Dana Michele Copeland, s/k/a, etc. v. Commonwealth ( 1999 )

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: Judges Bray, Frank and Senior Judge Baker
Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
DANA MICHELE COPELAND, s/k/a
DANA MICHELLE COPELAND
MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
v. Record No. 1851-98-2 JUDGE RICHARD S. BRAY
JUNE 29, 1999
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF HENRICO COUNTY
Buford M. Parsons, Judge
Robert P. Geary for appellant.
Leah A. Darron, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Donald E.
Jeffrey, III, on brief), for appellee.
Dana Michele Copeland (defendant) was convicted in a bench
trial of forgery, a violation of Code § 18.2-172. Defendant
complains on appeal that the Commonwealth failed to establish
that Henrico County was the proper venue for prosecution of the
offense. We agree and reverse the conviction.
The parties are fully conversant with the record, and this
memorandum opinion recites only those facts necessary to a
disposition of the appeal.
On January 13, 1998, Henrico County Police Officer
Thomas J. O’Keefe was “dispatched . . . on [a] forgery in
*
Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
progress” at a Ukrops market located in Henrico. Upon arrival,
O’Keefe identified defendant and a male companion from
descriptions provided by radio message, and he approached the
couple. Defendant immediately “took off running,” with O’Keefe
in pursuit, and was apprehended approximately two blocks from
the scene. O’Keefe returned defendant to the store, and, after
being advised of her “Miranda rights,” she confessed to “passing
what she believed to be a bad check.” O’Keefe subsequently
searched defendant’s pocketbook and “found another [forged]
check, check 0337, which [defendant] stated . . . that she
attempted to pass at the Food Lion Store but the clerk would not
accept it and she took the check and left.”
At trial, defendant moved to strike the evidence relating
to the forgery of check 0337, arguing that the Commonwealth had
failed to prove that the offense was committed in Henrico
County. The court overruled the motion and convicted defendant
of the offense, resulting in this appeal.
Forgery is “‘the fraudulent making of a false writing,
which, if genuine, would be apparently of legal efficacy.’”
Muhammad v. Commonwealth, 13 Va. App. 194, 196, 409 S.E.2d 818,
819 (1991) (citations omitted). Prosecution for the crime may
be undertaken “in any county or city where the writing was
forged, or where the same was used or passed, or attempted to be
used or passed, or deposited or placed with another person,
firm, association, or corporation either for collection or
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credit.” Code § 19.2-245.1; see Code § 19.2-244. “To prove
venue, the Commonwealth must produce evidence sufficient to give
rise to a ‘strong presumption’ that the offense was committed
within the jurisdiction of the court, and this may be
accomplished by either direct or circumstantial evidence.”
Cheng v. Commonwealth, 240 Va. 26, 36, 393 S.E.2d 599, 604
(1990) (citations omitted); see Pollard v. Commonwealth, 220 Va.
723, 725, 261 S.E.2d 328, 330 (1980).
When reviewing venue on appeal, we must “determine ‘whether
the evidence, when viewed in the light most favorable to the
Commonwealth, is sufficient to support the trial court’s
findings.’” Foster-Zahid v. Commonwealth, 23 Va. App. 430, 442,
477 S.E.2d 759, 765 (1996) (citation omitted).
The instant record established only that defendant
possessed a forged check in Henrico County after previously
attempting to “pass” the instrument at an unspecified Food Lion.
The evidence abandons to conjecture the actual situs of the
forgery or location of the Food Lion. See Pollard, 220 Va. at
726, 261 S.E.2d at 330 (evidence “that a City employee possessed
outside the City stolen City property which originally had been
assigned to a City vehicle” held “wholly inadequate” to prove
venue). Thus, the Commonwealth clearly failed to established
the requisite venue in Henrico County.
Accordingly, we reverse the conviction. However, because
the “error did not stem from evidentiary insufficiency with
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respect to [defendant’s] guilt or innocence,” we remand for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion, if the
Commonwealth be so advised. Id. (citation omitted).
Reversed and remanded.
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