in the amount of $942.90, which constituted
the cost of a June 4, 1996 air conditioning repair to the 1989
Plymouth Voyager, less amounts already paid by employer and less
the cost of a state inspection of that vehicle.
In order to hold an employer liable for medical expenses
pursuant to Code § 65.2-603, claimant bore the burden of proving
that those expenses were reasonable, necessary, and causally
related to his compensable injury. Claimant presented no
evidence that air conditioning repairs to vehicles other than
his 1989 Plymouth Voyager were medically reasonable, necessary,
or causally related to his compensable injury by accident. 2
2
We note that claimant's argument that employer was
contractually obligated to reimburse him for the cost of air
conditioning repairs to four vehicles is without merit. Such a
contract, not approved by the commission, has no legal
significance under the Workers' Compensation Act. Rather,
employer's responsibility for medical expenses is judged under a
reasonableness standard pursuant to Code § 65.2-603.
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Accordingly, we cannot find as a matter of law that claimant's
evidence sustained his burden of proof.
II.
Claimant contends that the commission erred in refusing to
hold employer liable to reimburse him for interest, i.e.,
finance charges, and other "out-of-pocket" costs associated with
pursuing his claim. The Workers' Compensation Act does not
provide any basis for an award of such costs. Accordingly, the
commission did not err in denying claimant's request.
III.
The July 25, 1995 home air conditioning repair expenses
were addressed in the commission's January 5, 1996 opinion. In
that opinion, Deputy Commissioner Bruner found those home air
conditioning repair expenses noncompensable on the ground that
they were not medically necessary. The full commission affirmed
that opinion. Subsequently, this Court affirmed the
commission's opinion.
Res judicata applies "where there is a valid, personal
judgment obtained by a defendant on the merits of an action.
The judgment bars relitigation of the same cause of action, or
any part thereof which could have been litigated between the
same parties and their privies." K & L Trucking Co. v. Thurber,
1 Va. App. 213, 219, 337 S.E.2d 299, 302 (1985). Because the
issue of employer's liability for the cost of the July 25, 1995
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home air conditioning expenses was previously decided against
claimant and in favor of employer, the commission did not err in
ruling that claimant could not seek to relitigate that issue.
Thus, the commission properly denied claimant's request for
reimbursement for the July 25, 1995 home air conditioning
expenses as barred by the doctrine of res judicata.
IV.
In ruling upon claimant's request for mileage
reimbursement, the commission found as follows:
[C]laimant's evidence did not limit his
travel to direct routes to/from medical
treatment or repair facilities. There was
therefore no basis to assess travel costs
against the employer, since the claimant
essentially declined to present such
evidence of reasonable travel, but only
evidence of travel that was presumably
inflated. The Deputy Commissioner
acknowledged payment by the employer for
some mileage, and she limited Carter's
recovery for such reimbursement to amounts
already paid. We find on review that this
was a reasonable accommodation to inaccurate
mileage evidence offered by the claimant.
The record amply supports the commission's findings. In
light of the reasonableness standard applicable to this issue,
we cannot say as a matter of law that claimant's evidence proved
that employer was liable to reimburse him for any mileage
expenses other than those it had already paid. 3
3
In affirming the commission's ruling on this issue, we
cannot consider any evidence that was not properly before the
commission when it rendered its decision.
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For these reasons, we affirm the commission's decision. 4
Affirmed.
4
Appellant has filed a motion that appellee's brief not be
considered by the Court. Appellee has filed a motion to dismiss
the appeal. We deny both motions.
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