Calvary Memorial Park, Inc., etc.v VEC & Francone ( 1999 )


Menu:
  •                   COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Elder and Bumgardner
    Argued at Alexandria, Virginia
    CALVARY MEMORIAL PARK, INC.,
    T/A FAIRFAX MEMORIAL PARK
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1730-98-4               JUDGE SAM W. COLEMAN III
    JUNE 29, 1999
    VIRGINIA EMPLOYMENT COMMISSION and
    CHRISANTHE FRANCONE
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    J. Howe Brown, Jr., Judge
    Michael H. Doherty (Holmes, Rosenberg &
    Doherty, P.C., on briefs), for appellant.
    Gaye Lynn Taxey, Assistant Attorney General;
    Andrew B. Golkow (Mark L. Earley, Attorney
    General; William A. Diamond, Assistant
    Attorney General; Rees, Broome & Diaz, P.C.,
    on briefs), for appellees.
    Calvary Memorial Park, Inc. (Calvary) appeals the circuit
    court order affirming the Virginia Employment Commission's (VEC)
    award of unemployment benefits to Chrisanthe Francone.   Calvary
    asserts that Francone was disqualified by virtue of Code
    § 60.2-618(2) from receiving unemployment benefits because she was
    discharged from her employment for misconduct.   Calvary argues
    that the evidence did not support the VEC's findings of fact and
    *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    that the VEC's decision was contrary to the law.    Finding no
    error, we affirm.
    BACKGROUND
    On appeal, we consider the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the finding of the commission.    See Wells Fargo Alarm
    Services, Inc. v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 
    24 Va. App. 377
    ,
    383, 
    482 S.E.2d 841
    , 844 (1997).
    So viewed, the evidence established that Francone worked as a
    family services counselor selling burial plots for Calvary.
    Calvary paid Francone by commissions earned from "pre-need" burial
    plot sales.   A "pre-need" sale refers to the sale of a plot to a
    customer for future use.   On "pre-need" sales, the customer
    received a 10 percent discount on the cost of the plot and the
    family service counselor earned an 18 percent commission.    An
    "at-need" sale refers to the sale of a plot to a customer for
    immediate interment.   On "at-need" sales, the customer received no
    discount and the family service counselor earned no commission.
    Francone had frequently expressed disagreement with Calvary over
    its refusal to pay commissions on "at-need" sales.
    Houng Ly spoke with Francone about buying a plot from Calvary
    to bury his recently-deceased sister.     Francone referred Ly to
    - 2 -
    family service counselor Patricia Farmer.1   Ly already owned two
    adjacent plots at Calvary but wanted to reserve those plots for
    burial of his parents.    There were no available plots adjacent to
    Ly's pre-owned plots.
    The contract of sale expressly permitted Ly to exchange and
    receive credit for the value of the two pre-owned plots against
    any plots of equal or greater value.    However, rather than
    exchange a plot, Ly wanted to retain the plots he owned.
    Therefore, Ly purchased a non-adjacent plot in which to bury his
    sister.   Farmer drafted the contract as an "at-need" sale.
    Later that day, Francone saw the Ly contract and suggested to
    Farmer that the transaction should have been treated as a
    "pre-need" sale by allowing Ly to exchange one of his existing
    plots for a plot for his sister and then allowing Ly to repurchase
    the original plot.    This would entitle Ly to a discount on his
    purchase and would entitle Francone to a commission on her sale.
    Farmer replied that Francone's proposal was not the correct way to
    structure the sale.    Francone discussed the matter with another
    family services counselor.   They concluded that the sale could be
    treated as "pre-need."
    1
    The family service counselors work on a rotating schedule.
    Each day one counselor receives all the commissions from the
    business transacted that day. Thus, although Farmer completed
    Ly’s paperwork, any commission from that sale belonged to
    Francone.
    - 3 -
    Francone contacted Ly and had him return to Calvary to revise
    the contract.    With Ly's approval, Francone restructured the
    agreement so that Ly exchanged one of his existing burial plots
    for his sister's new plot.    Francone then resold to Ly the burial
    plot that he had exchanged, which resulted in a discount for Ly
    and a commission for Francone.
    Francone submitted the revised contract to Calvary.    When
    Calvary's president discovered the Ly contract, he discharged
    Francone for violating a company rule and for defrauding the
    company.   Calvary asserts that the rule is stated in the
    employment contract which expressly provides that commissions and
    discounts are paid only on "pre-need" sales and not on "at-need"
    sales.
    Although its policies allowed customers credit for the value
    of pre-owned burial plots exchanged for plots of the same or
    greater value, the policies necessarily did not allow the type of
    transaction in which Francone engaged.    Calvary had neither a
    progressive disciplinary process nor an employee handbook that
    expressly proscribed such procedures.
    ANALYSIS
    Code § 60.2-618(2) disqualifies a claimant from receiving
    unemployment benefits when discharged for misconduct connected
    with work.
    [A]n employee is guilty of "misconduct
    connected with his work" when he
    deliberately violates a company rule
    - 4 -
    reasonably designed to protect the
    legitimate business interests of his
    employer, or when his acts or omissions are
    of such a nature or so recurrent as to
    manifest a willful disregard of those
    interests and the duties and obligations he
    owes his employer.
    Branch v. Virginia Employment Comm'n, 
    219 Va. 609
    , 611, 
    249 S.E.2d 180
    , 182 (1978).
    The statutory term "misconduct" should not
    be so literally construed so as to effect a
    forfeiture of benefits by an employee except
    in clear instances; rather the term should
    be construed in a manner least favorable to
    working a forfeiture so as to minimize the
    penal character of the provision by
    excluding cases not clearly intended to be
    within the exception.
    Kennedy's Piggly Wiggly Stores, Inc. v. Cooper, 
    14 Va. App. 701
    ,
    707-08, 
    419 S.E.2d 278
    , 282 (1992) (quoting 76 Am. Jur. 2d
    Unemployment Compensation § 77 (1992)).
    "[T]he findings of the Commission as to the facts, if
    supported by the evidence and in the absence of fraud, shall be
    conclusive, and the jurisdiction of the court shall be confined
    to questions of law."   Code § 60.2-625; see Lee v. Virginia
    Employment Comm'n, 
    1 Va. App. 82
    , 85, 
    335 S.E.2d 104
    , 106
    (1985).   However, whether an employee's conduct constitutes
    misconduct is a mixed question of law and fact.   See Israel v.
    Virginia Employment Comm'n, 
    7 Va. App. 169
    , 172, 
    372 S.E.2d 207
    ,
    209 (1988).
    - 5 -
    The evidence supports the VEC's finding that Calvary had
    no rule prohibiting the transaction that Francone structured for
    Ly.   Although Calvary's administrator and Farmer testified that
    Francone's transaction violated the sales staff's professional
    standards, neither identified a rule that prohibited Francone's
    action or would have put Francone on notice that the Ly contract
    was prohibited by the cemetery's policy.    Although Francone's
    employment contract provided that she would not receive a
    commission for "at-need" sales, the employment contract did not
    explicitly proscribe or prohibit the transaction.    In fact, by
    providing for a customer discount and sales commission for
    "pre-need" sales, the contract encouraged sales persons to
    structure sales, if possible, as "pre-need" sales.
    Additionally, Calvary acknowledged that Ly could have
    purchased a third plot as a "pre-need" sale if he had buried his
    sister in one of the pre-owned plots, even though the purchase
    was being made to accommodate an immediate need for a burial
    plot.    Calvary also conceded that had the exchange taken place
    on one day and the repurchase have taken place on the next day,
    it would not have considered the transaction a violation of its
    policy.    For the foregoing reasons, we find that the VEC did not
    err in ruling that Francone did not "deliberately violate[] a
    company rule."     See Branch, 
    219 Va. at 611
    , 249 S.E.2d at 182.
    - 6 -
    Having determined that Francone did not deliberately violate
    Calvary's rule, our consideration turns to whether Francone's
    actions manifested a willful disregard of Calvary's best interests
    and the duties that Francone owed Calvary.   See Kennedy's Piggly
    Wiggly, 14 Va. App. at 705, 
    419 S.E.2d at 281
    .   By awarding
    commissions on "pre-need" sales, and by making "pre-need" sales
    advantageous to customers, Calvary created incentives for
    counselors to make "pre-need" sales which would benefit both the
    customer and family service counselors.   In this situation, the
    type of transaction Francone executed was reasonably foreseeable.
    Calvary adopted no rule and had made no express effort to forbid
    it.   Ly had already purchased two plots from Calvary and approved
    of Francone's revision of the contract governing his acquisition
    of a third plot.   Although Francone restructured the sale to
    maximize her own benefit, the restructuring also benefited a
    valued client.   Under these circumstances, we cannot say as a
    matter of law, that Francone willfully disregarded her employer's
    interests.
    Accordingly, we uphold the VEC's ruling that Francone was
    not terminated for misconduct, and we affirm the judgment of the
    trial court.
    Affirmed.
    - 7 -