Michael Wilkerson v. Commonwealth of Virginia ( 1999 )


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  •                     COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
    Present: Judges Coleman, Annunziata and Bumgardner
    Argued at Norfolk, Virginia
    MICHAEL WILKERSON
    MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY
    v.   Record No. 1286-98-1             JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
    JUNE 8, 1999
    COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
    FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF SOUTHHAMPTON COUNTY
    Rodham T. Delk, Jr., Judge
    (Robert E. O'Neill; Office of the Public
    Defender, on brief), for appellant.
    Appellant submitting on brief.
    (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General; Richard B.
    Smith, Assistant Attorney General, on brief),
    for appellee. Appellee submitting on brief.
    Michael Wilkerson appeals his conviction after a bench
    trial of two counts of petit larceny, third offense.     The
    defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence.
    Concluding that the evidence was sufficient to sustain the
    convictions, we affirm.
    On appeal, we review the evidence in the light most
    favorable to the Commonwealth, granting to it all reasonable
    inferences fairly deducible therefrom.   See Archer v.
    Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 1
    , 11, 
    492 S.E.2d 826
    , 831 (1997).   In
    so doing, we must discard the evidence of the accused in
    *Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code § 17-116.010,
    this opinion is not designated for publication.
    conflict with that of the Commonwealth.     See Cirios v.
    Commonwealth, 
    7 Va. App. 292
    , 295, 
    373 S.E.2d 164
    , 165 (1988).
    A Franklin County detective was patrolling on August 13,
    1997 at 6:30 p.m., a clear and sunny day.    He passed the
    defendant, who was riding a bicycle and carrying a grocery bag
    that “looked to be somewhat heavy.”    The detective made eye
    contact with the defendant as they passed and continued to watch
    the defendant in his rearview mirror.   The defendant turned
    twice to look back at the detective.    When the detective turned
    the corner, the defendant dropped the grocery bag into the ditch
    at the side of the road.   He “leaned down, came to a stop on the
    bicycle, laid the item down and he was looking back towards [the
    detective] and he . . . proceeded to go forward again.”      The
    defendant then continued down the road toward the Winn Dixie
    store.
    The detective turned and went back, following the defendant
    whom he again passed in the Winn Dixie parking lot.    The
    defendant spent two or three minutes at a pay phone.    He then
    left the parking lot headed away from the detective and the
    discarded grocery bag.   The detective got out of his car and
    walked back toward the grocery bag.    As he did, the defendant
    was “peddling pretty fast.”   The detective retrieved the bag,
    which was a plastic Winn Dixie grocery bag, got back in his car,
    and caught up with the defendant, who had gotten about a quarter
    mile away.
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    As the detective approached, the defendant pulled over and
    got off his bicycle.    The detective asked him why he had dropped
    the bag full of steaks in the ditch.    The defendant denied
    knowing what he was talking about, denied the steaks were his,
    and denied ever having seen them.   The detective opened the bag
    while he talked with the defendant.     It contained four packages
    of Winn Dixie steaks and two packages of Super Fresh steaks but
    no receipt from either store.   The steaks were cold but not
    frozen.   The detective arrested the defendant when he denied
    that the steaks were his.   At no point did the defendant claim
    the steaks.
    Both the Super Fresh and Winn Dixie grocery stores were
    located in the area, and the managers of both identified the
    packages of steaks as coming from their particular stores.     The
    detective obtained from both stores cash register tapes showing
    all sales made within an hour and a half of the detective first
    seeing the defendant.   Neither tape showed a sale of the steaks,
    and no cashier had seen anyone fitting the description of the
    defendant.
    The defendant argues that the evidence is insufficient to
    prove larceny because it did not show when or how the steaks
    were removed from the store.    He contends that the
    Commonwealth’s case is comprised solely of the fact that the
    defendant was in possession of the steaks, but they could have
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    been displayed and sold earlier than the period accounted for by
    the store receipts.
    "[L]arceny is the taking and carrying away of the goods and
    chattels of another with intent to deprive the owner of the
    possession thereof permanently."    Lund v. Commonwealth, 
    217 Va. 688
    , 691, 
    232 S.E.2d 745
    , 748 (1977).   Evidence of possession of
    recently stolen goods “is prima facie evidence of guilt.”
    Hackney v. Commonwealth, 
    26 Va. App. 1
    59, 164, 
    493 S.E.2d 679
    ,
    681 (1997).    When this possession is unexplained or falsely
    explained, the fact finder may infer that the person in
    possession of the stolen goods was the thief.    See Montgomery v.
    Commonwealth, 
    221 Va. 188
    , 190, 
    269 S.E.2d 352
    , 353 (1980).
    “The inference derived from evidence of recent possession of
    stolen property may be enough, by itself, to support a
    conviction of larceny.”    Hackney, 26 Va. App. at 168-69, 493
    S.E.2d at 681 (citing Bright v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 248
    ,
    251, 
    356 S.E.2d 443
    , 444 (1987)).
    The detective saw the defendant in possession of property.
    The defendant discarded the bag in a ditch when he first saw the
    law enforcement officer and quickly rode away.   When the
    detective confronted the defendant, he denied throwing the bag
    away or ever seeing the steaks.    The bag was full of steaks but
    no receipts.   The steaks were still cold on a sunny day, in the
    middle of August, in Franklin County.   The managers could
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    identify the steaks as coming from their stores, but no receipt
    recorded their sale and no cashier recognized the defendant.
    This evidence permitted the inference that the defendant
    possessed recently stolen goods and that permitted the inference
    that he was the thief.    The inferences to be drawn from the
    evidence are solely within the province of the fact finder.      See
    LaPrade v. Commonwealth, 
    191 Va. 410
    , 418, 
    61 S.E.2d 313
    , 316
    (1950).   We will not substitute our judgment for that of the
    fact finder.    See Cable v. Commonwealth, 
    243 Va. 236
    , 239, 
    415 S.E.2d 218
    , 220 (1992).   The trial court's judgment will not be
    disturbed on appeal unless plainly wrong or without evidence to
    support it.    See Commonwealth v. Jenkins, 
    255 Va. 516
    , 520, 
    499 S.E.2d 263
    , 265 (1998).   The credibility of the witnesses and
    the weight to be accorded their testimony are matters solely for
    the fact finder who can accept or reject the testimony in whole
    or in part.    See Bridgeman v. Commonwealth, 
    3 Va. App. 523
    , 528,
    
    351 S.E.2d 598
    , 601 (1986).   Further, the fact finder is
    entitled to disbelieve the self-serving testimony of the accused
    and to conclude that the accused is lying to conceal his guilt.
    See Speight v. Commonwealth, 
    4 Va. App. 83
    , 88, 
    354 S.E.2d 95
    ,
    98 (1987) (en banc).
    For the foregoing reasons, we affirm the convictions.
    Affirmed.
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