Richard N. Smull v. Karen W. Smull ( 1999 )


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  •                        COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Benton, Willis and Senior Judge Cole
    Argued at Richmond, Virginia
    RICHARD N. SMULL
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1308-98-4               JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR.
    JULY 20, 1999
    KAREN W. SMULL
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF FAIRFAX COUNTY
    M. Langhorne Keith, Judge
    David L. Duff (David L. Duff, P.C., on
    brief), for appellant.
    Stefan C. Long (Stefan C. Long, P.C., on
    brief), for appellee.
    On appeal from the denial of his motion to reduce his
    spousal support obligation, Richard N. Smull contends that the
    trial court erred (1) in requiring him to prove that no jobs
    were available in his career field, and (2) in awarding to Karen
    W. Smull all of her costs and attorney's fees.     We affirm the
    judgment of the trial court.
    I.     MOTION FOR SPOUSAL SUPPORT REDUCTION
    Richard and Karen Smull were divorced on March 7, 1988.       On
    March 12, 1998, Richard moved for a reduction in his spousal
    support obligation, asserting that he had experienced a material
    change in circumstances warranting a reduction in the support
    *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    required by the divorce decree.   The trial court denied the
    reduction and denied Richard's motion for reconsideration.
    A party seeking to modify spousal support is "required to
    prove both a material change in circumstances and that this
    change warrants a modification of support."   Schoenwetter v.
    Schoenwetter, 
    8 Va. App. 601
    , 605, 
    383 S.E.2d 28
    , 30 (1989).
    As we further noted in Hammers [v. Hammers,
    
    216 Va. 30
    , 
    216 S.E.2d 20
     (1975)], a party
    seeking a reduction in support payments has
    additional burdens: "[H]e must make a full
    and clear disclosure relating to his ability
    to pay. He must also show that his lack of
    ability to pay is not due to his own
    voluntary act or because of his neglect."
    Edwards v. Lowery, 
    232 Va. 110
    , 112-13, 
    348 S.E.2d 259
    , 260
    (1986) (citation omitted).
    "When a trial court hears evidence ore tenus, its findings
    are entitled to the same weight of a jury verdict, and will not
    be disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence
    to support them."   Floyd v. Floyd, 
    1 Va. App. 42
    , 45, 
    333 S.E.2d 364
    , 366 (1985).
    After retiring from the Air Force just before the divorce,
    Richard found employment at Systems Planning Corporation
    ("SPC"), where his primary duty was to act as a liaison to the
    Taiwan Economic Relations Office.   After a downturn in the Asian
    economy, the Taiwanese Office modified its contract with SPC
    from a retainer to an "as needed" basis.   As a result, Richard's
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    hours at SPC, and his income from that organization, were
    greatly reduced.
    Around the same time, Richard began working as a wine
    wholesaler in a business managed by his current wife.   When his
    hours at SPC were reduced, he began spending more time at the
    wholesale wine venture, which produced much less income.    The
    trial court found that Richard had made no effort to secure
    employment other than by SPC in his professional field and that
    his decision to devote his time to the lower paying wine
    wholesaling enterprise was voluntary.   Thus, his reduction in
    income did not require a corresponding reduction in his spousal
    support obligation.   See Dept. of Social Services v. Ewing, 
    22 Va. App. 466
    , 470-73, 
    470 S.E.2d 608
    , 610-13 (1996).
    Richard argues that the trial court erroneously required
    him to prove that no jobs were available within his professional
    field.   The record does not support this contention.   At the
    hearing, Richard produced no evidence that he had sought work in
    his field.   He produced only the testimony of his supervisor at
    SPC, who stated that no more work was available for Richard at
    that firm.   Richard made no attempt to find work in his
    professional field beyond a single employer, SPC.   The trial
    court did not err in requiring proof of a greater effort.
    II.   COSTS AND FEES
    An award of attorney's fees and costs is a matter submitted
    to the sound discretion of the trial court and will be overruled
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    on appeal only for an abuse of discretion.   See Graves v.
    Graves, 
    4 Va. App. 326
    , 333, 
    357 S.E.2d 554
    , 558 (1987).     "We
    have said that 'the key to a proper award of counsel fees . . .
    [is] reasonableness under all of the circumstances revealed by
    the record.'"   Westbrook v. Westbrook, 
    5 Va. App. 446
    , 458, 
    364 S.E.2d 523
    , 530 (1988).
    Richard initiated these proceedings by his motion to reduce
    spousal support.   The trial court denied that motion.   The trial
    court took into account the relative financial circumstances of
    the parties and determined that Richard should pay Karen's fees
    and costs.   Sufficient evidence in the record supports this
    decision.
    The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
    Affirmed.
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