Robert M. McCombs v. Rosemary M. McCombs ( 1999 )


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  •                          COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judge Bray, Senior Judges Baker and Overton *
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    ROBERT M. McCOMBS
    MEMORANDUM OPINION**
    v.              Record No. 0341-98-1              PER CURIAM
    FEBRUARY 2, 1999
    ROSEMARY M. McCOMBS
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF VIRGINIA BEACH
    A. Bonwill Shockley, Judge
    Reeves W. Mahoney (Timothy M. Richardson;
    Huff, Poole & Mahoney, P.C., on briefs), for
    appellant.
    Kenneth W. Stolle (Bennett & Stolle, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    Relying upon the terms of a "Stipulation Agreement" with his
    former wife, Rosemary M. McCombs (wife), Robert M. McCombs
    (husband) moved the trial court to deny wife earnings which
    accrued on her undistributed share of husband's "retirement
    accounts" after the agreed valuation date.        The court determined
    that the agreement allotted wife a settled share of the subject
    1
    accounts "based on a valuation date of January 1, 1994,"
    together with "the dividends and any interest on [wife's] portion
    *
    Judge Overton participated in the hearing and decision of
    this case prior to the effective date of his retirement on
    January 31, 1999 and thereafter by his designation as a senior
    judge   pursuant   to   Code   § 17.1-401,   recodifying   Code
    § 17-116.01:1.
    **
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    1
    Contrary to the recitation in the disputed order, the
    agreement provides, "as valued on January 1, 1994."
    . . . [which] shall accrue from [that date] forward."    Husband
    appeals, contending that the ruling departs from the terms of the
    agreement.   We agree, and reverse the order.
    When called upon to construe property settlement agreements,
    "our threshold inquiry is whether their terms are ambiguous."
    Smith v. Smith, 
    3 Va. App. 510
    , 513, 
    351 S.E.2d 593
    , 595 (1986).
    "[A]mbiguity exists when [the] language admits of being
    understood in more than one way or refers to two or more things
    at the same time."    Id. (citations omitted).   Although the
    parties to an agreement "may advance different interpretations of
    the provisions . . ., this 'does not necessarily imply the
    existence of ambiguity where there otherwise is none.'"     Douglas
    v. Hammett, 
    28 Va. App. 517
    , 523, 
    507 S.E.2d 98
    , 101 (1998)
    (citation omitted).
    Absent ambiguity, the rights of the parties are determined
    by the language of the agreement, applied consistent with
    "ordinary meaning" and without judicial revision.     Smith, 3 Va.
    App. at 514, 351 S.E.2d at 595.   The "meaning and effect" of an
    unambiguous agreement "are questions of law to be determined by
    the court," and "we are not bound by [a] trial court's
    construction of . . . contract provisions . . . in issue."
    Tiffany v. Tiffany, 
    1 Va. App. 11
    , 15, 
    332 S.E.2d 796
    , 799
    (1985).
    Here, at the outset, we find no ambiguity in those
    provisions of the agreement in issue.   The language expressly
    - 2 -
    provides for the transfer of "[f]ifty percent (50%) of husband's
    retirement accounts . . . as valued on January 1, 1994," to
    wife. 2   "[S]egregat[ion] in a separate account . . . for wife"
    was to occur "as soon as possible after entry of a final divorce
    decree and . . . [Q.D.R.O.] prepared by wife's counsel."    Such
    language clearly manifests the intent of the parties that wife
    later receive one-half of the aggregate value of the subject
    accounts as determined on January 1, 1994, a date which preceded
    the agreement by nearly two years, without mention of
    subsequently accrued earnings.
    The parties, therefore, did not contemplate the inclusion of
    dividends and interest on wife's share.    They simply agreed upon
    an uncomplicated formula which permitted each to
    contemporaneously and precisely determine their respective
    benefits and burdens relative to the accounts, thereby promoting
    a mutually acceptable and expeditious resolution of differences.
    Accordingly, we reverse the disputed order and remand the
    proceedings to the trial court for further disposition consistent
    2
    Retirement Accounts: As an obligation which
    shall not be dischargeable in bankruptcy,
    Wife shall receive Fifty percent (50%) of
    Husband's retirement accounts at Eastern
    Virginia Medical School . . . as valued on
    January 1, 1994 which shall be "rolled over"
    or separated or segregated into a separate
    account or accounts for Wife as soon as
    possible after entry of a final divorce
    decree and a Qualified Domestic Relations
    Order ("Q.R.D.O.") prepared by Wife's counsel
    and endorsed by Husband's counsel.
    - 3 -
    with this opinion.
    Reversed and remanded.
    - 4 -
    

Document Info

Docket Number: 0341981

Filed Date: 2/2/1999

Precedential Status: Non-Precedential

Modified Date: 10/30/2014