Farid Sediqi v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )


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  •                      COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Annunziata, Lemons and Senior Judge Hodges
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    FARID SEDIQI
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.           Record No. 1550-97-4          JUDGE DONALD W. LEMONS
    JANUARY 12, 1999
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF ALEXANDRIA
    Donald M. Haddock, Judge
    Joseph J. McCarthy (Delaney, McCarthy,
    Colton & Botzin, P.C., on briefs), for
    appellant.
    Eugene Murphy, Assistant Attorney General
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee.
    Farid Sediqi appeals his conviction for aggravated malicious
    wounding, a violation of Code § 18.2-51.2.      On appeal, he argues
    that the trial court erred in refusing to grant his motion for a
    new trial.    Because we hold that the trial court committed no
    error, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On September 2, 1996, Mohammad Riaz, the victim, left the
    home that he shared with his wife, Rubina Riaz, to meet his
    girlfriend, Najlah Sediqi, in the stairwell of her apartment
    building.    Riaz testified that while he was seated with Najlah,
    he saw her two brothers, Farid Sediqi ("Farid"), the appellant,
    and Mohammad Haroon Sediqi, enter the stairwell and attack him
    *
    Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    with steel pipes, 12 to 20 inches in length.   Riaz was struck in
    the head until he lost consciousness.    He sustained a total of 15
    lacerations to his head and face that required more than 100
    stitches.   The doctor who treated the victim testified that his
    upper body was "totally purple" across the back of his shoulders
    and neck.
    The Sediqi brothers were tried together on February 4, 1997,
    without a jury.   At trial, Riaz was the only witness to identify
    the brothers as his attackers.    Rubina Riaz testified that she
    was aware of the relationship between her husband and Najlah and
    that she knew that her husband was on his way to meet her on the
    night of the attack.    Her testimony revealed that Rubina Riaz had
    two brothers who lived in Northern Virginia.   On February 5,
    1997, the court found both Farid and his brother guilty of
    aggravated malicious wounding.
    On May 29, 1997, the trial court heard the codefendants'
    joint motion for a new trial based on the claim of newly
    discovered evidence.    At the hearing, Abdullah John Allouzai
    ("John Allouzai") testified that he had spoken with Riaz on
    October 31, 1996.   John Allouzai admitted that he approached Riaz
    pursuant to a request by the "elderlies," leaders of the Afghan
    community in Northern Virginia.    John Allouzai stated that Riaz
    told him during their meeting that he had not seen the persons
    who had attacked him.   John Allouzai testified that Riaz told him
    that, although he had not actually seen his attackers, he thought
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    that it was Najlah's brother "because she was the only one who
    knew to meet me at the stairway."    John Allouzai also testified
    that "when elderlies say something to you, you often -- 99.9
    percent of the time you support that, and you listen to that."
    John Allouzai admitted that he suggested to Riaz that he accept a
    financial settlement from Farid and his brother.
    At the same hearing on the joint motion, Jobib Allouzai,
    John Allouzai's brother and Riaz's friend, testified that Riaz
    "usually says that he knows who attacked him."    Riaz testified at
    the hearing that John Allouzai approached him and suggested that
    the case should be settled out of court for money.    Riaz stated
    further that he never told John Allouzai he had not seen the men
    who had attacked him.    The court ruled that:   (1) the Sediqis
    could have discovered John Allouzai's testimony through due
    diligence; (2) the evidence was not credible; and (3) it would
    not have affected the outcome of the trial.
    MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL
    On appeal, Farid argues that the trial court erred in
    refusing to grant his motion for a new trial.
    Motions for new trials based on
    after-discovered evidence are addressed to
    the sound discretion of the trial judge, are
    not looked upon with favor, are considered
    with special care and caution, and are
    awarded with great reluctance. . . . The
    applicant bears the burden to establish that
    the evidence (1) appears to have been
    discovered subsequent to trial; (2) could not
    have been secured for use at trial; (3) is
    not merely cumulative, corroborative or
    collateral; and (4) is material, and such as
    should produce opposite results on the merits
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    at another trial.
    Stockton v. Commonwealth, 
    227 Va. 124
    , 149, 
    314 S.E.2d 371
    , 387
    (1984) (citation omitted).
    On March 27, 1997, at the first scheduled sentencing
    hearing, Farid and Mohammed Sediqi requested a continuance,
    alleging that they had discovered a new witness who could testify
    that Riaz had told different versions of who had attacked him.
    The court granted the continuance.     On April 30, 1997, Mohammed
    Sediqi filed a Motion for a New Trial. 1   Farid adopted his
    brother's motion.   On May 29, 1997, a hearing was held.
    In its analysis of the motion for a new trial, the trial
    court did not state whether it found that John Allouzai's
    testimony was discovered subsequent to trial.    The trial court
    did find that Farid failed to show that the evidence could not
    have been secured for use at his trial through the exercise of
    reasonable diligence.
    [A] party who seeks a new trial on the ground
    of after-discovered evidence must show that
    he used reasonable diligence to secure such
    evidence before the earlier trial. It is not
    sufficient merely to say that the evidence
    could not have been discovered by the use of
    due diligence. The applicant for a new trial
    must set forth in affidavits facts showing
    what his efforts were to obtain the evidence
    and explaining why he was prevented from
    securing it.
    Yarborough v. Commonwealth, 
    15 Va. App. 638
    , 646, 
    426 S.E.2d 131
    ,
    1
    Mohammad Haroon Sediqui's appeal on the identical issue was
    denied by order of this Court dated March 20, 1998.
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    136 (1993) (citation omitted).
    Farid maintains that he did not know John Allouzai prior to
    his trial.   He argues that in order to secure this evidence for
    use at his trial, he would have had to interview "approximately
    7,000 Afghan families in the Northern Virginia area alone."     He
    contends that such efforts would have exceeded the scope of
    reasonable diligence.
    However, John Allouzai met with Riaz in an attempt to settle
    the matter on October 31, 1996, three months prior to his trial.
    Farid concedes that his own father was present when the elders
    approached John Allouzai to request that he meet with Riaz.
    Under the circumstances, the trial judge was entitled to reject
    Farid's claim that he could not have discovered John Allouzai's
    testimony before his trial with the exercise of reasonable
    diligence.   In addition, Farid failed to present evidence to the
    trial court setting forth his efforts to obtain the evidence, and
    explaining why he was prevented from obtaining it.
    The nature of John Allouzai's testimony served to undermine
    Riaz's identification of the Sediqi brothers as his attackers.
    "However, newly discovered evidence which merely discredits,
    contradicts, or generally impeaches a witness is not a basis for
    granting a new trial."   Mundy v. Commonwealth, 
    11 Va. App. 461
    ,
    481, 
    390 S.E.2d 525
    , 536 (1990).    Because his testimony was
    intended only to impeach Riaz's testimony, the court correctly
    determined that it was an insufficient basis for granting a new
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    trial.
    The trial court also found that the new evidence was not
    material.    "Before setting aside a verdict, the trial court must
    have evidence before it to show in a clear and convincing manner
    'as to leave no room for doubt' that the after-discovered
    evidence, if true would produce a different result at another
    trial."   Carter v. Commonwealth, 
    10 Va. App. 507
    , 513, 
    393 S.E.2d 639
    , 642 (1990) (citation omitted).     Here, the court weighed the
    evidence presented at the hearing, and determined that the
    outcome would not have been different if the evidence had been
    presented at trial.
    At trial, Riaz positively identified Farid Sediqi and his
    brother as his attackers.    The evidence showed that at the time
    of the beating, Riaz, a married man, was having a relationship
    with the Sediqi brothers' sister.   At the hearing on the joint
    motion for a new trial, John Allouzai testified that Riaz told
    him that he could not positively identify his assailants.    At the
    same hearing, Riaz again identified Farid and his brother as his
    attackers.   Jobib Allouzai also testified that Riaz "says he
    knows who attacked him."    Unlike Riaz, John Allouzai was not an
    eyewitness to the beating.
    Although the trial judge denied the motion for a new trial,
    the court nonetheless treated it as a motion to reopen the
    evidence.    The judge, as the fact finder in the first trial,
    considered the evidence, found that it was not credible, and
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    affirmed the conviction of the Sediqi brothers.   In summarizing
    the "new" evidence presented at the hearing, the court stated,
    only [one] fellow who comes forward and says,
    well, on Halloween he told me that he didn't
    really see it, and this is in the posture of
    a negotiation to keep this thing under lid
    within the Afghan community and not to bring
    it before the civil authorities . . . [and] I
    don't believe it affects the outcome in any
    way, shape or form in the mind of this fact
    finder, who was, in fact, the fact finder in
    the trial.
    Because we agree with the trial court that Farid Sediqi
    failed to meet the requirements necessary to grant a new trial
    based upon after-discovered evidence, we affirm his conviction.
    Affirmed.
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